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23 August 1985

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ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

SEVRES CONGRESS ENDS; CRITICIZES U.S., FRANCE, TURKEY, USSR

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 15 Jul 85 pp 1,4

[Text] As we reported in our Saturday's edition, the 3d Armenian Congress that has been in session in Sevres for a week continued its work Saturday to draft a new constitution. In a press conference on Friday, the Reverend James Karnuzian declared that the purpose of the constitution will be to unite all Armenian communities living in various countries under a broad-based roof.

During the press conference a statement was read condemning the United States for its Congress' refusal to endorse a resolution regarding April 24. Criticism was also leveled against France, which was charged with discrimination and accused of making preparations to deport French-Armenians involved in the Orly incident. The Ottoman Empire also received its share of criticism for having collaborated with the Young Turks.

The statement thanked the Soviet Union for preserving Armenian traditions and culture, but expressed regret that the Soviets do not acknowledge the damages suffered by Armenians in Turkey.

Our sister paper, CUMHURIYET, reports that during the deliberations of the congress, a number of youths handed out pamphlets of the Armenian National Unity Party. This party opposes the regime in Soviet Armenia, and the said pamphlet called for criticism of the Soviet Union.

Karnuzian said that this proposal was examined by the congress but the delegates did not approve it.

Karnuzian said: "We must keep silent on certain problems for the interests of the Armenian nation." He said that no tangible results emerged from a joint Armenian-Kurdish conference held in Bremen, FRG, recently. He added that a similar meeting will be held soon in the FRG.

The congress ended its deliberations late on Saturday and voted on the new constitution. The meeting ended with the election of new members to the Executive Council. It is reported that 20 articles were modified in the constitution submitted to the congress and that they were approved in their modified form. The constitution will be put in its final form and published in 3 months.

James Karnuzian was reelected as chairman of the Executive Council. At the conclusion of the congress, Karnuzian stated that delegates to the congress included extremists as well as moderates. He said:

"I share the views of the moderate elements who are calling for a civilized dialog with the Turks. I tried to find a compromise point to resolve differences of view among the delegates."

After the congress, Karnuzian and delegates attending the congress attended a reception given by Mayor Andre Santini of the city of Issy-les-Moulineaux.

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ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

PAPER CALLS FOR DONATIONS TO COUNTER TURKISH LOBBYING

Paris GAMK in Armenian & French 14-15 Jul 85 p 1

[Editorial: "The Enemy is Not Asleep; We Must Remain Alert"]

[Text] The activities that have been taking place in the anterooms of the European Parliament in recent months--naturally those regarding the recognition of the Armenian genocide which is what interests us--are highly significant.

Those who were on the scene to participate in the efforts to awaken the sympathies of the politically diverse European representatives for the recognition of the Armenian genocide, to clarify the issues and to deliver documented evidence or testimony of documentary value witnessed Turkish actions--which at times assumed improper or even vulgar proportions--against the Armenian nation, the Armenian cause, the Armenian demands, Armenian viewpoints and the evidence presented by the Armenians. The continual and feverish shuttling of a large group of Turkish and Turkish-paid "experts" working to distort history and to discredit undeniable historical evidence, the contacts made by Turkish delegates in the European Parliament, the permanent presence of a phalanx of Turkish representatives from every walk of life, the numerous multilingual propaganda publications distributed among the parliamentarians and the vast sums expended to keep such a large staff on the move signify Turkey's determination to foil the Armenian efforts at any cost and to prevent the European Parliament from officially recognizing that in 1915 Turkey perpetrated a preplanned genocide against the Armenian people.

Turkey is very sensitive about this issue because it knows that the official recognition of the Armenian genocide will be followed by more serious and politically more substantive demands which will open a new front and which will put the Turkish government under greater pressure.

Turkey is sensitive about this issue, and consequently it remains alert and vigilantly monitors Armenian moves at all times and everywhere.

Of course we know that we are right, but we must never have the illusion that the foreigners who will vote in favor of the Armenians will do so out of respect for Armenian rights. Their goal is to serve their own national, governmental, political, economic and party interests. They are concerned only with their own interests and not those of the Armenians. Having realized that, we see that what is being played out in the anterooms of the European

Parliament is a tug of war to win the attention of the foreigners and that the outcome of that contest will become evident only when the resolution is voted on. The winner of this tug of war will be the side which is more vigilant and which moves faster.

The UN Human Rights Commission has been trying for years to draft a report on genocide. Much time has been wasted on this report; there have been numerous delays and much ink has been shed. References related in one way or another to the Armenian genocide have played a major role in these delays. Article 30 of a report prepared by the commission was thrown into oblivion. A new agenda was decided upon to modify the report to make it acceptable to all members of the commission. Turkey, as always, showed a high degree of sensitivity to these delays and the drive to omit the Armenian genocide from the report and monitored the course of the events with great vigilance. Turkey brought all its ties and influence into play and spent enormous sums to prevent the endorsement of a resolution containing any mention of the Armenian genocide.

Today, the enemy remains awake as the UN Human Rights Commission prepares to begin its new session in Geneva where the genocide report is expected to be discussed. It monitors the course of events carefully; it has put its forces on the alert and it has opened its pocketbook in order to foil the efforts of the Armenian nation by its own means or through its proxies and friends.

Just as it has done in the European Parliament, Turkey has mobilized its forces against an issue that is highly important for the Armenian nation, its battle for the restoration of its rights and its future struggles. This means that a new tug of war will begin in the anterooms of the UN headquarters in Geneva, and, as we stated before, this tug of war will be won by the side which is more alert and which moves faster.

The efforts made by the forces dedicated to the resolution of the Armenian cause have always been made with the goal of a national triumph. This means that if we want to win--and we do--today, more than ever, we must remain alert, we must move swiftly, we must note every move of the enemy instantly and we must act to neutralize it.

In this battle, the flanks of the combat forces will be protected by the people--the masses which can impose their collective will on even the mightiest forces with their collective strength. Our nation must know that in the face of the large sums spent by the enemy even its few pennies are of great importance on the path to victory. Our people will display its collective will and its participation by opening up its pocketbook generously. Every Armenian must sacrifice, each in his or her own way. Material sacrifice is as important as moral sacrifice.

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ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

TURKISH COMMUNIST ATTITUDE TOWARD ARMENIAN QUESTION NOTED

Montreal HORIZON in Armenian 1 Jul 85 p 2

[Text] Although the Turkish Communist Party [TCP] has always been left out of the Turkish political process (it has been outlawed in every Turkish constitution since the time of Ataturk) and currently it is in a state of exile, it still does not dare to see the Armenian question in its entire reality. In a communique published on April 19, the TCP Central Committee hastily recalls the policies of Enver and Talat noting that they "had millions of Armenians and Turkish workers massacred." The communique then retreats behind the usual barrage of sloganeering and accuses the United States of being the dark hand behind Armenian terrorism charging that the Americans want to "spread terrorism into the socialist countries" and citing terrorist incidents in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

What is important, however, is that the Turkish communists appear to have acknowledged that the "regrettable incidents" of 1915 constituted a genocide. At least that is what one understands when they say: "On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Armenian genocide, the TCP calls on everyone to act with cool heads and to see the provocations of the United States."

But betraying its Turkish character, the TCP condemns "the dream of an independent Armenian state" and various separatist movements, "with which the United States wants to drown the concept of national independence in the vigilant minds of our people."

In view of their hostile stance toward the Turkish regime, one would expect that the Turkish communists would deviate from the course adopted by the Turkish government. But Turkish opposition to an independent Armenian state emerges even from beneath the veil of their leftism.

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

EGYPTIAN SCHOLAR DISCUSSES ARAB SOCIOLOGY

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 20-26 July 85 pp 65-66

/Interview with Dr Sa'd-al-Din Ibrahim, professor of sociology at the American University in Cairo, by 'Isa ibn Hisham: "Arab Sociologists Inadequate; Authoritarianism Dominates the Arab Family"; at a symposium held by the Center for Studies of Arab Unity, Amman, date not given/

/Text/ Dr Sa'd-al-Din Ibrahim, professor of sociology at the American University in Cairo, is one of the most prominent Arab sociologists. Within the field of this discipline, one which is growing rapidly among us, and which ought to grow more and more because of its importance, Dr Sa'd-al-Din Ibrahim has written numerous studies marked by insight and profound analysis.

AL-TADAMUN met Dr Sa'd-al-Din Ibrahim during a symposium held recently in Amman by the Center for Studies of Arab Unity under the title, "Preparing the Arab Man To Contribute to Science." Dr Sa'd-al-Din Ibrahim participated with an important paper on certain issues of Arab sociology in the area of the family and creativity.

AL-TADAMUN began the conversation with a question about whether we have anything that can scientifically be called "Arab sociology." The conversation then turned to issues connected with Arab society and to the researcher's observations on the subject.

/Question/ Do we have an Arab sociology? There are those who say that Arab sociologists have in the past neglected to study such things as conditions in Lebanon.

/Answer/ There is no Arab sociology in the full sense of the word. What there is is an effort toward an Arab sociology. Just as we are striving toward many things, so we are striving to realize or achieve an Arab sociology. In clarification, we have to say that sociology, as a science, has general methods and categories. What makes sociology what it is--and this holds true in all societies and across all civilizations and

cultures--is the nature of the problems which sociologists study, whether in one country or another. There are general concepts and categories in sociology, and these are accepted by all sociologists everywhere. What makes the discipline carried on by professors and students of sociology in the Arab world an Arab sociology is the project of describing and analyzing the internal structures of Arab society, either generally or locally.

Arab sociology, therefore, is not a /distinct/ science by virtue of its methods or theoretical categories; it is an Arab sociology by virtue of the content of the research questions and problems to which Arab sociologists and professors of sociology turn their attention. For example, there are general categories having to do with the state. What is significant is that Arab sociologists have to examine the forms and institutions of the state in the Arab world. They have to bring to light the extent of the state establishment's closeness to or remoteness from the social structure--i.e., the extent to which the state establishment and the structure of society keep pace with each other, and the extent to which the state embodies the true or actual nature of the society. There are questions such as cultural pluralism or dualism. Arab sociologists must give ample study to them and show the extent of this variety. They must study whether some of this variety will lead to struggle, conflict, and competition, or whether it will lead, or may lead, to harmony, renewal, enrichment, etc. They must apply themselves to studying Arab social and class formations. In all of these things, Arab sociologists have until now been inadequate. However, there are serious efforts to turn attention to these things and to study them without ideological dogmatism. Every Arab sociologist can have his political commitment and identity; but when he turns to the study of a question in his capacity as a sociologist, he must put on the objectivity--we do not say neutrality--of a sociologist and must use the discipline's methods and conceptual arsenal to analyze a particular Arab situation, so as to bring us closer to a better understanding of what is going on within us and around us.

/Question/ In your opinion, what are the immediate elements and the indirect factors, in the context of Arab society generally, and in the context of the family specifically, that might foster or hinder creative activity by Arab people?

/Answer/ The abundant literature about child-rearing and the family in the Arab world is mostly impressionistic and speculative; little of it is marked by a methodical scientific style. Hamid 'Ammar's study of growing up in an Egyptian village, which came out 30 years ago, remains the most complete and comprehensive of the studies of the subject in a methodical scientific manner. Next to it in importance is a collection of essays by the professors of the American University in Beirut on child-rearing methods in the northern part of the Arab East, especially Lebanon, in the three decades following Hamid 'Ammar's study. These and other studies did not concentrate directly on the subject of creativity. As for the impressionistic

and speculative studies, among the most important examples of them are Hisham Sharabi's study, "Introduction to the Study of Arab Society," and Father Henri Ayrout's book on the Egyptian peasant. Halim Barakat has produced a broad presentation of both sorts of study, as well as of the folk proverbs and works of literature and art that throw light on socialization within the Arab family, in his book on contemporary Arab society. Al-Sayyid Yasin has reviewed and criticized numerous speculative studies of the "Arab personality," both those written in Arabic and those in other languages, in a book by him bearing the same title. Among the foreign writings of a speculative character on the subject of the Arab family, child-rearing methods, and their relation to the Arab personality is the English orientalist Edward Lane's book, "Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians," which came out in the middle of the 19th century and left a deep impact by eliciting both disagreement and agreement. There is the Israeli orientalist Patai's book, "The Arab Mind," which came out after the 1967 defeat.

In most of these sources and in others, the picture of the Arab family appears with the following features. First, it is an extended family, not only in that related successive generations live together in the same residence and share the same source of support, but also in the existence of a network of relationships, interactions, commitments, rights, and duties. Notwithstanding the gradual shrinkage of the immediate material basis of the extended family, namely the single residence, the remaining concomitants of extendedness have remained in one form or another.

The second feature of this family is that it is patriarchal, not only in that the kinship basis is male, but also in terms of the authority structure and division of labor and roles within the family. Authority, status, and influence are pyramidal, beginning with the oldest of the males, and descending by degrees to the youngest of the females.

Third, it is a cohesive family, one characterized by solidarity, not only in that it is traditionally an economic, residential, and kinship organic unit, but also in that it is a defensive unit for the individual and the group in confrontation with other individuals, groups, and the external world, and in that it is a unit of psychological and social mutual support, one which guarantees its members security in all these aspects, in return for their self-denial for the sake of the collective familial entity and for their being merged into it.

Finally, it is a conservative and traditionalistic family, not only in the political sense, but also in its emphasis on inherited religious values, traditions, customs, and ceremonies, on considerations of stability, continuity, reputation, and honor, and on the primacy of membership in and loyalty to the family unit.

Question / In your capacity as a sociologist, what are the negative features that you notice in the structure of the Arab family?

Answer Some Arab sociologists note that the pyramidal structure of the family is based on age and on sex. Traditionally, the young are dependent on the old, and they are bound to a nearly absolute obedience in an authoritarian relationship. Traditionally, communication between adults and children takes place vertically, not horizontally. Proceeding from above to below, it takes the form of commands, notification, imparting of instructions, direction, prohibition, warning, threats, intimidation, reprimand, etc. This above-to-below communication may be accompanied by punishment, deprivation, anger, and other such things. All of this comes about as a result of autocratic relationships which employ a philosophy of child-rearing based on intimidation, not on persuasion.

We have observed that descriptions of authoritarian family relationships very often contain an element of exaggeration. Rarely are these elements found with such concentration, intensity, and purity in most Arab families. However, even taking the element of exaggeration into account, what remains of these traits in the actuality of Arab family life is enough to put obstacles in the way of the possible growth of creative abilities in those who possess the necessary formative elements initially. Creativity is a matter of original responses, of a tendency to disagree and be different in one's view of nature and society. This tendency does not grow in such an authoritarian atmosphere.

It may be noticed that in addition to the large number of authoritarian traits given to adults, especially the father, the latter is compassionate and merciful, the bestower and the withhold, the one who punishes and the one who shows mercy. In our societies, the father is the possessor of intelligence. Perhaps this was the inspiration behind the traditional Arabic saying, "A father's wrath is part of the wrath of God."

This brings us to a second negative element in the structure of the Arab family and in its way of raising its children: traditionalism and conservatism. Traditionalism is not necessarily synonymous with conservatism. Some societies and cultures stress the value of change as an indicator of progress. In such societies, the consecration of this value becomes traditional. Since the 17th century, for example, western societies have introduced and established this tradition within their scale of values; no one denies or doubts the value of change; the dispute is generally about the speed or direction of change, who is to pay its price, or the distribution of the material and nonmaterial gains from change. Conservatism, however, means following in the steps of the past and imitating one's forebears. Conservatism is a kind of popular "Salafiyah."

Every generation of Arab fathers proceeds to bring up its children as it was itself brought up by the previous generation; and the mother draws most or all of her information about raising her children from her mother, female relatives, or female neighbors who are older than she. Rarely does she draw this information from modern sources, even in cases where that is possible. The educated mother is not very different from the uneducated one in this respect. As for the content of the child-rearing process--the beliefs,

values, standards, ideas, tendencies, feelings, and behavior controls that are implanted--these, too, tend toward conservatism: toward following in the footsteps of the remote or recent past, glorifying the classical tradition with its remote creators and modern bearers, not doubting its validity or value, and hence not questioning or criticizing it. Since the patriarchal authority prohibits or does not encourage criticism, the desired response on the part of the children is acceptance, obedience, intellectual and behavioral submission, all of which, naturally, have many echoes.

Consequently, the instrument for preserving the intellectual and social heritage is its retention in the memory without much accretion or diminishment. Retention means inculcation and reiteration. The authority inculcates, and the individual reiterates. In such a familial context, the meaning of accomplishment for the children becomes correct reiteration of what has been received as instruction from adults. The model of the cultivated individual is that of the individual who in conversation or behavior can give stereotyped responses to stereotyped stimuli, one who stands up when any authority symbol enters, one who listens without disputing, one who obeys without questioning, and one who responds with correct and appropriate answers to any questions directed at him.

As for achievement in school, the model of the serious student is the one who memorizes his lessons and proves his worth by reiterating them as he received them when he is questioned in recitations or examinations. Even if the authority presents something new, it will be inculcated and reiterated in the same way, without questioning, doubt, criticism, or analysis. Even material whose authority is new will be treated like part of the classical heritage, to be venerated, respected, and memorized. Direct personal experience is therefore not necessary in order to confirm or achieve certitude about the truth; authority is the source and the proof. Inculcation and reiteration, as agents of child-rearing and education, take on exaggerated forms within Arab culture. Sometimes the analytic and critical faculty of the mind becomes inactive or withers away in the Arab individual, and the faculty of memory and recall expands to fill its place.

Question Do you think that the picture of the Arab family is necessarily the picture of Arab society?

Answer Socialization with the Arab family, in spite of it providing some of the components necessary for creativity, freezes or destroys the other components. The telling equation here is the interweaving and interaction of the two strands, the authoritarian and the traditionalistic-conservative. In this, the Arab family can be considered an image of the society on a small scale, while the society can be considered an enlarged image of the family. The other institutions of society--especially, the school and the state--foster and support what the family initiated in its members during late childhood; the family, in turn, receives its values and standards from the institutions of society--especially, the conservative religious establishment, the quasi-feudal economy based on income from land,

and the institution of the authoritarian state. These institutions expect adults to obey and submit; if not, there is deprivation, suppression, punishment.

This excursus about the historical experience of Arab society in changing itself and the context of the family, and consequently in providing an appropriate climate for the development of creative abilities, has been in order to explain the threefold dialectical relationship between individual, family, and society. It is not the intention to imply that Arab society ought to repeat the European path. The intention is merely to sound out the depths and dynamics of the relationship. What we have said about how the Arab social structure in general and family structure in particular do not provide an appropriate climate for evoking and developing creative abilities does not mean that creativity and creative people are absent in contemporary Arab society. Since the time of the Arab Awakening there have been dozens of individuals who escaped from the net that is hostile to creativity.

However, it is to be noticed that those who escaped from that net did so, in the majority of cases, by pure accident. From an initial reading of the biographies of a number of Arabs who were creative individuals or innovative in modern times it becomes clear that a number of factors were linked in their escape: distance from the family at an early stage of their lives, travel or a wandering existence for a certain time during their youth, and a variety of educational or vocational experiences during adolescence and young manhood.

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

OBSTACLES TO ESTABLISHMENT OF GREATER ARAB MAGHREB ANALYZED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONAL in French Jul 85 pp 93-108

[Article by Pierre Rondot: "The Greater Arab Maghreb: Hopes and Contradictions"]

[Text] Pierre Rondot thought that a synthesis of the past and recent meetings, talks, agreements and disagreements among the leaders of the Greater Maghreb countries should be prepared in article form for our magazine. It could be said that it is a never-ending subject, for there is very little hope that the Greater Arab Maghreb will be established in the near future; the more reason therefore for an author specializing in this subject, and well known of our readers, to assess the situation.

The "Greater Arab Maghreb" is sometimes "in the news," but only incidentally. And this geopolitical concept has not yet become very familiar to the readers and listeners of our western news organizations.

To the Arabs, the Maghreb is, in their language, "the West." When viewing onward the Arab world from Egypt, which is its geographic center, all the countries which extend westward are "the Maghreb." But for the Europeans who look to the south, the region located beyond the narrow Strait of Gibraltar and the Channel of Sicilia is, if anything, "North Africa;" and although Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia thus happen to form a natural grouping, neither Libya, nor the former Spanish Sahara, nor Mauritania really seem to be part of that same group.

Somehow, Europe's interest in the daily news from that part of Africa is not aroused by a specific treaty, whether of Tunis or Oujda, the concrete consequences of which are not very obvious. Rather, what makes news is a prolonged conflict, such as the Saharan, or surprise attacks bearing the Libyan stamp. Rightly or wrongly, differences and divergences, rather than unifying hopes and accomplishments seem to characterize this region.

Thus, the recently disclosed "Greater Arab Maghreb" concept does not immediately command the attention of the western public. Furthermore, more often than none, it suffers the same discredit which European opinion attaches to Arab

plans and assertions of unity. It is, however, useful to assess this situation for, in the political vocabulary of North Africa, and in the collective conscience of these peoples, our neighbors, it is a concept which is becoming gradually more familiar and, some day, might even arouse strong new feelings.

A Seldom Unified History

To be sure, the global unity of an Arab world stretching from the Atlantic to the Red Sea and the Gulf cannot be taken for granted. Undoubtedly, it can only be the result of long and systematic efforts. On the other hand, the grouping, regional so to speak, of only Maghreb countries may seem more natural. Yet, this partial and limited grouping cannot be "taken for granted" either; it has been seldom achieved throughout history.

The Maghreb was under a single power only three times during the old Muslim dominations: At the end of the 7th century, during Sidi 'Uqbah's brief ride; during the third quarter of the 10th century, under the Fatimids, natives of Ifriqiyyah, present-day Tunisia; and from the middle of the 12th century to the first quarter of the 13th, under the Almohads who came from the High Atlas. As for the Ottomans, from the middle of the 16th century to the beginning of the 20th, they were unable to invade Morocco or penetrate deeply into the Sahara, except to the South of Tripolitania; and in the northern portion of the region, they were the source of a rash of independence-related local dominations in Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, etc.

On the other hand, tribal Berber particularisms held on in the mountains of Morocco and Algeria. But most of all, Sunni Islam became established in the entire region where only a few centers of Kharijite Islam remain with the Ibadis of the Algerian Mzab, the Tunisian island of Djerba and Nefousa Djebel in Tripolitania and corresponding clusters in coastal towns.

Even during its peak in the 19th and 20th centuries, western colonization favored only partially the unification of the Maghreb. To be sure, France held the central portion of that region, but it is a known fact that it applied different statutes to Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. The latter was somewhat divided, under vastly different regimes, with, furthermore, Spain holding part of Western Sahara. To the very south of the region, Mauritania was under a French colonial regime. And Libya, which had remained under Ottoman rule for a long time, passed under the domination of Italy just before World War I.

Liberation Struggles and the Greater Maghreb

But, as soon as World War II was over, unity was proposed from the Atlantic to Sirte at the same time as independence was demanded. Yet, at first, circumstances often required that the liberation struggle and negotiations be conducted in each country on the sole basis of local conditions.

The sultan of Morocco, Mohammed V, first demanded the unity of his country and its emancipation in Tangiers on 10 April 1947, by calling upon Maghrebian and Arab solidarity. Opened in Cairo in January 1948, the "Maghreb Bureau" was

the agency of "The Arab Maghreb Liberation Front," to which belonged, for Morocco, Mohammed Abdelkrim, former leader of the Rif revolt, followed by Allal al Fassi, one of the founders of Istiqlal, and, for Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, the founder of Neo-Destour.

Declared independent at the end of 1949, but, in fact, still linked to Great Britain and the United States, monarchic Libya offered a discreet aid to the North African nationalists. A "North African Front for Unity and Action" was founded early in 1952 by Messali Hadj, an Algerian and prime mover of the "Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Freedoms." Beginning in 1952, French policy shifted in favor of the Tunisian and Moroccan protectorates, but remained uncompromising toward Algerian demands. From then on, North African nationalists, never losing sight of the final objectives of independence and unity, took action and, when warranted, fought in each sector according to opportunities.

Pierre Mendès-France offered Tunisia internal autonomy on 31 July 1954; Neo-Destourian leaders put an end to the guerrilla of the Tunisian fellaghas [opponents of the French] shortly after the launching of the armed revolt in Algeria on 1 November. The FLN, according to its proclamation, was aiming for "national independence in a North African framework;" it alluded to the efforts that were being made in Morocco and Tunisia on behalf of the liberation struggle and it added: "In that field of action... we have been for a long time the forerunners of an unfortunately never achieved unity of action among our three countries."

The sultan of Morocco was reinstated on his throne on 6 November 1955, Morocco and Tunisia achieved independence on 2 and 20 March 1956 respectively; these two countries opened all the facilities of their territory to the Algerian FLN fighters. The Tunisian population was almost the only one to suffer from the action launched by the French airforce on 8 February 1958 against the Tunisian town of Sakiet Sidi Youssef, where FLN forces were often stationed. This tragedy, regularly commemorated ever since, came to symbolize the common struggle and destiny of the Maghreb.

Projects and Outlines of Maghrebian Institutions

The idea of an unified Maghreb was raised in Tunis as far back as the autumn of 1956, by Habib Bourguiba, who was still then the Bey's prime minister, besides being first of all the "Supreme Fighter" of Tunisian independence: "We will once again be, as we were in the past, a single nation from Salum to Casablanca," he stated at the podium of the Constituting Assembly which was drawing up the future republican institutions of Tunisia. "Our goal," he stated, "is to unify the Greater Arab Maghreb. To this end, it is urgent that we establish and strengthen the ties between our countries through joint action with a single goal, namely, to revive the glory of our fraternal countries and enable them to regain their prestige, ensure their development and take their place in the midst of developed nations, by working for the progress of civilization, the triumph of peace and the welfare of whole of humanity."

High delegates from North African parties, the Algerian FLN, Moroccan Istiqlal and Tunisian Neo-Destour, met in Tangiers from 27 to 30 April 1958; they outlined the draft of a Maghrebian Constitutional Assembly; but, as representatives of these same parties were to note 25 years later when commemorating this event, it never was implemented.

This bitter comment was to inspire the statemen who celebrated the 26th anniversary of the now historical Tangiers meeting from 26 to 28 April 1984 to be more determined.

The Tunisian prime minister, Mohammed Mzali, speaking as secretary general of the Destourian Socialist Party (PSD), heir to the Neo-Destour, described the establishment of an Arab Maghreb as "a coming progressive idea, a milestone of civilization... As viewed by the PSD, Maghrebian, or Arab, unity... does not mean integration, but rests rather on tight lateral cooperation, in the framework of which interests... will become interdependent... The establishment of the Greater Maghreb is... more than ever an imperative necessity imposed by history, worldwide political and economic environment and, most of all, by the emergence around us of economic groups which leave us no other choice than to deal with them as a Maghrebian community." Obviously, it pertains essentially to EEC.

On behalf of the Moroccan Socialist Union Party of the People's Forces, which attended this assembly for the first time, Abderrahim Bouabid emphasized that it was necessary to go beyond a simple commemoration and take "frank and clear" decisions, in order to eliminate the obstacles to Maghrebian unity.

A final proclamation, adopted at the end of the conference, stated that "the Greater Maghreb included the countries located within the geographic area extending from the Islamic Republic of Mauritania to the Socialist People's Libyan Jamahiriya" (art 5); by so doing, it left open the Western Sahara issue. It called for the creation of the Greater Maghreb Consultative Council (art 7) and the formulation, during forthcoming meetings, of a basic ideological document explaining the way the parties were to approach the content of the Maghrebian entity, its goals and the stages of its implementation (art 3). It would therefore involve setting up a Maghrebian assembly and drawing up a Maghrebian charter.

Only one institution has been set up as of now; It is the Permanent Maghreb Consultative Committee, established in October 1964 by the ministers of economy of Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. This organization, which has its headquarters in Tunis, gave itself the task of creating a system of regional trade preferences and coordinating the policies of member states in the matter of industrialization and exports, in order to avoid duplication and inter-Maghrebian competition. To that end, it gradually created a series of specialized organizations such as transportation, tourism, postal and telecommunications, industrial research, etc.

But, shortly after assuming power in Tripoli on 1 September 1969, Colonel Qadhafi turned away from this Maghrebian institution: Attracted more by the Near East and anxious first to solve the problems of a Libyan economy in need

of "decolonization," as far back as May 1970, he abstained from notifying the organization that he would not be sending a representative to the committee's meeting in Algiers. Admission of Mauritania in 1975 was not enough to re-vitalize this Maghrebian institution which limited its activities to nothing more than studies, seldom followed by concrete implementations.

Libyan Initiatives

Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi has been an ardent admirer of Jamal 'Abd-al Naser since he was young. Like him, he dreams of Arab unity. Under the Ra'is' incentive, a "tripartite pact" was drawn in Tripoli as far back as 25 December 1969, which organized discussion meetings between Egypt, Libya and Sudan. Following Naser's premature death, Qadhafi felt that it was more than ever necessary to establish solid multilateral ties among Arab states. He was, however, soon discouraged by the small amount of activities generated by the Union of Arab Republics, grouping Egypt, Libya and Syria, the creation of which he had sponsored in Benghazi on 19 April 1971. Consequently, he thought about more forceful bilateral agreements: on 2 August 1972, he persuaded Anwar al-Sadat to accept the short-term merger of Egypt and Libya.

Perhaps already doubting his Cairo partner's zeal for union and, in any case, anxious to increase such agreements, Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi turned to the Maghreb which he had neglected until then. While on a visit to Tunis on 16 September 1972, he took the opportunity to address directly a large crowd of people whom he exhorted to applaud a Tunisian-Libyan project for union. But Habib Bourguiba who, having been alerted, hastened to join him, rejected his arguments as publicly and eloquently.

No doubt disappointed by Egypt, which had backed out of the merger and, notwithstanding the charter of the Arab Republic Union, had gone to war against Israel without either a hint or even a warning to Libya, Colonel Qadhafi once more turned to Tunisia early in 1974. He first persuaded the Tunisian minister of foreign affairs, Mohammed Masmoudi, and, on 12 January, he made a neighborly visit to Djerba, President Bourguiba's residence. Warm and enthusiastic, he persuaded the "Supreme Fighter" to accept the presidency of an Islamic Arab Republic to be formed through the immediately operative union of the two countries. But, sensitive to the arguments of his director of cabinet, Habib Chatty, and of his prime minister, Hedi Nouira, Habib Bourguiba drew back: Reasonable objections, most of all constitutional, were raised against the plan which, subjected to various delays, soon fell into disuse. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi first seemed to resign himself to the situation. But, a few months later, Hedi Nouira seemed to have been the target of a Libyan-inspired plot; whence a new period of tension between the two countries.

This time disappointed by Tunisia, and undoubtedly hoping to find more ideological affinities in Algeria, Colonel Qadhafi then turned to Colonel Boumediene: A first meeting, for the purpose of uniting, took place in Hassi Messaoud on 28 and 29 September 1975. There seemed to be, however, differences of structures between the two countries which, it must be added, the internal development of Libya was only to emphasize. Both sides therefore decided to take measures aimed at establishing "strictly adequate organic ties

between the two countries." Several similar meetings followed and President Kountche of Niger attended one of them. Colonel Qadhafi addressed Algerian audiences on several occasions and aroused some sympathy even in official circles; but no political implementations were to follow; and Algerian authorities were to note some Libyan encroachments on the border zone, between Ghadames and Ghat.

In turn, in August 1976, President Bourguiba felt that it would be expedient to reconcile with Libya; the two countries reconciled and decided to submit their difference over the division of the petroleum-rich continental plateau in the Gulf of Gabes to the International Court of Justice.

Thus, the Tunisian authorities were surprised when, on 27 January 1980 a commando of Libyan-based, trained in warfare, young Tunisians, having crossed through Algerian territory, tried, unsuccessfully it must be added, to take over Gafsa and set up a revolutionary government. The Libyan secretary of foreign affairs hastily denied any Libyan connection with the aborted coup, but declared: "If the Tunisian leaders allow Libyan intervention in the form of an infusion of revolutionary spirit into the Tunisian masses, the Libyan people are hardly to blame for it."

In Tunis, Mohammed Mzali, replacing seriously ill Hedi Nouira as prime minister, set out from then on to become, under President Bourguiba's wing, the artisan of a policy of systematic reconciliation with Libya and of true establishment of Maghrebian entity as quickly as possible. But the Maghreb ideal collided against the dramatic crisis created by the fate of Western Sahara even more than against the Libyan interventions.

The Saharan Crisis

While the Organization of African Unity (OAU) advocates, as a practical rule and for the sake of harmony, the maintenance of the frontiers left over from the colonization, it is generally believed in Morocco that the Sahara, object of a particularly arbitrary colonial division, is a case which must be viewed in a broader historical perspective. It should be noted that, due to the French colonization, Algeria did end up owning a large portion of the Sahara, including a very large western region, "historically Moroccan." Furthermore, it is said that Mauritania and Spanish Sahara were no less arbitrarily carved from the historical territory of Morocco. And if the Moroccan government, in a gesture of conciliation, forgoes contesting the legitimacy of both Algeria's western frontiers and the distinct existence of Mauritania as a country, it feels that it would be at least normal if Western Sahara were to be returned by Spain. These views, and the actions they have inspired, form the basis of a lasting litigation, the main repercussions of which we will indicate.

Morocco's claims affect in various ways first, and almost simultaneously, Spanish Sahara, colonial then independent Mauritania and independent Algeria.

In 1957, the southern branch of the "liberation army" of Morocco, partially made up of Saharans, drove the Spanish forces of Western Sahara back to the coast and entered the northern section of Mauritania, where a few tribal chiefs

pledged allegiance to the Moroccan sovereign. With the help of a French column, the Spaniards regained control of their Saharan colony, but found themselves up against the actions of the Liberation Front of Sahara (1968), followed by those of the POLISARIO (Popular (Front) for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro), created on 19 May 1973. Morocco refused to recognize the independence of Mauritania in 1960, thus delaying its admission to the Arab League. Shortly after the independence of Algeria, Moroccan forces advanced northeast of Tindouf in September 1963 and clashed violently with Algerian contingents.

The Saharan problem took the limelight during the 70's. Morocco became reconciled with Mauritania after settling its border dispute with Algeria through the Treaty of Ifrane on 15 January 1969. King Hassan II and Presidents Mokhtar Ould Daddah and Houari Boumediene met on 14 September 1970 in Nouadhibou to discuss ways of decolonizing Spanish Sahara. During the Rabat Summit in October 1974, the first two privately decided to divide this territory between themselves, while the third, maybe banking on the fact that the granting of independence by Spain would thwart their plan, was said to have agreed. (Perhaps the Algerian president was banking on the fact that the Spanish government would precede the Moroccan and Mauritanian initiatives by granting independence to its colony. Cf Paul Balta's report in LE MONDE, dated 20 March 1985). Disregarding a resolution of the UN General Assembly, which had reasserted on 12 December 1972 the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence, and interpreting in favor of the Moroccan arguments the very subtle advice handed down by the Hague Court on 16 October 1975, King Hassan, having anticipated the Spanish leaders' move, launched the famous "green march" on 6 November 1975, in direction of El Aioun. Through the Madrid agreements of 14 November 1975, the Spanish government of then dying General Franco transferred the administration of Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania, without, however, formally surrendering sovereignty, and announced the total withdrawal of its troops for 27 February 1976.

It was on that date that the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR) was proclaimed; it was recognized by Algeria as early as 6 March. A coup having ousted President Mokhtar Ould Daddah in Nouakchott, Mauritania gave up the portion of Saharan territory that it had requested be allocated to it. Morocco grabbed it immediately. Mauritania signed an agreement with SDAR on 5 August 1979. After many unsuccessful efforts, OAU finally succeeded in having its "experts' committee," which had met in Nairobi on 26 August 1981, define the terms of a cease-fire between the royal forces of Morocco and the POLISARIO and of the referendum for self-determination which was to follow. Morocco, however, became indignant when OAU Secretary General Edem Kodjo decided to grant OAU membership to the SDAR on 22 February 1982, because it had been recognized by 26 African nations, or the majority of its members. Mobilizing its friends, Rabat diplomacy objected, for lack of a quorum, to the OAU summit meeting in Tripoli in 1982. The Saharan delegation agreed not to attend the 1983 Addis-Abeba summit meeting which invited Moroccans and Saharans to negotiate directly the referendum preparations, an offer rejected by the Moroccans. From then on, the deadlock was total; there are speculations that Morocco, whose armed forces have gradually wrested almost total control of the northern portion of Western Sahara from the POLISARIO, may be thinking of settling the Saharan problem through arms and the fait accompli.

From the Treaty of Tunis (19 March 1983),...

"There is no doubt that our Maghrebian and Arab peoples aspire to unity... It is up to us to weave the many ties of cooperation and rapprochement which will finally lead to it... by advancing gradually, without hesitations or reversals... Our interests demand that we remain the Maghreb of Nations, a step toward achieving union then unity (AL-'ALAM, Rabat, 2 June 1980)... The way problems are handled and creative imagination must yield new methods and formulas (LE TEMPS, Tunis, 10 September 1980)... (Tunisia hopes to have) relations (with Libya) marked with cooperation and deep friendship, forgetting misunderstandings" (declaration before the Tunisian Parliament on 29 December 1980). The Tunisian prime minister, Mohammed Mzali, made these statements in 1980; he stated that he would be eventually willing to act as a mediator between the "interested partners."

Prepared through discreet contacts between royal advisers Ahmed Bensouda and Reda Guedira and the head of the Algerian diplomacy, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, the Akid Loufti (Algerian town in Oran, near the Moroccan border) meeting lasted 5 hours and was attended by King Hassan and President Chedli Bendjedid on 26 February 1983. This meeting, which raised many hopes, did not change in any way the positions of the involved parties concerning the Western Saharan problem. But it served as a prelude to some sort of rapprochement between Morocco, which sent its minister of the interior, Driss Basri, to its eastern neighbor as early as March, and Algeria, whose president received the visitor; it was decided to "ease the traffic of people and goods... in order to establish... a climate of peace, serenity and mutual trust."

A sound entente was prepared between Algeria and Tunisia through ministerial visits, the creation of joint institutions and an increase of cooperation projects, particularly the joint development of border regions: "Economic Maghreb is a vision which compels recognition on its own merits... The establishment of the Maghreb is the only valid answer to all the threats...", declared Mohammed Mzali (ALGERIE ACTUALITY, 19 March 1983), when President Chedli Bendjedid met President Habib Bourguiba in Tunis to sign the "treaty of fraternity and harmony" of 19 March 1983, "implying necessarily the settlement of all differences... through peaceful means, (mentioning) a common destiny in the framework of the Greater Arab Maghreb (and advocating) the consolidation of (inter-Maghrebian) relations of positive neighborliness and brotherly cooperation." The treaty was opened for membership to the other Maghrebian countries. The next day, a joint communiqué recommended that a solution to the Western Saharan problem be found, in accordance with the resolutions of the Nairobi OAU summit meeting.

A partial Maghrebian summit meeting gathered Presidents Habib Bourguiba, Chedli Bendjedid and Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidallah of Mauritania; the latter adhered to the 19 March treaty on 13 December. And Colonel Qadhafi sent a request for membership on 18 December, which was well received in Tunis but with reservations in Algiers which would have preferred to see the frontier delimitated and marked beforehand according to its "colonial" boundaries (the only Algerian frontier which has not yet been subjected to these operations is the issue).

...To the Treaty of Oujda (13 August 1984)

Colonel Qadhafi declined to participate in the Addis Ababa OAU summit meeting early in June of 1983; he indicated that Libya's "duty toward Western Sahara" had been fulfilled and there no longer was any disagreement with Morocco on that issue. Forgetting his former grievances against the Moroccan monarchy, he went to Rabat from 30 June to 3 July 1983, had a long meeting with the king and received party heads and union leaders; he maintained that he wanted to settle the Saharan problem within the perspective of Maghrebian unity, but his primary wish was to see the Arabs turn their attention to fighting Israel.

After touching base in Nouakchott (22 July) and Algiers (24 July), Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi reached Monastir on 16 August, where he recommended the swift implementation of the Greater Arab Maghreb, "the first step toward integral Arab unity;" but, contrarily to what he once thought, this unity could be achieved progressively through the action of ideologically different regimes. The joint communiqué advocated "the strengthening of complementarity as an important and essential step toward the achievement of total unity, in the Maghreb.

The possible exchange of Moroccan mining products for Libyan petroleum and the Libyan recruitment of workers in Morocco, the latter, moreover, being extended to Tunisia, came under consideration at the end of August 1983, following Libyan-Moroccan meetings at the ministerial level. Established at that time, the Great Joint Libyan-Moroccan Commission met in Rabat on 25 and 26 January 1984, decided to align the economic plans of the two countries, exempt traded products from taxes and develop cooperation in a great many fields.

The Moroccan-Libyan rapprochement was also acclaimed by King Hassan who mentioned in the FIGARO MAGAZINE (dated 25 February) the "dispossessions" inflicted by history to both Libya and Morocco. Receiving a Libyan delegation on 13 July, he suggested that Morocco and Libya could become a factor of union to which other nations could aggregate. The future Moroccan-Libyan treaty was thus taking shape.

But, during the first 7 months of 1984, the relations of Libya and Morocco with the signatories of the treaty of Tunis developed differently. In January, Libya maintained that it was not involved in the Tunisian "hunger" riots; but that it suspected Tunisia of having something to do with the 8 May attempted putsch in Tripoli and it seized three Tunisian gendarmes on the border; the reconciliation, which occurred at the end of June, was accompanied by the creation of a joint security commission and various financial measures.

In Mauritania, school and university incidents were attributed to Libyan agents.

During secret top-level contacts in April, May and July 1984, Rabat was said to have suggested an Algerian-Moroccan union; Algiers was said to have objected that the Saharan problem was being evaded and vainly proposed a compromise. The FLN Central Committee declared on 23 May that the Saharan war was an obstacle to the establishment of the Greater Maghreb. An FLN delegation, however, went to Casablanca in July, on the invitation of the Socialist Union of People's Forces and suggested a dialog between the involved parties in order

to find a solution to the Saharan problem. A border incident, caused on 15 June by the raid of a Moroccan detachment into Algeria, cost human lives but had no political consequences.

There were rumors of a meeting planned in Oujda for 13 August between King Hassan, Colonel Qadhafi, President Bendjedid and perhaps even King Fahd. Only the first two actually met in that town. They signed a "treaty of union," whose main idea and a good share of the writing, were due to the Moroccan sovereign. The purpose of this document was to consolidate the brotherly ties between the two peoples..., contribute to the unification of the Arab Maghreb..., and achieve the unity of the Arab nation." It created between Morocco and Libya an "union of countries... opened to other countries belonging to the Arab nation or to the African community." Thus created, "the Arab-African Union" is jointly presided over by the king of Morocco and the Guide of the Libyan Revolution; it includes a defense council; it also has a secretariat manned in turn by a Moroccan residing in Tripoli, appointed on 24 September, and a Libyan residing in Rabat; it also has a "Moroccan-Libyan Assembly" inaugurated on 8 December in Tripoli.

Toward a Maghrebian Summit Meeting?

Returning to Libya after the signing of the Treaty of Oujda, Colonel Qadhafi was received by the chief of state in Algeria, but only by the prime minister in Tunisia. While the Tunisian leaders refrained from expressing unqualified praises, President Bendjedid, addressing on 27 August students going abroad, declared: "The establishment of the Greater Arab Maghreb cannot be based on tactical axes and objectives... We cannot build the Greater Arab Maghreb in the absence of the peoples, nor in defiance of the basic objectives of the Algerian revolution, nor at the expense of the interests of any of the region's people."

Meanwhile, on 8 September, "in order to end speculations about Moroccan-Algerian relations since the signing of the Treaty of Oujda," Morocco abolished entry visa requirements for Algerian nationals.

But, on 12 November, the Moroccan delegation withdrew from the 20th OAU summit meeting which was being held in Addis Abeba and attended by a SDAR delegation. And King Hassan's trip to the southern provinces of Morocco from 10 to 18 March 1985 was an opportunity for him to solemnly declare once again the "Moroccan quality" of Western Sahara.

The Saharan obstacle therefore seems to block any normal diplomatic development geared to the establishment of the Greater Arab Maghreb. But a great deal has been said about non-official meetings which cannot be verified. Thus, Bechir Moustafa Sayed, permanent secretary of the POLISARIO Political Bureau, maintains to have met Driss Basri, Moroccan minister of the interior, in Lisbon, on 27 January 1985; this is being categorically denied by the head of the Moroccan diplomacy,

In any case, unofficial Algerian-Moroccan contacts, through private emissaries, seem to have been many over the last few months. In that context, the following people were seen: On 8 January in Algiers, Abdellatif Filali, who was

then the Moroccan minister of information, and Reda Guedira, a royal adviser; late in December 1984, in Rabat, Dr Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, head of the Algerian diplomacy, who went to Marrakech on 23 January for a royal audience; and once again in Algiers on 30 January, Reda Guedira. But, having become minister of foreign affairs, Abdellatif Filali declared to the Parisian press on 16 April that discussions about Western Sahara had brought no results, due to the uncompromising attitude of Algeria which was demanding a six-party summit meeting, therefore including SDAR. It was furthermore indicated that several suggestions for a compromise, trying for example to unite two entities, Moroccan and Saharan, under the king of Morocco's crown, had not been accepted.

In Tunis, where the Saharan problem has always been approached very cautiously, there is still hope that a solution can be found. As far back as 2 October 1984, the PSD Central Committee, under President Bourguiba's directives, invited high Maghrebian officials to a summit meeting in order to "consider appropriate solutions to the problems... which are hindering the development of the region and preventing the coordination of cooperation, solidarity and complementarity efforts." Following careful diplomatic planning, the Tunisian minister of foreign affairs, Beji Caid Essebsi, went in turn to Mauritania on 9 January 1985, Algeria on 14 January and 2 February, Morocco on 17 January and Libya on 22 January. In early February, he was still hoping that the Saharan problem could be solved "in the framework of the Maghrebian dynamism which the summit was being called upon to establish."

But, in early March, the head of the Tunisian diplomacy indicated that "although the principle of a five-party summit was being retained," it was impossible to set a date. And on 12 March, before the PSD Central Committee, he specified that there still were obstacles to holding a summit meeting, "due in particular to a basic difference on how the Western Saharan affair should be approached;" however, postponing the summit meeting "would enable the Maghrebian brothers to continue the dialog."

The lack of success of the Tunisian attempt confirms that, under the present circumstances, establishing the Greater Arab Maghreb cannot be expected for the near future. But contacts are being maintained and the search for a compromise is being discreetly pursued. Pessimists will say that all attempts on behalf of Maghrebian unity have been in vain. Optimists will answer that this perseverance, even thwarted, shows a determination which will finally triumph.

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

GCC PLANS TO CUT FOREIGN MANPOWER

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[Article by Kieran Patton]

[Text]

Member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are planning to cut foreign manpower by as much as 25 per cent over the next five years.

The move follows continuing uncertainty in the world of oil pricing and production which has highlighted concern not only in the GCC but also other Arab oil-producing countries about the effects of the current recession on growth and development.

With an immediate future of low demand and unstable oil prices being forecast, the focus of attention has begun to spotlight on the massive numbers of migrant workers who, in addition to contributing to the economies of the countries where they work, have also been substantial sources of finance for their home countries, which rely on repatriated earnings as a source of much-needed foreign exchange.

There are no exact figures of the number of migrant workers in the Middle East. Nevertheless, there are some Gulf states where the indigenous population is heavily outnumbered by the foreign workforce, and within the GCC, official statistics show that there are about four million foreign workers, with Asians representing 82 per cent.

The ratio of foreign manpower in the GCC ranges from 40 to 90 per cent of the total workforce at present, and the current slowdown in development projects has caused the GCC countries to seek ways to lessen their dependence on the foreign workforce.

A recent report by the British Bank of the Middle East has already highlighted the economic recession in the Gulf during 1984, a slowdown which resulted in a capital outflow of \$25bn and an exodus involving some 700,000 foreign workers.

This year, Saudi Arabia — which hosted three million foreign workers at one time (70 per cent of the entire workforce, according to 1983 figures) — is expected to send home over half a million foreign workers, and the hardest hit there as in other Gulf states will be workers in the construction sector

which flourished in the 1970s and early 1980s and which is reported to account for 25 per cent of the total foreign workforce in the GCC countries.

Since 1983, more than 6 per cent of the entire foreign manpower and about 3 per cent of the total population of the six GCC countries have left the region and provisional figures for 1984 indicate that those figures increased by one percentage point.

Since the 1970s, some countries in the Middle East and in Asia have lost substantial numbers of their workforce to richer, oil-producing states. Jordan, for example, has over 40 per cent of its workforce abroad — mostly in neighbouring oil-producing countries.

Current estimates of the numbers of migrant workers vary because until now, governments have tended to allow free flows of cheap labour into their countries.

With the drop in oil revenues, if only in the short term, the stability of countries which either supplied labour or received substantial financial support (by way of repatriated earnings) is being seriously affected and has given rise to concern about what is likely to happen as a result of the current recession.

Migrant labour over the past decade has contributed heavily towards home countries' foreign exchange, and indeed can often be the receiving country's largest single source of hard currency. Egypt earned \$2.8bn in oil sales in 1984 — and \$3.4bn in remittances from Egyptians working abroad. However, Egyptian authorities have recently reported a significant drop from both sources so far this year.

The Egyptian experience is being felt elsewhere as government budgets in oil-rich countries are being increasingly cut, with the consequence that fewer contracts are being awarded, fewer projects are being started or even completed, and there is less demand for the largely Asian migrant worker. Within the GCC itself, there are estimated to be four million foreign workers and it is planned to dispense with one million of these workers before the end of the decade.

Local manpower programmes

According to GCC sources, university graduates in the Gulf countries have begun replacing foreigners in certain spheres, particularly in clerical jobs in government offices and as teachers. Finding jobs for eligible citizens has, therefore, become one of the top priorities for Gulf governments and "task forces" have been set up in a number of GCC countries to study and implement programmes for citizen workers to replace migrant labour.

These programmes — preparing local manpower for roles in the development of their own countries

— are seen as a necessary evolution in the economic and social growth of states which have to date relied heavily (and in some cases, perhaps too heavily) on the inflow of foreign workers. They are also a follow-up to the GCC Labour Ministers' conference in Riyadh last year when agreement was reached to initiate programmes which would "guarantee the optimum means for providing work opportunities" for GCC citizens.

Last month, when the GCC Labour Ministers again met, they recommended that foreign workers should be recruited only when and where necessary, with priority being given to local and Arab nationals, in an urgent bid to curb the import of foreign manpower. The ministers also agreed to carry out a survey of local manpower and its problems in order to be able to propose ways and means of best employing GCC citizens, with the ultimate objective of cutting dependence on foreign labour.

The importance of migrant workers to the economies of the Middle East over the past ten years cannot be overestimated and this migration has had numerous positive effects on both the countries employing the labour and the countries from where the labour has come, such as employment, investment, increased development and the creation of more entrepreneurial ventures.

In Jordan, remittances by migrant workers are the single most important component of the country's foreign earnings, contributing about \$1.25bn a year. South Korea, which has substantial numbers of both contractors and workers in the Middle East, has remittances from Koreans abroad which are equally large.

The first signs of recession in the Arab world came only three years ago, in 1982, when there was a sharp downturn in the volume of construction contracts — a 40 per cent drop from the 1981 value.

Nevertheless, the countries employing migrant workers cannot afford, even if they wished, to cut down on foreign labour completely. Planning and development commitments have already been made and it is not just a question of whether countries can afford to continue with projects — but, rather, can they afford not to? More selective recruitment There will always be a demand for foreign labour in the Middle East, but the countries employing such labour will now become much more selective and the countries supplying it will have to adapt accordingly.

It may be several years before the full effects of the current oil crisis within the Arab world and its economic cutbacks are fully felt but when those effects do show themselves they could leave not only economic but also social upheaval in their wake.

One country which could face serious consequences as a result of the Arab oil recession is the Philip-

pines, which has supplied more labour to the Middle East than any other south-east Asian country. The 1982 figures showed 200,000 Filipinos in Saudi Arabia alone. Overall annual remittances are around \$1.5bn.

Other countries in Asia, such as Indonesia and Pakistan, which are Islamic, may weather the coming storm better. Saudi Arabia, for example, now stresses that it is keen to recruit Muslim workers and this trend may be the future basis for the employment of migrant workers in the Middle East.

But perhaps the major problems will be in the oil-producing countries themselves, which over the past decade have enjoyed extensive wealth and development and which over the coming few years could face the unfamiliar prospect of falling incomes, less influence and a reduced ability to help their poorer, fellow Arab, neighbours.

CSO: 4400/214

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

GERMAN INSTITUTE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT GULF ECONOMY

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 21 Jun 85 pp 6-7

[Text]

The 1984 report of the Hamburg-based German Orient Institute paints a gloomy picture of the economies of the Middle East following the sharp decline in oil revenues and the continuing war between Iran and Iraq.

The Institute, which researches political, economic and social development in the Middle East, says that the serious shortfall in oil revenues was compounded by the unfavourable domestic investment climate and high interest rates abroad — factors which have provoked an unending flight of capital to foreign investment havens, particularly Switzerland and the United States.

The Institute maintains that although Iraq was able to restore economic equilibrium, which had been upset by the war against Iran, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and United Arab Emirates) failed to overcome the recession despite intense efforts.

According to the Institute's evaluation, the non-oil component of the gross domestic product of the GCC countries amounted to "only" 4.5 per cent in 1984 — the lowest share so far in this decade.

But that was not all. The Institute's report also sees adverse trends in the construction sector of these countries. Public spending on construction in the Gulf countries declined by about 20 per cent during 1984.

The flushing out of some 700,000 migrant workers, spurred by the recession, was accompanied by the flow of their savings and deposits to their native countries, which contributed to further reducing the net income from foreign investments.

The decline also produced a negative impact on the non-oil producing countries of the region (Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Morocco were cited here).

The Orient Institute highlights another interesting regional development: Turkey's economic thrust

into the Middle East. Turkey's exports to the Arab Gulf countries and Iran shot up from \$200mn in 1979 to \$3.2bn in 1984 —a sixteen-fold increase. These countries accounted for some 45 per cent of Turkish exports. This figure is higher than the European Community's share, of 42 per cent of Turkish exports. The recent Hanover Fair, where Turkey was presented as a "partner country", also showed that Turkey was turning its attention increasingly to "greener pastures" in the Gulf countries; most of the literature, brochures and other material at the Hanover Fair were produced in Arabic —and not in German — implying that many Arab buyers were expected to purchase Turkish goods in Germany.

Turkey's economic involvement in the Arab region is further underlined by the fact that in 1984 orders worth \$14bn were placed by Arab countries with Turkish companies. Since the transit trade for Iran and Iraq has been fuelled by the Gulf war, the Arab region has become Turkey's number one trading partner.

CSO: 4400/214

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

GAS, OIL AGREEMENT WITH YUGOSLAVIA--Algeria and Yugoslavia show their attachment to South-South cooperation by giving it a concrete form: The results of the visit by the minister of energy and chemical and petrochemical industries to Belgrade speak eloquently of this. Long-term agreements were concluded for Algerian gas and crude oil to be supplied to Yugoslavia. The gas agreement, lasting 20 years, provides for the supply of 1,000 million cubic meters in the first stage via the trans-Mediterranean gas pipeline. The oil agreement, lasting 6 years, provides for a supply of 500,000 metric tons per annum as of this year. [Excerpt] [Algiers Domestic Service in French 1830 GMT 2 Aug 85 LD]

CSO: 4500/176

EGYPT

WAFD PARTY'S SUCCESSION PROBLEM DISCUSSED

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 24 Jul 85 p 8

[Article by 'Asim al-Qirsh: "After the Resignation Furor, What Will Happen to the Wafd Without Siraj-al-Din?"]

[Text] Over a week ago, Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din threatened to resign from the Wafd Party leadership. Although he withdrew his threat and resignation and returned to the party--in response to an urgent plea--to tighten his grip around it unopposed, the hole the furor left in the bottom of the "new-old Wafd ship" led the largest opposition party in Egypt to wake up to the fact that it could very well find itself once again, and for any reason, without Siraj-al-Din, the old man who was behind its return to the political theater.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT followed the controversy raised in Cairo by the "pasha." It asked Wafd leaders if they had prepared themselves for such an eventuality, and who could fill this great position and whether the disappearance of the Wafd leader would open the doors to an easy victory for the remaining parties in future elections. We came out with the following picture.

Behind the Wafd's walls, everyone behaves openly on the basis that Siraj-al-Din is the skipper today, tomorrow and after tomorrow as well, and will remain the "party's model" as long as he is with us, "God grant him long life." No one wants, out of decency at least, to voluntarily talk about the issue of "succession," which emerged with last week's events, for several reasons, the most important of which is that "the man is still with us, age is in God's hands and it is not proper to talk about a successor when he is alive and well."

Even those who accuse the Pasha of threatening to abandon the ship and walk out on the party to force "the majority" to go along with him to President Mubarak's palace to celebrate the end of the "parliamentary session," thereby ignoring the unanimous desire of the deputies to boycott any meeting attended by [assembly president] Rif'at al-Mahjub even if it were at the president's residence, admit that the party can easily go astray in the jungle of divisions if the 70-year-old Siraj-al-Din decided to leave or actually abandoned his position as captain.

The Pasha himself raised the question of his succession last week, when he was justifying his determination to resign to members of the Wafd's

Supreme Body, by saying "suppose God chose to call me to his side, what would you do? Will we let the party collapse?" Everyone replied with great emotion: "It would be the greatest disaster for the party. There is a difference between predestination and bringing it about yourself." They also told him, while arguing with him in the spirit of Sa'd Zaghlul, Mustafa al-Nahhas and the forefathers of the Wafd, "if you resign, we will resign too. You are a soldier and belong to the Wafd and not to yourself. Your resignation is rejected, there is no Wafd without you."

The violent storm which accompanied the resignation issue has abated. The emotion which stormed around the final meeting of the parliamentary session, when the Wafd deputies (58 of them) were stunned by Dr al-Mahjub's decision to bring to a vote a request to lift the immunity of their colleague, Mustafa Shardi, editor in chief of the party newspaper, in order to hear his testimony regarding a suit filed against him by the governor of Alexandria who was subject to a violent campaign in the Wafd's newspaper, has subsided.

Dr Wahid Ra'fat, the party's deputy leader and number-two man, simply said about the succession story: "The leader of the party is over 70 years old. All the leaders are between 70 and 80 years old. This situation is similar to the one Moscow faced in the past. Therefore, it is natural to talk about a successor. The party's bylaws provide a solution: when the leadership position is vacated through resignation, the deputy, who received the most votes in the most recent leadership elections, shall take over temporarily and call the general assembly to convene within 2 weeks. The matter is arranged beforehand." Dr Ra'fat proceeded to say: "I myself took over this task in accordance with the bylaws when the decision on the political isolation of Siraj-al-Din political was issued.

"Moreover, the Wafd includes faces from all generations. The sons of the old Wafdist family bring new blood to the party and replace their fathers out of conviction, not heritage. The task of the senior party leaders is to hand over power to the future. They are followed in proper succession by more than one file of leaders. The law of nature says no one is indispensable. This is what experience demonstrated in Egypt after 'Abd-al-Nasir and, in France, after De Gaulle. We are all going to die and any one of us can go at any time."

We asked Dr Ra'fat if he could mention any specific names who could fill the void at the top should it be necessary some day.

He promptly replied that the matter of succession was determined by the general assembly--which has not convened until now and the number of participants in it from all the governorates has not been set yet. "The Wafd does not have family inheritance. It is true that the veteran Wafdist are more entitled to take over, but the main criterion in the selection process is to turn the leadership over to the best man. The idea is that after putting the party on ice, and following its reemergence in August 1983, we have been in politics for no more than 2 years, during which ad hoc committees were formed. These committees include an astounding number of qualified people who are supposed to be able to produce a 'shadow

government.' However, no one has yet emerged with the same kind of charisma, experience, endurance and long-lasting popularity as Siraj-al-Din."

[Question] What does the Pasha exactly do at this old age? Is he, for instance, merely a spiritual father?

[Answer] Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din is the party leader and chairs the meetings of the parliamentary body and the supreme body. By his unmatched ability and endurance, he runs the party's main affairs and keeps in touch with its rural offices. He reviews the newspaper word by word and settles disagreements among members and any conflicts that may arise over candidacy among Wafdist families. He is aided in all these tasks by a group of aides who report to him on the party's daily business and convey his instructions to the ranks of the Wafd. However, his activity, by virtue of his age, of course, has become limited. Do not forget the party's reemergence battle and the 1984 elections. However, in spite of constant exhaustion, he nonetheless does not stop from performing his basic role maintaining the party's cohesion.

For this reason and more, his presence with us as an umbrella and a spiritual leader is necessary until the storm is weathered and a knowledgeable person able to lead the Wafd is found. I do not think this will be easy, considering all the currents that comprise the party.

[Question] Why did this storm rage in the first place? Who was responsible for it?

[Answer] It was all a misunderstanding and a succession of developments beyond anyone's control. The Wafdist members got very excited and enraged following the decision to withdraw immunity. Their emotions turned into a hurricane which could not be faced in any way, but it was not directed at Siraj-al-Din.

The main lesson learned from the resignation [threat] is that the absence of the leader from the battlefield can be a problem and can lead to no coordination and clashes. Things are reported differently to the party leader and he himself has no immediate contacts to issue prompt instructions. Thus, when the immunity decision enraged the deputies, and caused tension and an outburst of emotions, the leader of the party was not in parliament because he is not a member and cannot meet with or contact deputies there.

They were supposed to consult with him before resorting to such rashness because he accepts differing opinions. If the Pasha had insisted on his resignation, the Wafd would have faced a certain split because no one has his power and no one would recognize any other leader after him.

Many will claim seniority and rank and, consequently, preference. Fortunately, Siraj-al-Din chose to stay until the party has its feet planted firmly on the ground. He will consolidate his popular base in the 26 governorates. The main weak point is that the party's regional committees have not yet been formed. We are not a body without a soul, as claimed on the day of

resignation, but rather a head without a body because we have the leadership but the structure is not yet complete. It can take at least 2 years before seeing any results.

The Wafd deputy leader believes that things will not change in any elections with regard to the other parties in the absence of the Pasha at the head of the Wafd Party. The ruling party has its own power and authority and an established administrative structure, and the governors belong to it. The rest of the parties are made out of "straw," to quote Dr Ra'fat, and are either made up of an individual and his family or a party that makes itself appear greater than it actually is. The only exception is the Socialist Labor Party with its weight and known history as an extension of Misr al-Fatat. As for the Wafd itself, it depends on its past strength.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT also contacted Mumtaz Nassar, chairman of the Wafd parliamentary body and opposition leader under the dome, and heard the following remarks:

--We shall perish from the face of the earth and so long as the Pasha is living, he is in fact the model of the party. It is clear that after a long life, he will have successors to assume responsibility after him because Egypt does not lack men, but his imprint will live on.

--The Wafd represents the conscience of this nation and will remain that way. If elections were to be held at any time, even without Siraj-al-Din, the Wafd would win with a majority.

--Our party is democratic and liberal and we have no dictatorship. Every member is free to have his own ideas. That is why I assert that events during the last few days were only a passing matter handled in a way which averted disagreement.

--Siraj-al-Din is more than a spiritual leader to the Wafd. As the party leader, he has to initiate policy and oversee its implementation within and outside parliament. The recent storm is nothing new to the party which in the past has experienced crises and divisions and has been abandoned by the liberals, the constitutionalists, the Wafdist bloc and the Sa'dists, but has survived.

Did the Pasha actually intend to walk away from the party leadership? Or was it a maneuver and a mere "theatrical move" to consolidate his control over the Wafd so that his image as a leader would not be shaken again and he could guarantee to be "the only voice" of the Wafdist? [This is] according to one of the Wafd's old guard, a name chosen by one of the Pasha's opponents, while attacking, in our presence, Siraj-al-Din's control over the party formations, which possess the decisionmaking power, and his removal of enlightened elements, in view of the fact that the Pasha has not called for a national conference or a general assembly and while criticizing the party leader's insistence on his "individual" and "undemocratic" stance in "facing a collective choice" of the parliamentary body and, finally, while reminding us of the rule memorized by veteran Wafdist that "a true

Wafdist never resigns." The most he does is freeze his membership, but does not leave the Wafd's trench. The man, however, conceded that "the Pasha holds the party together, that things will become chaotic after him and that the party will become more than a Wafd."

At any rate, the Pasha confirmed during the resignation week that he was going to step down from the party leadership only, but will "live and die as a Wafdist." These are the words throughout the past year by his younger brother, Yasin Siraj-al-Din, whose membership in the Wafd was reinstated only this week after the Pasha dismissed him from the party in an effort to stress the meaning of partisan commitment when Yasin accepted an appointment to the Nile Valley Parliament without the party's permission.

Yasin Siraj-al-Din, the reinstated Wafdist deputy, told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that he knew from personal experience and by the justifications offered by his older brother that he was indeed determined to resign. When he informed them of his insistence on his decision, everyone suddenly felt the void which his departure could create and that the situation could deteriorate without him.

My belief is that the party was not a candidate for divisions and it will be the same in the future without the Pasha's presence. Therefore, I think "things work out for the better" because the party leader will now give much thought to putting the house in order and I am confident that everyone will accept such an action for the good of the party.

About your question regarding succession, I think the Pasha was also thinking about it and perhaps imagined before the incident that there were leaders who could take over his role after him. However, the crisis made him realize that it is difficult, at present at least, to be reassured of the presence of someone able to steer the ship because there is a difference between a tottering helmsman and a skipper like himself.

As for the candidate to fill the seat of the Wafd leader, it is a matter left to more than one side: the General Assembly as a start, in addition to the influence of the (Parliamentary Body) and the Supreme Body and, of course, the popular base in general.

[Question] How far apart are the positions of the new Wafdist and the party's old guard?

[Answer] The Pasha is keen on not differentiating between the old and the new elements. He tries to instill this idea in the minds of everyone. It is true that the new have many distinguishing traits. We do not deny, however, that this way of thinking does exist. There is a disagreement, albeit underground, between the old and the new. The old members feel they have a past, a history, sacrifices and experience, etc. Perhaps the old personalities feel they did not get the positions they deserved. As for the young elements, I believe they feel it is time they had their say. But regardless of how independent the deputies are in their opinion, even if it were against the wishes of their leader, the Wafd members are still

the most committed among all the other parties. Furthermore, a reasonable number wanted to respond to the Pasha's instructions to go to the president's meeting with the parties and their leaders, but they deemed it wise to avoid any internal clashes and to give in to the opinion of the majority. At any rate, what happened was a passing disagreement which does not reflect a struggle over Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din's opinion or the newspaper's policy for two reasons. The first is that the party leader is subject, democratically, to the opinion of the whole. [Second] he is the one who directs the newspaper's editorial policy.

And should the Pasha disappear, the Wafd, in my opinion, is composed of three props: an old popular base which did not come out of a vacuum but regenerated itself; a huge symbol by the name of Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din; and cadres-within the party who go from the top to the bottom, although the organizational part has not yet been completed. The absence of this symbol makes party action more difficult indeed, even though the Wafd will remain the strongest party. I believe the considerable socialist line within the Wafd may be enhanced in the absence of a leader as strong as the Pasha.

Without embarrassment or beating around the bush, Dr. Jihad 'Awdah, political analyst at the AL-AHRAM Center for Political and Strategic Studies, summed up the whole story, emphasizing for example, that the Pasha's disappearance some day may be healthy for the Wafd because the party would then find its way to reform and revert to its normal size "because now it seems greater than it actually is due to its link to Saraj-al-Din, its long history, and its march of hostility to the July revolution." Dr 'Awdah, who follows the situation from afar, does not believe that the Wafd, or any other party here, as a general rule, is considered a substitute leader. He specifically cites the party's weak organizational structure and is almost certain that the Wafd has not prepared itself for a coming phase without the Pasha.

Dr 'Awdah furthermore ennumerated what the Wafd may lose without Siraj-al-Din:

--The man's disappearance, either through retirement, death or resignation, will rob the party of a charismatic personality around which all the party currents rally because he represents the point on which all the Wafd wings meet. Consequently, his exist from the arena would make dealings among these wings difficult.

--The party would also lose "continuity," or its survival all this time since prerevolution days, and I cannot think of anyone as large as the Pasha to guarantee such a continuity, which is one of the main sources of the party's legitimacy, and the party will face, without Siraj-al-Din, new guidelines for the creation of another source of legitimacy.

--The party will, by necessity, lose a part of its grassroots support which is linked to Siraj-al-Din and which enabled it to score reasonable victory in the parliamentary elections.

Dr. Jihad 'Awdah presented the rest of the picture as follows:

--The primary problem the Wafd will face with the absence of the Pasha is the matter of legitimacy. The party builds its legitimacy on the basis of its being the descendant of the 1919 revolution, but the likely candidates for succession will, by necessity, belong, in their political action, to the 1952 revolutionary era. As for the "old guard," they will become a "spiritual father" or a "symbol" within the party.

--Right after the Pasha's exit, the doors of struggle will be widely opened to two probable kinds of struggles: one linked to the ideological current within the party and the other revolving around the identity of the individuals and their intellectual style of behavior.

--The party does not have a main force because its ideology is loose and includes under its umbrella several affiliations. The struggle will center on who will get to the helm first.

--The Muslim Brotherhood will certainly play a role in the post-Pasha stage, but they will have to determine whether they will accept to maintain the formula by which they joined the Wafd or to abandon the ship altogether.

--The other most important problem the party will face is who can rally the party around him. In the presence of Siraj-al-Din, the ideological struggle was vehement between the secular and religious currents. And in his presence the secularists had the upper hand and the religious current was contained. Without him, an answer to such a question is urgently needed.

--The struggle between persons and styles will drag the party into a choice between three currents of principles:

A. How can we convince President Mubarak that the Wafd is the best party? This current is represented, according to Dr 'Awdah, by Yasin Siraj-al-Din.

B. The centrist group which holds discussions with the government and, at the same time, addresses the wishes of the people. In brief, it stands in the middle of the road and is represented by Mumtaz Nassar, leader of the Wafdish opposition.

C. The third current, represented by a number of names, including Mustafa Shardi and Ahmad Abu-al-Fatah, fervently advocates a parliamentary system in the full sense of the word whereby the prime minister plays a double role, similar to the one followed in Britain.

--The solution may lie in a "collective leadership" or a leadership committee composed of a secular party leader, a Muslim Brotherhood deputy or leader and several deputies representing Wafd political currents and possessing almost equal power. That is unless the next leadership believes that it can receive 30 percent of the electoral votes without having the Brotherhood in the current coalition which brings it together with the Wafd.

--The swapping of seats between the Wafd and the National Party is a definite possibility in any future elections because they both stand in the center

politically, and they do not have strong organizational boundaries to prevent such an intertwinement, with each of them retaining its own ideological character.

--The possibilities of success are a reality in any elections in which Siraj-al-Din is not at the Wafd's helm. The party can easily maintain its parliamentary representation and seats, not by winning broader bases but by its ability to attract prominent names who have their own popularity, even if they are not necessarily Wafdist.

12502
CSO: 4504/420

EGYPT

MUBARAK'S BROTHER, WAFD PARTY MEMBER, INTERVIEWED

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 30 Jul 85 p 7

[Interview with Sami Mubarak by Sa'id Shalash in Cairo: "Sami Mubarak, the Silent Deputy in Parliament Throughout Full Session: Political Life in Egypt Has Changed"; date and place not specified]

[Text] This is the man who caused quite an uproar in Egypt prior to the last parliamentary elections in Egypt a year ago.

He stirred up an uproar with his return from Germany after living there close to 20 years. He also caused an uproar by suddenly joining the Wafd Party, by the way he announced his affiliation and then by running for elections at the head of a ticket and by his success in the elections.

He remained in the spotlight in the Egyptian, Arab and world press. His house, located in Heliopolis, Cairo, is always filled with correspondents and journalists from all over the world who go there to observe the strangest phenomenon in Egypt's modern history: the brother of the head of state joining an opposition party.

The spotlights were also turned on the Wafdist member during the early days of the parliamentary session.

With the passage of time and with the members of the Egyptian parliament, both government and opposition, performing their political duties, each in his own way, Sami Mubarak kept his silence for a full year without submitting a single interpellation or saying a word inside the assembly hall. He did not write one article or express any views in the newspaper of the Wafd Party, of which he is a member. He did not participate in the party's parliamentary body meetings, even the one held by leader Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din when he threatened to resign from the party.

Just as quickly as he appeared he also disappeared. The spotlights were turned away from this prominent member, expectations were dashed and many question marks were raised about the reason for his disappearance. Therefore, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT met with deputy Sami Mubarak to ascertain why he did not speak, why he remained silent at a time when many expected him to speak the most. The following is the interview:

[Question] Where do you stand now 1 year after the parliamentary session in Egypt? It has been noticed that you were completely silent in the parliamentary meetings and that you did not submit any interpellations or take part in anything, including the Wafd Party parliamentary body's meetings. Why was that?

[Answer] I find parliamentary life in Egypt totally different from what I saw in other parliaments in the world or what I witnessed in parliament before the revolution. Because I was new in parliament, I wanted to observe everything and to listen to debates under the dome in order to see how they are conducted and, ultimately, to study them so as to be fully knowledgeable before speaking on any subject or bill before parliament or opposing any bill which differed with the opinion of others. God willing, I will speak and be active in the next session and will begin my work then. Moreover, I have written several articles which will be published in the party newspaper in the next few weeks.

[Question] Your silence throughout a full parliamentary session leads us to ask why you entered politics if you are not a politician? What have you gained from politics?

[Answer] Politics is not a profession. If it were, Egypt would have changed 30 years after the revolution. Politics is a trust and a sensitivity toward the people's interests, which is why I went into politics. But if politics is for personal interests, I do not consider it politics. About your question concerning my gains from politics, I came out with an important rule that if the rulers do not apply democracy in full and if they do not guarantee individual freedoms in full, we will never better ourselves.

[Question] In the opening session of the Egyptian parliament attended by President Husni Mubarak, did you not feel uneasy about belonging to an opposition party?

[Answer] Not at all. I am a member of the Wafd Party and my brother is in the National Party [NDP]. He and I are working for Egypt and the people are the ones who selected me and put me in this position, so why should I feel uneasy about my brother's presence? I am not at all embarrassed by my affiliation with the Wafd Party.

[Question] Where are the programs you announced in the election campaign, or was this a kind of election propaganda?

[Answer] I have many good ideas which I will submit soon. Also, I have proposals for promoting industry and production in order to lower the unemployment rate and put Egyptians to work because production is the key element. At a time when the head of state is calling for increased production, many ministers do not know the meaning of production. That is why we are where we are today.

[Question] I would like to know what you think about the democratic experience in Egypt today?

[Answer] Democracy in Egypt is not yet complete. Unless we have free elections entirely by the will of the people and unless a government can be elected by the people through honest elections and can be removed by the people at any time, if they sense any lassitude on its part, to be replaced by another one--something that has not happened and will not happen unless democracy is complete--the fittest will always survive and the people's court is here to stay.

[Question] In the wake of the Egyptian street's split over the matter of stripping your colleague, Deputy Mustafa Shardi, of his immunity, some say that the deputy felt he was too strong to have his immunity taken away and he exploited the party newspaper to this end. Others say the way he was stripped of his immunity was the cause of the problem. What is your view as a Wafdist deputy?

[Answer] The way Wafdist member Mustafa Shardi was stripped of his immunity was extremely strange. The entire parliament, including the NDP members, had refused in a previous meeting to strip Wafdist member Mustafa Shardi of his immunity. This refusal was a most magnificent manifestation of democracy, one which the Egyptian people met with great joy, but the joy did not last.

What happened in that meeting was for personal considerations. Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub is working against the country's interest. Some NDP members are not satisfied with his actions because this sort of behavior is detrimental to the democracy advocated by President Mubarak.

[Question] How do you perceive the Wafd after Siraj-al-Din?

[Answer] The Wafd is not individuals. If it were, it would have vanished after Sa'd Zaghlul or Mustafa al-Nahhas. There is a new generation and trusted leaders in the Wafd Party.

[Question] Do you not think that the Wafd's popularity dropped after the election?

[Answer] If elections in Egypt were honest, the Wafd would have won an overwhelming majority. The Wafd's popularity today is stronger than what it was during the elections. The people felt our presence because we corrected some erroneous courses and exposed some grave mistakes. This is tangible progress due to the opposition's presence in parliament. I hope the opposition will be able to express its opinion more forcefully than at present and that the government will open its heart to other opinions which may benefit the entire country.

[Question] How about directing a word to President Mubarak?

[Answer] I say to President Mubarak: Beware of hypocrites. 'Abd-al-Nasir was a loyal leader who was changed by hypocrites alone. Al-Sadat was a loyal leader also and was changed by hypocrites alone. I hope Husni Mubarak will not be drawn by the hypocrites around him to make the same mistakes made by his predecessors, 'Abd-al-Nasir and al-Sadat.

[Question] As a member of the Egyptian parliament and, at the same time, the brother of the head of state, do you not maintain relations with the ministers?

[Answer] Thank God I have no relationships with any of the ministers. There are some ministers whom I respect and esteem.

What happened to the brothers of 'Abd-al-Nasir and al-Sadat after their death is a fresh example. That is why I stay as far away as I can from any minister. I attend to all my own business personally.

[Question] But are you not considering going abroad again?

[Answer] Not at all. I shall remain in Egypt and do not intend to travel again.

12502

CSO: 4504/429

EGYPT

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY SESSION NOTED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 10 Jul 85 p 6

[Article by Fu'ad Sa'd: "First Parliamentary Session's Effort Under Multiparty System"]

[Text] The day following the last meeting of the People's Assembly parliamentary session--the meeting during which the opposition walked out following the decision to withdraw the parliamentary immunity of Wafdish Deputy Mustafa Shardi--I saw four assembly members standing together in the wide assembly courtyard talking as friends about general subjects and laughing every now and then. When I drew closer to them, I saw that they were two National Party [NDP] members, Sa'd Shalabi and Tawfiq Zaghlul, with the other two from the opposition, Mustafa al-Tawil and Dr Milad Hanna.

The truth is that this made me happy. I had imagined a rupture or a kind of enmity between the two sides because of the opposition's action in the final meeting. I immediately remembered what Ahmad Yusuf al-Jundi (the successful Egyptian businessman in London) once told me. He said that his late father, Yusuf al-Jundi, a Wafd Party leader in the forties, was a close friend of Dr Ahmad Mahir, leader of the Sa'diyin party and prime minister at the time. In one of the parliamentary sessions, there was a harsh argument between the two men, during which they exchanged the most horrible insults! The young man thought that this scene was the end of the friendship between his father and the prime minister and the final rupture between the two friends. When he returned home around midnight, however, he heard laughter coming from his father's study. When he entered the room, he was surprised to see his father with Ahmad Mahir and 'Umar 'Umar (former head of the Bar Association and a Wafd leader as well) spending the rest of the evening together following the parliamentary session. From then on, he realized that one can always distinguish between political differences and personal friendship.

Today seems so much like yesterday, or, as Justice Ahmad Musa, People's Assembly counsel, rightly says, democratic practice is deeply rooted in the Egyptian people's nature.

Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub (People's Assembly president) says in this regard: "The assembly hall witnessed throughout this session extensive objective debates enriched by both the majority and the opposition with opinions

and counteropinions. These debates laid the foundation of new traditions in democratic practice in our constitutional institutions which represented a new spirit that partisan differences are differences over principles, programs and solutions and that the current phase requires all assembly members, majority and opposition alike, to proceed in a bold and honorable national bloc in order to confront our social problems in a serious and positive fashion and for the sake of national goals."

No Excessive Legislation

We know that the People's Assembly has two main tasks:

The first is the legislative task, represented in the debate and passage of bills. It is noted in this regard that the assembly did not live up to expectations in passing laws, even though the general principle it reached regarding the application of the Islamic Shari'ah, to "cleanse the present laws of provisions which are in violation of the Islamic Shari'ah" in a gradual and scientific way while preparing the general atmosphere for society to attain the Islamic society, is appreciated. Another thing worthy of appreciation as well is the assembly's endeavors to pass the new personal statute law during this session and the great efforts exerted by the members of the legislative committee, under the chairmanship of Justice Hilmi 'Abd-al-Akbar, to accomplish this great feat.

The assembly president says in this regard that "we were intent on confronting our social problems through a universal perspective and we avoided legislative distention. This position was based on the assembly's conviction, shared by the executive power, that the crucial point was not legislative distention or going overboard in legislative enactments, but rather the enactment of solid legislation so as to keep pace with social and economic growth in order to clear the way for change and development."

Assembly Watchdog Role

As for the assembly's second task, to oversee government action, it was clear that the assembly performed this role with efficiency and efficacy through parliamentary watchdog means which are inquiries directed at the ministers, interpellations, and fact-finding committees.

This prominent role was shared by both majority and opposition People's Assembly members on the basis that loyalty to the homeland takes precedence over loyalty to partisan commitment.

In this regard two observations may be made:

The first is that many questions by the members were local or regional in nature, although such questions are supposed to be left to the governorates' popular councils while the People's Assembly is supposed to rise to the level of general questions of interest to all governorates and all citizens.

The second observation is that many of the people's general problems did not receive enough attention through general debate. A good case in point

was that only 3 out of every 12 requests for a general debate submitted by the members submitted during the session were discussed. They were:

- the application of the Islamic Shari'ah;
- the drought problem;
- the means for developing and exploiting fish resources.

The remaining questions, although very important were not discussed. They were:

- the housing problem and how to ease it;
- the housing policy in Egypt;
- the population problem in Egypt;
- the positive and negative aspects of the local government system and how to support it;
- the supply policy;
- the construction of new cities and communities;
- the electric power outage phenomenon;
- subsidies and provision of electric power;
- means for developing and alleviating land registry and documentation procedures.

New Stars

Indeed, the dialogue inside the hall most of the time was objective and constructive. The assembly knights from among the veteral deputies maintained their standard with the emergence of the new knights serving their first term. The rise of new stars among women leaders, although not to the desired degree, is also noted with appreciation. In the forefront of the new female stars are: Layla Hasan (al-Sharqiyah [Governorate]), Suhayr Jalyanah (North Sinai), Jablah 'Awwad (South Sinai), Wajihah al-Zalabani (al-Buhayrah), Imitithal al-Dib (Alexandria), 'Inayat Abu al-Yazid (al-Gharbiyah), Zaynab 'Abd-al-Hamid (Bani Suwayf), Amal 'Abd-al-Karim (Aswan) and Sakinah Ahmad (Asyut).

Female leaders played a significant role behind the scenes regarding the personal statute law. We make special mention of Dr Amal 'Uthman (minister of social affairs and assembly member) and Mrs Fatimah 'Annan (dean of assembly women).

What Do Assembly Leaders Say?

And now, what is the opinion of assembly leaders, both majority and opposition:

Justice Ahmad Musa (assembly counsel) says: "For the first time since the outbreak of the revolution; we have a parliamentary opposition with a clear and independent entity which has a full chance to express a counter-opinion. This session is undoubtedly considered a successful step on the road to proper democratic practice which is deeply rooted in the Egyptian people's nature. Thus, we have started to regain our character and true entity in the democratic system.

"The democratic way is the firmly established road for realizing the people's goals of development, for alleviating suffering and for solving chronic problems which have accumulated throughout past regimes.

"We all remember that not too long ago no kind of opposition was allowed. Now, this parliamentary session produced a strong opposition which had its full chance to oversee the government through inquiries and interpellations concerning nuclear reactors and those related to losses in the cement industry. The fact is that these interpellations were objective and, therefore, received great government attention. There is no better proof than the fact that the opposition received its full rights whereby the opposition leader spoke 115 times in this session and the Labor Party leader spoke 70 times."

Justice Mumtaz Nassar (opposition leader) says: "The session was eventful and successful by all standards. The opposition had its full share of debate and dialogue despite certain difficulties arising from the assembly presidency's insistence, in many cases, on expressing its opinion from its podium although we overcame this problem by fruitful dialogue. However, the last day of the session, when the opposition walked out, had some repercussion on the many positive accomplishments.

"There is no doubt, and the truth be said, that compared to previous parliamentary sessions, this session's positive points far outnumbered its negativeness."

Engr Ibrahim Shukri (Labor Party leader) says: "We must not forget that the People's Assembly, through this recent session, had the burden of debating two state budgets (1984-85) and (1985-86), two reports on the economic development plan and two communiques reporting government policy. This took considerable time and was a praiseworthy effort by the assembly during this session.

"On the other hand, however, we note that the most important debate in this session was the one concerning the application of the Islamic Shari'ah. I believe it did not get its fair share of debate, thus creating repercussions which could have been avoided. This matter was taken up during the personal statute law debates. Despite some people's belief that some differences existed over certain provisions, objective discussions and

the willingness to hear all points of view and to give a full chance for dialogue resulted ultimately in unanimous approval of the final version of the law which had in mind the safety and stability of the family.

"I can truly say that the opposition had its fair share of debate in most cases, although it encountered some restrictions in some very important and sensitive subjects. I do hope, however, that the democratic process will move toward better things, God willing, and I believe that in light of this session's experience, the assembly bylaws must be reviewed."

Mahmud Dabbur (assembly counsel) says: "The session, as far as duration, was the longest parliamentary session (13 months) and, as far as content, was the strongest session during which serious practices occurred. I believe that the opposition had a good chance to participate in overseeing government action and was actually able to assert its presence in legislative action.

"In general, despite excesses by certain parties, the end result attests to the fact that parliamentary performance in this session was unprecedented in Arab parliaments. Furthermore, it gives new hope for enhancing democratic practice which has been marked mostly by national reconciliation and, at the same time, by democratic flexibility in the sense that support or rejection is not linked to fixed platforms, be it in the majority party or the opposition. This tends to settle situations in favor of public, rather than partisan, interests, and this is what is needed.

"It is noted that the tempo inside the assembly was not limited to some glamorous faces. Many members, including the female element, were infected by parliamentary performance, thus giving the session fertility and wealth.

"As for the negative aspect, it is still hoped that the assembly's General Committee will be more active so as to be similar to the government's cabinet. We also hope that the assembly committees (18 of them) will perform their duties in the field of holding meetings at production and work sites to hear what the people have to say. We also hope that the assembly will soon set up its own printing press so that members will receive reports and printed matter on time. Moreover, there are efforts underway now to modernize work in the assembly through the use of a computer, in addition to efforts being made to create a family atmosphere for assembly employees because a sense of stability promotes better performance."

Dr Milad Hanna' (representative of the left and an opposition leader) says: "Egypt today is not ruled by the will of individuals or groups, but rather by the will of the state's constitutional institutions. Not since 1952 has the parliamentary arena witnessed such democratic interaction among the political forces as this session, which spread the broadcast democratic climate since the outbreak of the revolution. As an engineer, I say this recent session is considered the basic stage in the democratic edifice, even though its accomplishments have not yet come to the surface. If the practice continues in the same fashion, I expect that this democratic edifice will be completed in the next session via the amendment of the People's Assembly elections law, so as to give more guarantees to the electoral

process, and the amendment of the parties law by changing the "potentate committee" and easing the restrictions on the creation of new parties.

"I expect the first floor of the democratic edifice to be built in the next session. As for the other floors, they are ambitious expectations toward the building of a democratic skyscraper in Egypt."

12502
CSO: 4504/431

EGYPT

ABU GHAZALAH HAILS PRODUCTION OF TUCANO PLANE

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 18 Jul 85 p 1

[Article: "Egypt's Manufacture of Tucano Aircraft Is Proof That Egyptians Are Arab Nation's Vanguard"]

[Text] Field Marshal Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, deputy prime minister and minister of defense and military production, announced that the Egyptian "Tucano" aircraft, seen for the first time in the aerial review during the graduation ceremonies for a new class of pilots yesterday, proved the Egyptians' ability to be the Arab nation's foremost model and vanguard.

The new aircraft--produced by the Industrialization Authority and introduced into service by the British Air Force in recognition of its efficiency-- is marked by its low-altitude-flying ability and is one of the fruits of cooperation between Egypt and Brazil. The Tucano aircraft represents an important connecting link in the training program between the "Jumhuriyah," the "Alpha Jet," and the "L-29" aircraft. It will enter the basic training phase during the next few years.

Field Marshal Abu Ghazalah announced that the armed forces had fulfilled their promise to Egypt and its people to have a deterrent air force possessing the most modern aircraft and using the most qualified pilots.

The field marshal said that what we are seeing today is positive proof that we are living up to the promise as loyal citizens. The fact that this excellent elite of Egyptian youth and eagles is joining the air force confirms that we are on the way to fulfilling our commitment to build a deterrent air force to protect Egypt and its skies.

The ceremony was attended by: Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi, deputy prime minister and minister of education and scientific research; Lt Gen Ibrahim al-'Urabi, chief of staff; Dr Kamal al-Janzuri, minister of planning; Dr Wajih Shindi, Minister of tourism; the commanders of the main services of the armed forces; the governor of al-Sharqiyah Governorate; a large number of armed forces commanders; and military delegations from the Royal Jordanian Air Force, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq and the military attaches in Egypt.

The ceremony began with a formation of four Gazelle helicopters carrying the flags of the armed forces, the air force and the air college, followed

by a formation of L-29 aircraft, used for last-year student training which covers the basic training phase, then by Alpha-Jet aircraft, piloted by college instructors and students, which qualifies graduates for piloting the Mirage-2000 and the F-16 aircraft. They are also used as tactical-support fighter-bombers.

Maj Gen Fakhri Jahras, the college dean, announced that President Husni Mubarak, commander in chief of the armed forces, had approved conferring the Military Duty Medal of the Second Order upon the top graduates and Field Marshal Abu Ghazalah awarded each graduate a bachelor's degree in aviation and an international commercial pilot's license and appointed each an air lieutenant on probation.

Air Marshall Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid Hilmi, air force commander, talked about the importance of developing the Air College to graduate a new generation of pilots who understand the new technology and confirmed the existence of cooperation in this regard with the U.S. Air Force Academy and Egyptian universities and the Military Technical Academy.

12502

CSO: 4504/431

EGYPT

MISSILE BOATS TO BE MADE BY LOCAL INDUSTRY

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 16 Jul 85 p 1

[Article: "Field Marshal Abu Ghazalah Announces Egypt Is To Manufacture Missile Boats; Only Egyptian Expertise Used in Shipbuilding"]

[Text] Field Marshall Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, deputy prime minister and minister of defense and military production, announced that the Armed Forces Higher Council had approved and given instructions to the navy commander to start forthwith the production of missile boats in Egypt. He stressed that no foreign-made missile boats will be purchased, regardless of the cost.

He added that the armed forces are concentrating in the current stage on bringing in all the Egyptian shipbuilding experts so as to give a full chance to Egyptian industries and prevent foreign experts from regarding this matter as a way for material gains only.

He said Egypt's entry into the field of building missile boats enables us to claim that we are on the right road to building Egypt with Egyptian hands and protecting it by navy personnel, for in order to control the land, one must control the sea, and in order to control the heart, one must control the extremities. We have long coasts and need a strong navy to protect these coasts.

Field Marshal Abu Ghazalah said that it had been declared to form a committee of armed forces personnel, including a number of industrialists in Egypt headed by the Suez Canal Authority, the Arab Contractors [Company], and all the shipbuilding agencies, to study Egyptian industrial capabilities that can support this industry and concentrate on the construction industry in Egypt instead of importing it so as to augment Egyptian industrial depth in the shipbuilding industry.

Field Marshal Abu Ghazalah had witnessed in Isma'iliyah yesterday the launching of three armed forces fast coastal launches built by the Arab Contractors shipyard in Isma'iliyah and delivered to the border Guard forces.

The ceremony was attended by Eng Muhsin Sidqi, minister of housing; Mr 'Abd-al-Mun'im 'Amarah, governor of Isma'iliyah; Eng Muhammad 'Izzat 'Adil, head of the Suez Canal Authority; Lt Gen 'Ali Jad, navy commander; Maj Gen Mahmud

Mahdi, commander of the Border Guards; Eng Salah Hasaballah, president of the Arab Contractors; and senior armed forces commanders.

Field Marshal Abu Ghazalah, accompanied by Lt Gen Ibrahim al-'Urabi, chief-of-staff of the armed forces, the heads of the different services and a number of commanders, inspected the final stage of combat readiness testing of an armored formation. At the conclusion of the inspection, the field marshall thanked the commanders, the officers and the soldiers for their efforts and praised the formation's high combat efficiency. He asked them to work hard to maintain this standard and to pay attention to training.

12502
CSO: 4504/431

LIBYA

BRIEFS

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AGREEMENT SIGNED--The agreement on the establishment of the Council of the Union of the Arab-African chambers of commerce was signed in Rabat yesterday within the context of the Arab-African Union between the Jamahiriya and the Maghreb. Brother Tahar Masmoudi, Moroccan minister of commerce and industry, expressed the hope when he received members of the two chambers in the Jamahiriya and Morocco that this union would become the nucleus of a comprehensive union of industrial and commercial chambers in the Arab Maghreb countries and praised the efforts exerted by the brother leader of the revolution and King Hassan II for the consolidation of the foundation of the Arab-African Union. [Text] [Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 2 Aug 85]

CSO: 4500/174

MOROCCO

ALTERNATE MEANS OF OBTAINING FINANCING ADOPTED

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 28 Jun 85 p 11

[Article: "Establishment of 'Mutual Guarantee Societies' to Support the Economic, Industrial, and General Development of the Country"]

[Text] Difficulties encountered by companies and even, at times, by banks in finding the credits needed by companies to modernize their equipment; the uncertainties in the international situation; and the inadequacy of existing methods of economic evaluation have led a considerable number of professional people and business leaders (including those from medium and small-sized companies) to adopt the principles of solidarity, cooperation, and mutual benefit.

That is how mutual guarantee societies were born, initially in Europe. They started off with a bang, and observers agree in thinking that they will have an even more brilliant future.

The principle of the system is simple: it involves establishing regional, national, or professional groups intended to facilitate access to bank financing to their members. In other words, potential borrowers join an organization called a "mutual guarantee society" capable of providing them with a collective credit guarantee which, most often, they are not in a position to offer the banks on an individual basis.

In short, the basic idea is the substitution of a group for an isolated debtor.

Although the "mutual guarantee societies" were first developed in Europe at the beginning of this century, they only achieved real development after World War II. There were various reasons for that, including the need for reconstruction in the countries damaged by military operations during the war, the little interest which an isolated potential borrower had for the banks, and banking technique, which had not yet reached its present degree of development.

In most countries this technique of a "collective guarantee" has often served to complement the activities of national level credit organizations which at times are structured according to the same principles of mutuality and cooperation. The objective of these national level bodies is the financing of certain vital sectors of the economy such as medium and small-sized companies, individual artisans, agriculture, transportation, housing, etc.

Initial Experiments

The initial experiments took place in the field of grain production and transportation. Then the movement reached out to medium and small-sized companies. At present in Europe there are about 600 mutual guarantee societies, with more than 630,000 professional and medium and small business members. Credit guarantees of all kinds are often for sums amounting in overall terms to the equivalent of several tens of billions of dirhams.

In Morocco, this new Morocco where the past, present, and future live together, the concept of community has been developed, moving from the traditional form of solidarity to a new idea of planning and organization provided by mutual insurance institutions and modern production and marketing cooperatives. Today the cooperatives are real economic units whose development is encouraged by the state in all areas. The spirit of solidarity has also seen its field of activity extend to the areas of the risks faced by individual persons in their places of employment and their private lives. On this subject laws have also been promulgated, including the royal decree issued on 22 March 1955 establishing a solidarity and guarantee fund to guarantee loans for the fishing season and for the consolidation of other debts. These loans were extended by the Banque Populaire to shipowners in the fishing industry. Furthermore, the royal decree of 2 February 1961 on the reform of the Credit Populaire Marocain [Moroccan People's Credit Institution] states in Article 1: "The Moroccan People's Credit Institution is composed of the following organizations: the board of directors of the Credit Populaire [People's Credit Institution], the Banque Centrale Populaire [People's Central Bank], and regional people's banks."

In this way the mutual guarantee system has begun to function in Morocco.

An Organism for Providing Guarantees

A mutual guarantee society is not a bank. It does not receive deposits into accounts or in the form of advances of funds. It is a guarantee organization which places itself between the customer and the banker in order to allow its members to obtain loans which are often more substantial than they could obtain on their own and, at times, under more advantageous conditions.

Mutual guarantee societies operate by providing surety in the form of endorsements and recourse of last resort, on the basis of a proper estimate of the risks and the character and personal competence of its members. This is

what is called the "ratio" of human value. There is nothing automatic in the operation of a mutual guarantee society.

The resources of these societies are provided by the capital subscribed by all of their members and by one or several guarantee funds built up gradually by the contributions of the members in connection with guarantees extended, of which they are the beneficiaries.

A Timely Idea

The idea of such a system in Morocco is particularly timely. In effect the state continues to expand its efforts to develop the country. This is shown by our investment codes. In this context the banking structure plays an essential role, but at times it is limited by the situation. That is the reason for the progressive establishment of a mutual guarantee system, based on the principles of solidarity, cooperation, and mutuality, of such nature as to make it possible to get around--even partially--temporary difficulties and thus to facilitate more and more substantial access to bank financing for different occupational categories. The Moroccan People's Credit Institution is convinced of its value. However, it is necessary for this system to be open to all economic categories, to companies in all sectors of the economy, and to private persons.

In this way our mutual guarantee societies will be able to go beyond the single objective of facilitating access to bank loans. They will be able to involve other forms of economic activity able in participating in the development of the economy or even of regions of the country for which they will serve as spokesmen of their economic and social categories in general. In particular, they will serve as spokesmen in contacts with banking institutions with which they will seek to establish new relationships.

5170
CSO: 4519/164

MOROCCO

DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR THE DAIRY SECTOR

Rabat L'OPINION in French 25 Jun 85 p 4

[Text] Aware of the highly regarded nutritional and social function of milk in Morocco, the government has favored the development of the dairy sector through the adoption of the following measures:

- The increase in the price of dairy products to the producer.
- A broad program for the importation of pure-bred dairy cattle.
- The development of a special system of loans by the CNCA [National Agricultural Credit Fund].
- The elimination of customs duties on the importation of cattle.
- The increase in the margin for the processing of dairy products.
- The establishment of new dairy products processing plants.

These measures have had considerable repercussions on the volume of milk delivered to the dairies, which has increased 10 times over the past 18 years. Some 28 million liters were delivered in 1966; 46 million liters, in 1970; 106 million liters, in 1970; 220 million, in 1979; and 280 million in 1984.

Despite all of this the consumption of dairy products in Morocco remains well below the level recommended by the FAO.

Local Milk Production Is Small

Whether at the urban or national level, the level of production in effect is equal to only one-third of the recommended consumption.

Milk processed at the dairy plants has risen to 280 million liters annually, compared to 800 million liters that would be required to reach the consumption level recommended by the FAO.

At the national level total production amounted to 655 million liters in 1983, compared to national requirements of 2,000 million liters.

Per capita consumption thus amounts to only 40 percent of that of Spain and 15 percent of the level in the countries belonging to the European Economic Community.

This situation is explained first of all by the low level of production by dairy cattle. About 84 percent of the dairy herd is made up of locally bred cows, 11 percent of cows of mixed local and purebred ancestry, and only 5 percent of purebred cows.

The respective production of the three categories is 1 to 2 liters per day for locally bred cows; 3 to 5 liters for cows of mixed breed; and 19 to 15 liters for purebred cows.

The difficult living conditions for most dairy cattle also provide a part of the explanation for this difference. A poorly-nourished cow, poorly taken care of, and periodically subject to climatic variations such as drought, cannot produce as much milk as a cow raised under optimal conditions.

To remedy this situation, two kinds of action have received major attention in the course of the past few years:

--the massive importation of purebred cows (more than 20,000 in 1983 and 1984).

--more extensive use of artificial insemination for the genetic improvement of the dairy herd.

Activities of Milk Processing Plants

The number of pasteurization units has doubled over the past 10 years, thanks to the establishment of many dairy cooperatives and privately-owned dairies covering the principal areas of production.

Milk collection activity near the production areas has expanded substantially, ensuring a stable market for the milk producers (whose income has increased very noticeably) and encouraging a net increase in the volume of milk intended for the urban areas.

The quality of the milk processed by the dairies has also improved to a significant extent, thanks to the installation of milk tanks with electrical generators at the point of production to receive and refrigerate the milk until it is collected by refrigerated tank trucks and brought to the dairies.

The grant of loans for the construction of stables, the establishment of cooperatives for the production of cattle feed, and the payment of premiums for the production of high quality milk are part of the range of measures taken by the dairies which have had an unquestionable effect on the development of the dairy sector.

The network for the distribution of fresh milk and milk products has been considerably expanded in the same way. Dairies have equipped themselves with a large number of refrigerated vehicles to transport their products to distant centers of distribution.

Parallel to these efforts, the dairies have tripled their capacity to process milk and milk products over the past 12 years, going from 140 million liters in 1973 to 450 million liters in 1984.

At the largest dairies the personnel are trained very carefully and are assisted by engineers and technicians who have broad experience in the dairy sector. Their first rate equipment is continuously maintained with the most advanced technology. Their laboratories for the testing and analysis of the milk they receive and the products they turn out compare favorably with the European dairy laboratories.

All of these elements ensure that the milk sold in Morocco is one of the cleanest products of all, thanks to the continued efforts by the dairies to maintain the highest level of quality in their products, whether this involves the collection of the milk, the transportation to the dairies in tank trucks, or onward movement and distribution to points of sale.

These activities are in addition to careful measures adopted for following up and checking on the reception of the milk at the dairies and in the course of processing.

Furthermore, the dairy sector has a very important additional impact on the whole economy of the country, due to the substantial purchasing power which it provides the milk producers on the farms and the high added value which it contributes at each of the various phases of its activity (collection, transportation, processing at the dairy, sale of dairy products, etc).

Continued investment by the dairies in expanding and modernizing their means of production is part of a program of long term development, reflecting their desire to favor in every possible way the harmonious expansion of this branch of the economy. Their objective is to achieve self-sufficiency for Morocco in the field of milk and dairy products, which constitutes one of the priority areas for the government in the agricultural and food sector.

5170
CSO: 4519/164

MOROCCO

BRIEFS

EDITORIAL CALLS FOR MODERATION--If the dispute which has arisen between Iraq and Libya should continue, it threatens to compromise seriously the holding of the Arab summit meeting. Efforts are being made to contain the dispute. Several Arab countries will be in touch with the leaders of the two countries, with which they have excellent relations. Morocco in particular will not hesitate to use all of its influence to urge Tripoli and Baghdad to display more moderation. Linked to Libya by the treaty of the UAA [Arab African Union] and having supported the UAA since the beginning of the conflict, our country can play a very important and very useful role with these two friendly countries. The statement published by the Libyan press agency, "Jana," declaring that no treaty was signed with Tehran and that, in fact, this only involved a memorandum of a conversation is a very good sign and seems to be the result of the mediation efforts now underway. Furthermore, the fact that this statement makes clear that the Iranian side rejected all of the Libyan proposals to put an end to the conflict in the Persian Gulf indicates that some differences of view continue to exist between the two countries. The Libyan statement, if it does not reassure Baghdad, should at least encourage Iraq to moderate its attitude toward Tripoli. If this dispute can be ironed out, there is room for hope. Of course, there will still remain some Syrian reservations. However, these are not insurmountable. [Text] [Rabat L'OPINION in French 30 Jun 85 p 1] 5170

EEC AID--Rabat, 26 Jul (MAP)--The European Economic Community decided to grant Morocco an aid totalling \$25.5 million destined to the carrying out of a project in the field of vocational and technical training. This aid will be devoted to the construction and equipment of 10 institutes of applied technology and 13 centers for vocational training. [Text] [Rabat MAP in English 1215 GMT 26 Jul 85 LD]

CSO: 4500/175

SUDAN

LOCAL BA'TH PARTY BRANCH REJECTS PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 1 Jul 85 p 21

Article: "We Reject the Draft Constitution for the Transitional Period"

Excerpt Text starts at this point has encumbered "justice in full" with a distorted arbitrary quality which is not worthy of the accepted usage concerning justice and its consummation. It would have been more correct to specify cases of arrest, detention and imprisonment in a manner which would not destroy people's rights and would guarantee that people were not treated ignominiously in the law, for instance, if it were pointed out that the only cases in which this was allowed were ones of flagrant violation, and that except for that it was permitted to arrest, detain and imprison people only by order of a competent judge or the public prosecutor, provided that the law specify the period of imprisonment and detention. It also ought to stipulate proper treatment during arrest and imprisonment in a manner worthy of the dignity of citizens and to specify that their status is subject to the Department of Prisons and its bills.

3. Article 22, which guarantees the freedom to reside and move inside and outside the country, comes about as a total appropriation of the freedom to reside and move about and unabashedly embraces the same contents as the evil aspects of the 1973 constitution, amended in 1975, which codified the usurpation of freedom in the era of Numayri and paved the way for the preventive arrests of unspecified periods for close to 7 years in the May regime's penitentiaries. Any restriction or suspension of the freedom to reside or move about must be abrogated, except in accordance with a judiciary verdict after all the forms of contestation which the law gives to the accused have been exhausted. As a precautionary measure, a solid barrier is needed which will prevent the imposition of any restrictions or suspensions on the right to move about except in accordance with a judiciary order or after the agreement of the public prosecutor for a specific period which the law will state in both cases, on condition that the judiciary order or the public prosecutor's agreement be subject to oversight by the judiciary for contestation, with urgent measures.

Second, the stipulations bearing on legislation in Articles 34 and 35. In spite of the overlaps from which the allocation of legislative powers to the Provisional Military Council and the Council of Ministers might be apparent, because the Provisional Military Council is a transitional institution which does not have ministerial responsibility, its area of competence must cover aspects of acts of

sovereignty and leave the matter of legislation during the transition to the field executive authority to facilitate the tasks of the Council of Ministers, provided that the Provisional Military Council be given a pro forma area of competence in approving legislation.

Therefore we consider that the area of jurisdiction of issuing legislation should be vested in the Council of Ministers, on the provision that the Military Council approve that, so that the latter will not be permitted to reject the legislation unless it has not received the agreement of two thirds the members of the Council of Ministers — similar to the orientation of the 1956 constitution, amended in 1964. If this area of legislative jurisdiction is not observed in the formation of the Council of Ministers, when it is decided that the parties are not to be given representation in it, the absence of the parties from its removal from the area of legislative jurisdiction; rather, it requires a review of its composition in a manner which is in keeping with the assignment of this jurisdiction to it.

Third, the article bearing on provisional rule and the regional executive council, Article 55, has given the Provisional Military Council the right to appoint the regional council and its chairman. This formulation in essence is not democratic and is unproductive, at least as far as appointing the rulers of regions goes. In order for it to be as possible for the regional council to face the challenges of running the region and solving its urgent problems related to the life of the citizens, in the context of the tasks of the transitional stage, its formation must include the national and democratic movement and the sector of administrators in the region who are not connected politically to the May regime, provided that the chairman of the regional council be elected from among the members.

Fourth, the articles bearing on the judiciary authority, Article 125 and those following it, have not addressed themselves to the sections of the judiciary authority in order to differentiate between the civilian judiciary and the judiciary of Islamic law in a manner where one can infer a statement of the places where the civilian and Islamic legal judiciary have been merged at present and an emergency intentional situation in our judiciary, because the judiciary, since it arose in the Sudan, was founded on the subdivision as an effect of the nature of the difference in study curricula. The true nature of the experience of the merger of the two judiciaries has cast wrongful reflections on the institution of justice in which the two sections have participated since the judges assumed areas of specialization without possessing sufficient knowledge to discuss them in a just, sound manner. Therefore, the separation between the civilian judiciary and the Islamic law judiciary is necessary.

Fifth, in the context of the general observations on the stipulations of the draft, we might set out the following:

1. The draft in the section bearing on the freedoms and rights of the citizen contains the use of the expression "in accordance with reasonable restrictions." The expression, in essence, involves an obscure restriction which entails risks of contradicting the principle and nature of right by means of sources which are not specified in the legislative area, "law," for example.

2. In the government agencies, following the establishment of the Constituent Assembly, the article related to the formation of the legislative authority specifies that the legislative authority in the Sudan consists of the Sovereignty Council and the Constituent Assembly, but the stipulation requires that detail be spelled out showing the relationship between the assembly and the Sovereignty Council and the role of each as far as legislation is concerned.

3. Article 76B, which specifies the periods for holding the Constituent Assembly, does not give a specific idea in terms of formulation and requires a formulation stating the meaning intended.

4. Article 97 specifies that the president is an alternative to the Sovereignty Council in the permanent constitution, which has not yet been issued, whereas this matter has not been discussed and might be subject to a choice between a parliamentary and a presidential one and the retention of the formula of the Sovereignty Council. Therefore the phrase ought not to have discussed the form of the sovereign institution.

Sixth, in general, we observe that the provisions of the draft have not dealt with the following important issues:

1. The identity of the Sudan's affiliation with the Arab nation, the Islamic entity and the African continent.
2. Affirmation of the inviolability of people's homes and the avoidance of entering and breaking into them except by judiciary order stating cause.
3. The details of basic human rights in civil, economic and political terms and the assertion of equality with respect to them.

Seventh, for all the reasons cited above our party confidently considers it necessary to rule out the draft of the transitional constitution of the Sudan for the Islamic lunar year 1405, with all its articles, which have now been set forth for discussion outside the framework of the declaration as a constitution for the transitional stage. We call on all bodies concerned to join in the rejection of the proposed draft in its overall and specific form because it conflicts with the spirit and goals of the uprising.

Eighth, since the national forces — the political parties, the union grouping and the armed forces — have previously declared their agreement to the charter which embodied the spirit of the uprising in its stipulations and guaranteed that reliance would be placed on the 1956 constitution, amended in 1964, to be in effect during the period of transition, and this is a constitution which in its provisions negates all the flaws and reservations which have marred the proposed draft, we appeal for the declaration of the 1956 constitution amended in 1964 as a constitutional document to be in effect during the stage of transition, following the execution of an amendment, to be referred to as the 1985 amendment, which will contain the following:

1. Reference to the Provisional Military Council rather than the Sovereignty Council.

2. The introduction of provisions spelling out reliance on decentralization in regional government.
3. The introduction of provisions codifying regional autonomy for the southern Sudan.

11887
CSO: 4504/410

SUDAN

PROBLEM OF NATIONAL PARTY FRAGMENTATION UNDER NUMAYRI REVIEWED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 10 Jul 85 pp 40, 41

Article by Mahmud Idris: "The Chairman of the National Unionist Party Relates the Story of the Schism in the National Unionist Party to AL-YAMAMAH: Did Isma'il Al-Azhari Die of Poisoning?"

Text No one will argue that the former regime's legacy of 16 years has left negative effects and obvious marks on all aspects of life in the Sudan, including party entities, which had been homogeneous until the moment the May coup took place in 1969. The most conspicuous of these effects was the split of the major parties into two or more segments.

In an attempt to clarify the roots of the dispute -- prompting Mr. 'Ali Mahmud Hasanayn to go back to "the roots" as he says -- I met with him in a conversation to ascertain the reasons why he formed the National Unionist Party, under his chairmanship, bearing in mind that the party had merged with the Democratic People's Party under the name of the Democratic Unionist Party, while we saw the leaders of the party rallying around the banner of the latter party under the leadership of the shepherd of the party, Mr Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani, on the basis on which the merger was founded under the chairmanship of Mr Isma'il al-Azhari. It was believed that with the restoration of democracy the party would return in its original form, which was dissolved with the outbreak of the 25 May 1969 coup. What is new?

The Beginning of the Party Rift

Question The National Unionist Party was known in the past for its nationalist struggle through which it participated effectively during independence, and its structure was homogeneous until that date, under the command of the leader Isma'il al-Azhari. Then there occurred the setback, which led to the schism within it, and its base became fragmented. Would you be so kind as to shed some light on this subject?

Answer Following the Sudan's attainment of independence in January 1956, disputes started to predominate within the party, since a group sought to dominate it from within -- the al-Khatmiyah leadership, at that time. When the party leadership rejected this factional dominance and considered that the National Unionist Party should continue as a democratic political party, this

group seceded and dismembered from it, formed the Democratic People's Party under the supervision of the al-Khatmiyah faction leadership. That was at the end of the first year of independence.

The Democratic People's Party, which emerged from the heart of the National Unionist Party, was allied at that time with the al-Ummah Party under the leadership and stewardship of al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Mahdi. This alliance was able to bring down the National Unionist Party cabinet, forming a new cabinet, known in political history as the cabinet of the two al-Sayyids — 'Ali al-Mirghani, the overseer of the al-Khatmiyah faction, and 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Mahdi, the overseer of the al-Ummah Party, the Partisans. The chairman of that party was Mr 'Abdallah Khalil, secretary of the al-Ummah Party at that time.

The Delivery of Power to the Military

The National Unionist Party entered the 1958 elections alone in confrontation with the alliance of the two al-Sayyids, the al-Ummah and the Democratic People's Parties; the National Unionist Party won 45 seats while the Democratic People's Party won 22, and the alliance of the al-Ummah and Democratic People's Parties managed to form the second "cabinet of the two al-Sayyids" under the chairmanship of Mr 'Abdallah Khalil.

The National Unionist Party remained in opposition, attracting the nationalist forces, and managed to expose the methods of factional dominance of political activity, shaking the condition of the coalition cabinet. It so happened that it was led to a state of collapse, which prompted the prime minister at that time, "Abdallah Khalil, to seek the aid of the armed forces and explicitly call on them to hold a coup in the well known sense of military coups. However, it was a delivery and a deliverance between the prime minister and the military leaders. This is not a claim on our part but something which was established through proof after the judiciary investigation which took place after the October 1964 uprising, since it became apparent that that was a delivery and a deliverance between the cabinet of the two parties and the leadership of the military and not a matter of a military coup from within the armed forces, as had been imagined.

The National Unionist Party resisted Lt Gen 'Abbud's regime from the beginning. In 1959 the al-Ummah Party joined the opposition which the National Unionist Party had started when the leader Isma'il al-Azhari and the imam al-Sadiq al-Mahdi formed the first opposition national front toward the end of that year. Then the Communists, the Moslem Brothers and some independent personalities came and the opposition front was formed, while the Democratic People's Party continued to support the military cabinet of Lt Gen 'Abbud, and kept supporting it until the uprising of October 1964 occurred.

The Revival of the Merger

In 1967, the al-Khatmiyah leadership considered it necessary to merge the People's Democratic Party into the National Unionist Party so that it would be close to power and so that this leadership would be under the protection of the National

Unionist Party's long struggle. For subjective considerations, the leadership of the National Unionist Party agreed at that time to the merger proposed by the leadership of the al-Khatmiyah, because that constituted a confrontation over the elections to the presidency, for which the leader al-Azhari had been nominated in competition with the overseer of the al-Ummah Party, the imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi.

All forces would have to try to gather other forces around themselves, in order to gain the hoped-for victory by various means. This was perhaps one reason for the National Unionist leadership's agreement to the proposed merger without reservation under the title of "the Democratic Unionist Party," which was formed by taking a word from each party in the old format. The matter was not lacking in negotiations and narrow intrinsic temporary interests. That merger was not one of principle or conviction. The Democratic Unionist Party arose on the rubble of the two parties but did not hold people's conferences at the base in order to approve the one of the most important of which was to bring the forces together to contest the elections to the presidency. Therefore, the merger was not effected in real form, out of conviction; rather, it was just an unstable "welding together," and the split in that weld continued to remain until an obvious, categoric rift a year later, when Numayri and his clique took power in the Sudan on 25 May 1969.

The Destruction of the Fragile Merger

Just 5 days after Numayri's coup, the overseer of the party, the leader of the al-Khatmiyah, sent a declaration to Ja'far Numayri supporting his coup, at a time when the chairman of the party himself, Azhari, was locked up in Kawbar Prison. This meant that the party overseer supported the dissolution of the parties, supported the aborting of democracy, supported the imprisonment of the party chairman and supported the new orientation of the May regime through the political decision the party overseer had taken in the absence of the imprisoned chairman of the party. That, in our opinion, was the beginning of the official destruction of this fragile merger.

However, we continued to work within the opposition under the title of the "Democratic Unionist" Party for 16 years, for considerations of opposition secret action and out of concern over national reconciliation. Nonetheless, we were far from the al-Khatmiyah leadership in body and soul. After the elimination of the May regime new facts emerged with the appearance of new generations which could not acknowledge oversight or factional hegemony over political action. These are new forces committed in principle to the freedom and democracy which are not to be found in the factional hegemony over political entities. Our decision was to go back to the "National Unionist" Party; that was a return to combative "roots" and a return to the values of freedom and democracy. We are extremely concerned with modernizing the party so that it can absorb the intellectual changes which have occurred in the social structure over the 16 years, and that will in no way be present in the context of a factional party.

Question The fact is that the Democratic Unionist Party still contains some old leaders of the National Unionist Party. You say that your party continued to exist in its entire form during the period of the May regime. How can we reconcile your statement and the fact that a leadership body was wrested from your party, rallying under the banner of the Democratic Unionist Party?

Answer The party's activity during the opposition period was secret and underground, not coordinated activity agreed upon by all the forces in it. The forces which fought against the May regime were numerous, and this was natural in the context of the repressive regime at that time.

The statement that major leadership elements of the National Unionist Party are now working in the ranks of the Democratic Unionist Party is one which involves great exaggeration. There are some personalities who are now formally in the ranks of the Democratic Unionist Party but do not differ with us over anything. Further, they agree with us regarding everything we have propounded and are in favor of the establishment of the National Unionist Party. They are a fragmented group within the Democratic Unionist Party, say what we say and attack factional hegemony over the Democratic Unionist Party and the symbols which dominate it. We are certain that they will not stay within this entity at all and will not allow this party to be led by elements which played a part in supporting the May regime. Therefore, we anticipate their departure at any time from the Democratic Unionist context. We hope that that will happen as soon as possible so that it will be possible for the true national ranks to be united in the framework of the national Unionist Party.

Six Basic Points of Emphasis

Question The National Unionist Party's new tendencies are scarcely understood by many people who did not have close experience with party life in the past, mostly from groups of young people. What could one say about that?

Answer We have prepared the draft of the new National Unionist Party charter, which we presented to the third general conference of the party held last May. The conference discussed the draft of the charter after it had introduced some amendments into it, then approved it in its final form. It is a charter which consists of three chapters. The first chapter concerns the intellectual points of emphasis of the party, the second concerns the general program and the third concerns the system for administering the party.

Here I would like to talk about the party's intellectual points of emphasis. The charter has defined these as six points, which are:

First, the Sudanese personality. The National Unionist Party expresses the Sudanese personality, which has taken form in the course of many years through the intermixture of numerous cultures, religions and beliefs which formed the distinctive personality of the Sudanese. The party expresses that in this context.

Second, democracy. The democracy the party is calling for has a specific, definite significance. It means equality of rights and obligations. It means

equality of opportunities, and it means freedom of belief and the freedom to express this belief and advocate it.

Third, Sudanese socialism. This is a socialism which is not founded on class struggle or enmity among the various social groups but is a socialism founded on mutual solidarity, mutual affection and mutual compassion.

Fourth, Islam. Islam is a civilized religion which calls for the establishment of society of grace. It is a society which is also founded on integration, mutual compassion and consultation in wisdom.

Fifth, nationalism. The party is founded on a national basis in the sense that it expresses the Sudanese personality, which is of necessity organically connected to Sudanese society and draws its thought from Sudanese ground and the conscience of the Sudanese people.

Sixth, ethnicity. The National Unionist Party is a national vessel within which Moslems, Christians and others interact. It includes all races, culture, religions and beliefs; it is not founded on a religious basis, a racial basis or a geographic basis.

The Need To Try the May Regime's Leadership

Question During the years of repression, the Sudanese people were subjected to various types of mistreatment, torture, alienation and theft. What is the party's opinion on trying the former regime and its overseers? What is your opinion on the September laws?

Answer We consider it necessary to try the May regime's leadership, which took part in the establishment of the regime. However, we consider that the current penal laws will not put the regime or its overseers up for that, since all the laws which are in effect now were issued by the May regime — a regime which cannot issue laws which punish its existence and acts.

Therefore we consider that the investigations now taking place will not reach any conclusions, since the investigators ultimately will come up against the absence of any penal laws for trying them. Proceeding from that premise, our party prepared the draft of a law under the title "the 1985 law to prosecute treason and corruption," which we submitted to the Provisional Military Council, the Council of Ministers, the Grouping, the unions and nationalist personalities. That law has the goal of trying the crimes of treason, political and economic corruption, unlawful gain and concealment. The law stipulates that its application will be in effect as of 24 May 1969 and thus has the goal of trying the leadership elite in the May regime and trying its overseers.

As for the September laws, we consider that they were issued by a regime whose existence we do not recognize and which we do not consider to have been qualified to legislate in general. We consider that the people who launched May committed a vile, futile act which the laws that prevailed at that time should punish and consequently we consider that what was founded on futility must be void.

Was Al-Azhari Killed?

Question There are people who say that President Azhari's death was not natural. What opinion does the party have in this regard?

Answer There is a statement which holds that when President Azhari was brought out of prison to attend the funeral of his brother 'Ali al-Azhari he suffered an ailment, as a result of which he was taken to the hospital. It has been said that the government inoculated the president with a poison which hastened his death. A clear investigation on this matter must be held so that it will be possible to arrive at a just decision. If that is proved, we demand that everyone who took part in that be tried on the crime of premeditated murder.

We can now only request an investigation into this incident. What has been proved is that al-Azhari could have been treated abroad. Indeed, there are doctors who recommended that he go abroad but the government deliberately procrastinated on the subject in order to get rid of this genuine national symbol.

Question In the context of the Sudan's relations with Egypt, the May regime concluded some agreements with the Arab Republic of Egypt, including the joint defense agreement and the integration agreement between the two countries. What is the party's opinion on that?

Answer We consider that the joint defense agreement and the integration agreement the Numayri regime concluded with the Egyptian government are agreements concluded in the absence of the Sudanese people and that the Sudanese political forces were not a party to them. Indeed, the practices which existed at that time indicate that the joint defense agreement had the goal of protecting Numayri's regime, not at protecting the Sudanese people!

Therefore, the party considers it necessary to review all the agreements the previous regime concluded with Egypt and others in a careful, complete manner and to eliminate all sections which are not compatible with the democratic orientation.

We in the National Unionist Party believe absolutely and clearly in the special nature of the relationship between the Sudanese and Egyptian peoples; we consider that integration must arise on behalf of the two peoples and that the special nature of the relationship between them must be directed to the service of freedom, democracy and development between the two countries. We consider that real integration between the two peoples makes it incumbent on the political forces in the two countries to resist any dictatorial dominance, in the Sudan or in Egypt. This is the integration we are calling for. It is an integration which has the goal of protecting the peoples, not protecting the regimes.

Question What is the party's view regarding the demand that Numayri be handed over to the Sudan for trial for what he committed against the Sudanese people during his tyrannical era?

Answer We do not yet understand why the Sudanese government has not submitted an official demand for Numayri to be handed over to be held to account before the Sudanese judiciary. We have asked the government more than once to take the initiative to do that and we have presented our view on this matter on the need to present an urgent demand to the Egyptian government in this regard. We cannot agree with the Egyptian government's abstention in handing him over.

The laws on political asylum grant asylum only to persons who have been harmed and oppressed in their country, and this does not apply to Numayri. He was not harmed but rather committed crimes against his people. The Egyptian regime in the past cooperated and was integrated with the Sudanese security agencies, and helped to hand over some of Numayri's opponents. If the Egyptian government itself permitted to do that in the past, how proper it would be for it now to transcend everything and hand over this dictator, the shedder of the blood of the Sudanese people, as an earnest of friendship; thus a new page will be turned in which it will renounce all its past practices!

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BAHRAIN

'EXODUS' OF BANKS 'STEMMED'

GF160600 Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English 16 Jul 85 p 1

[Text] The exodus of banks leaving Bahrain has been stemmed.

Four new banks have been given the go-ahead to set up on the island, halting the closures trend of recent months.

A string of banks have either left the island or scaled down since the turn of the year, prompting real fears of a serious slide.

Some officials cited the economic slowdown and falling oil revenues as reasons for a lack of business.

The new institutions are Midland Banks Group International Trade Services Ltd, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Midland Bank PLC; Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which is 51 percent owned by the North Yemen Government; Italy's Monte Dey Paschi di Siena; and Citicorp Investment Bank Ltd.

A spokesman for the Bahrain Monetary Agency, the island's central bank authority, said all had been granted licences to establish representative offices in Manama.

Citicorp's office will act as a regional representative center to cover its entire Middle East region.

The three latest banks to drastically reconsider their future on the island are the Texas Commerce Bank, the First City National Bank of Houston and Marine Midland.

Marine Midland's decision to leave after just 3 years is said by officials to be part of an international strategy.

They want to put \$2,000 million (BD754 million) in assets back into the U.S. market from European, Middle East and Asian operations.

CSO: 4400/210

BAHRAIN

BRIEFS

LAND STUDY--A feasibility study which could lead to a massive land reclamation project off Bahrain's east coast is well under way, according to official sources. A development plan has been produced and the project could lead to the construction of a third new town. The Fasht Al-Adham scheme could see Bahrain extend more than half-way to Qatar, if the findings are favourable. Officials involved in the project are keeping tightlipped about precise details, though the ambitious plans are known to involve the reclamation of some 200 square kilometres of land off Sitra. [Text] [Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English 25 Jul 85 p 1 GF]

CSO: 4400/210

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE HABASH REVIEWED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 29 Jun 85 pp 56-58

[Article by 'Isa Ibn Hashim: "The Book Answered Some Questions and Left Others Dangling; They Broke Away from 'The Sage' and Went to Marxism, So He Changed His Course and Followed Them."]

[Text] (At the beginning of the sixties, Dr Habash felt that there were many ideas and points of view within the Arab Nationalists Movement that did not point to a unanimity in outlook, and in spite of the formation of a committee, assigned to Muhsin Ibrahim, to review the movement's thoughts, divisions and cracks began to appear within it, Muhsin Ibrahim and those with him from a fanatical pan-Arab group turned into Marxists who promoted Marxist thought as a guide for revolutionary action.)

Dr George Habash is, in a sense, the arouser of modern Palestine, or at least he is one of those who aroused it. Since Palestine fell stained in its blood in 1948, and the Arab soul became a prisoner of despair, weeping and the like, George Habash began to act early on, searching for the reasons for the disaster and trying to do something for the sake of Palestine.

Since his early struggle, in which he was helped by his being in the fertile intellectual environment of the American University of Beirut, the image of modern Palestine has been emerging and taking form with the passage of time. In the book, "Physician of the Revolution" [Hakim al-Thawrah] (Highlight Publications, London, 134 pages), which was issued by Fu'ad Matar about George Habash a few months ago, there are pulsating pages about the leader of the Popular Front beginning with that early trip. They make this book one of the most important documents about one of the most tense and controversial phases in our modern history.

The book begins with what was fixed in George Habash's memory about the lost paradise:

"I remember scenes that occurred in the years before 1936, the year of the armed revolt and the famous strike. At that time, I was in al-Lidd [Lod], in the third or fourth grade. During the arithmetic period, the following thing happened: My friends and I were seated in our places solving an arithmetic problem. Suddenly, the arithmetic teacher stood up, quietly rapped on the

table, placed his watch in front of him, and told us to stand for a moment of silence. We were surprised by the teacher's request, and now there passes through my mind's eye a scene I cannot forget. Tears flowed from the teacher's eyes and fell upon one of the grade books that was before him. As the tears were falling, he said to us, 'At this moment as we are standing, there are brethren of ours hanging from the gallows in Jerusalem'" (p 8).

The story, in a few lines, summarizes one of the stages of the struggle by the Arabs of Palestine against the Jews and the British, and the development of consciousness among the new generation.

"For my part, I admit that it was school that got me involved in the problem of the nation and the masses, because I am from a Christian family, and religious minorities were not at the heart of the nationalist movement in the scientific sense" (p 9).

Even though George Habash says in another place in the book that sectarian questions were not an issue in Palestine, because the enemy of all the people of Palestine was one and the same (p 14).

Many harsh and grievous memories were fixed in the Palestinian youth's memory:

"I remember now the weeping of women when the ten men were taken away. Another incident had a great impact on me. One day, as I was on my way home, I heard cries and wailing and loud weeping at the home of one our neighbours. I asked my mother why, and she told me that the British had executed their son. The British had executed their son? Right now my passions are stirred as I remember. I do not know what my feelings were at that time, but now I know that such events succeeded, and make me remember the road that I have traveled" (p 11).

George Habash's family in al-Lidd had not been a family that concerned itself with politics, and his father never had a weapon in his home. His father was a peaceful person who made a living doing his humble work. He had a beast of burden that he would load up with soap, cloth and sweets, and head for the farmers in their villages. Sometimes he would be gone for more than a day, then he would return with the price of what he had sold. Sometimes he would not bring back money, but rather wheat, eggs and butter. What he brought back, he would sell to other merchants (p 11).

George Habash recounts this information to Fu'ad Matar so that the bloody image returns, and the tears spring anew from the following lines:

"The image of the fall of al-Lidd still arises in my mind's eye, and still in my mind's eye is the sight of the clinic overflowing with wounded, and the sight of the town's mosque and its church swarming with refugees. And still before my mind's eye is also the sight of the wounded girl who cried out for a drink, and the mother who wept for her son, or her child, or her husband. That was a terrible day" (p 19).

A few weeks before the fall of al-Lidd, George Habash had gone to study medicine at the American University of Beirut. The news used to tell about what

was happening in Palestine in the months that preceded the announcement of the state of Israel. It blew hot, and then cold. Before 15 May, he went to al-Karantina in Beirut to find out from those who had come by sea from Palestine about what was going on there. Those people felt that they would be returning, because the seven Arab nations would not abandon Palestine to be lost, and the Arab armies would soon achieve victory.

"I was moved by the sight of those coming from Palestine, and after that I found myself contacting Muhammad Yusuf Najm and others who were prominent in our political movement, asking that the matter of mobilization be speeded up. I remember saying that as long as the occupation of our country continued, we must leave the university and go participate in the fighting."

While George Habash had been traveling for study between al-Lidd, Yafa, Jerusalem and Beirut, his family had become rich. His father had expanded his business and enlarged his shop, then he opened a shop in Sul al-Dayr, in Yafa, and after that he had moved his family to Yafa. But in the months that preceded 15 May 1948, life in Yafa became difficult for Arabs, so George Habash's father decided to return to al-Lidd.

George Habash could not remain in Beirut while Palestine was in such straits. The semester ended, and he decided that his place must be in Palestine, not in Beirut as his family wanted. When the road through al-Naqurah was closed, he headed for al-Lidd by way of Amman. But in those days, al-Lidd was seeing its last days as an Arab city.

George Habash arrived in al-Lidd for his last visit there, and found himself in a dilemma. He was not trained, but he felt that it was his duty to fight with those who were fighting. However, his older brother got him out of his dilemma, when he told him that if he could not fight because he was untrained, he should work in the al-Lidd hospital, which was in need of medical services, and so it was.

"On the day following the fall of al-Lidd, Israeli forces entered the hospital where I was assisting the doctors in saving and aiding the wounded in the hope that the battle would continue."

I was upset by the sight of the Israeli officer and soldiers, and the feeling struck me that if only I had a pistol with me, I would empty its bullets into their heads. That was not my feeling alone, but the feeling of all the people. At that time, my mother's aunt came to the hospital, and urgently asked that I come with her, saying that my family wanted me for an urgent matter, and she insisted. Then I knew that my elder sister, who at that time had been sick, had died. I found myself moving down the street, which was empty except for Israeli forces and some bodies here and there, some of which had bloated abdomens. When we got to the house, she confirmed that my sister had in fact died, and they buried her in front of the house without the performance of religious rites because of the prevailing situation."

While the mourners were gathered in the Habash family's home, the Israeli soldiers came and demanded, as they had of all the people of al-Lidd, that they leave their homes.

How does George Habash describe this scene that became fixed in his memory?

"Suddenly we found ourselves outside of al-Lidd. Within a short period of time, the number of those who had gathered had come to be in the thousands. It was the month of Ramadan, and it was summer. We walked, and the thousands who had gathered in the mountain region walked. The children and the old men and women began to get tired, then the people began to complain of thirst. The weather was hot and there was no water, and the march was long and endless. Because of that, some died along the way of exhaustion and thirst. Many abandoned their children and babies and continued their trek on the basis that fate would open a way to salvation for their babies and children."

"On the morning of the next day, buses and trucks arrived at Na'layn from Ramallah to transport the people. I went with my family to Ramallah, and we spent several days sleeping in the vineyards and olive groves" (p 22).

What is most beautiful in the book is George Habash's Palestinian memories.

"As I speak to you now, the images of al-Lidd and of Yafa and Jerusalem form themselves in my mind. I remember our house in al-Lidd, which consisted of a single room in which we slept. In front of the room was an outdoor stone bench and a small plot of ground. I remember the tall mulberry tree, the almond tree, the rose plantings and the small Arabian jasmine bush in front of the stone bench. I remember the road that we used to walk along to get to elementary school. I remember the town market and the street that led to the market. The images of the shops now appear clearly in my mind, as if I were there now (p 13).

"I remember now with absolute clarity the 2 years which I spent in Yafa as a student, then the 2 other years during which I taught in Yafa. I remember now Yafa and the sea, Yafa and the oranges. The first time I entered Yafa I inhaled the scent of the oranges, which is like no other smell. At this moment it is as if I were inhaling that scent. Yafa lives clearly in my memory. Yafa and the main street, Yafa and the market, Yafa and the principle quarters, Yafa and the foreigner, and Yafa and the border that separated it from Tel Aviv, and the most important one of all is Yafa and the oranges."

These grievous memories are what reveal the explosive materials that formed George Habash.

The young George Habash, a second year medical student at the American University of Beirut, did not surrender nor did he forget, as others surrendered and forgot. From the American University of Beirut he began his journey, which began first of all around some of the Palestinian professors at the university, and then around Dr Constantine Zurayk around whom some of the pan-Arab youth used to gather at that time, and who used to call for appeasement.

George Habash's first nationalistic attempts were many and faltering, from the Salvation Battalions to the Salvation Movement to being convinced of the need of coming up with a new arrangement, to settling on a new undertaking by him and his original comrades: the National Arab Youth (p 34), then to the Arab

Nationalists Movement (p 39). He says that he and his comrades once acted under the name of the Organization to Resist Peace with Israel (p 43).

Dr George Habash describes the Arab Nationalists Movement as the child of the 1948 disaster, and its existence is directly linked to the disaster, and it does not concern itself with the social question because the Arab revolution in the understanding of its founders must pass through two stages: the political stage and the social stage. Therefore, they raised the slogan: Unity, freedom, and revenge for the sake of achieving the political revolution.

They did not want to mix the two stages because they feared losing the masses which might leave them if they tackled the phase of social revolution at the same time.

George Habash gives Fu'ad Matar examples of Arab Nationalists Movement thought at that time, and of their fighting behavior:

"A member of the movement had to ask for permission if he wanted to get married, and there were stories about some comrades being afraid to watch a movie without the leadership's approval of it" (p 51).

In his opinion, the movement had a "Guevarist" nature in view of its personal course of action, or it wanted that, and that was what, in his opinion, distinguished it from other pan-Arab parties that along with it raised the same or similar slogans.

"Palestinian organization with an Arab outlook, with half the basic elements in the founding nucleus Palestinian, and the same ratio held true of the cadres." Thus George Habash describes the Arab Nationalists Movement (p 60). On page 64 he adds that there was a sort of contradiction in the movement's structure, since its rank and file were from the downtrodden classes, while its cadres and basic symbols were from among educated people and students.

He criticizes the movement, during that period, because it did not have clear, theoretical guidelines, or a revolutionary philosophy to guide it, and therefore its development was unprogrammed and unplanned. He says, in what resembles self-criticism as well as criticism of the movement, "I admit that we were, during the first year, a radical, nationalist organization that did not have a comprehensive philosophy that would enable it to take the initiative in deciding some issue or playing an effective role" (p 70).

At the beginning of the sixties, Dr George Habash felt that there were many ideas and points of view within the movement that did not point to unanimity in outlook. A committee, entrusted to Comrade Muhsin Ibrahim, was formed to review the movement's thinking. Most of its members were Lebanese, "on account of Lebanon being the crossroads of intellectual and philosophical conflicts on the one hand, and because our comrades outside of Lebanon were pre-occupied with action pertaining to the struggle."

He says that he himself had at that time presented an assessment of Nasserism that took a resolute stand against its negative aspects. This assessment differed completely from Muhsin Ibrahim's positive assessment of Nasserism.

Muhsin Ibrahim continued to be positive towards Nasserism until some days after the 1967 defeat, since directly following the defeat he wrote articles such as "Indeed Not, 'Abd-al-Nasir Has Not Been Defeated" in the magazine AL-HURRIYAH.

However, after that things moved dramatically. The Arab Nationalists began to be subjected to all sorts of divisions and splits. One of the most noticeable splits was that by Muhsin Ibrahim and his followers, who suddenly changed from fanatical pan-Arabists into Marxists who promoted Marxist thought as a guide for revolutionary action. They began with the Organization of Lebanese Socialists for a while, to jump after that, in a brief moment, to the far left and Marxist extremism, describing the Arab Nationalists Movement whose intellectual vanguard they had been, as "fascist and reactionary" (p 79).

The dramatic course of events was associated with Arab reality itself at that stage. As far as Dr George Habash was concerned, it was no longer a question of parties and intellectual groups as much as it was a question of practical military struggle against Israel. Because he had been, since the days when he had been a young man at the university, one of those who had called for a hard line, he set out to give attention to the question of military organization. The culmination of his efforts was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. However, in this very same military field, there were divisions and splits as there were in the political field as well.

In the last pages of the emotional dialogue between Fu'ad Matar and George Habash, the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine tells the rest of the story: his opinion of Muhsin Ibrahim and his followers and the fact that they represent the opportunistic left or the left in its infancy, "even though some comrades believe that the CIA is what is behind their breaking away;" and his opinion of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, and other matters.

George Habash speaks well of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, "'Abd-al-Nasir was a revolutionary man who did not believe in compromise. Up until now and forever, whenever I happen to mention Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, I remember a dear person who was like a father or older brother to me, or a dear friend, and perhaps therein lies the answer to the emotion many people notice in my voice when Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir is mentioned" (p 111).

He says that despite his many comments about 'Abd-al-Nasir and Nasserism.

He also speaks well of Michel 'Aflaq:

"I had many meetings with Professor Michel 'Aflaq, and I was one of the first ones to meet with him. He used to enjoy our respect and love, and what he said affected us, and we sensed his loyalty to the cause" (p 32).

"Sage of the Revolution" is an enjoyable book. It talks about many things and explains many things. But is it enough to explain much of what comes to the reader's mind as he is reading it?

There are many questions of this sort:

Was it necessary for Dr George Habash to make that great leap, as did those who split from his movement?

Is it true that pan-Arabist thought is reactionary, and that salvation and restoration are contained only in Marxist thought?

Is Marxist philosophy the sole philosophy of struggle to guide action?

This guiding philosophy, and hence the principle, is it in fact necessary for nationalistic action in Third World countries?

Does it really give the hopes that have been hung on it?

And finally: Is Dr George Habash still satisfied, at the present time at least, that Marxist thought was or is the solution?

For our part, we believe that Dr George Habash is a national fighter who had a prominent role in the modern Arab movement, and that his true place is in the ranks of this movement, not in the ranks of any other movement. We believe that the Popular Front, its thought and its practices, are properly described as a pan-Arab movement, not a Marxist movement, and the important thing in our estimation is where it stands on the issues, not slogans or anything else.

If only Dr George Habash would make the desired move that would return him to his true position, and leave rapid leaps to others. The Arab Nationalists Movement was a natural movement, and it would be natural now to have new self-criticism (or a new dialogue?) that would bring matters back to what they should be.

12547
CSO: 4404/391

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

INCOME TAX PROPOSED--Among the measures presented to the Supreme Council of the United Arab Emirates, in connection with increasing state revenues, were the imposition of an income tax for the first time in the history of the UAE and the participation of all the emirates in the federal budget. These proposals were included in the studies conducted to reduce the deficit in the federal budget caused by the drop in oil exports on the one hand and the price of oil on the other. The proposals were presented to a committee consisting of the Council of Ministers and the National Council, which was formed last January at the request of the president. Other necessary measures include paying the bills of contractors and suppliers and conducting a broad and comprehensive survey of the social and economic situation in the country. [Summary] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 15 Jun 85 p 43]

CSO: 4404/419

AFGHANISTAN

USSR WEIGHED DOWN BY FORCE OF ISLAM

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French Apr 85 pp 129-137

[Text] The Afghan tragedy will soon have gone on for 7 years. It is too often forgotten that it began in April 1978, and there is no reason for anticipating an early end, at this point. It is a drama played by several actors. Some of them are well known and perform in plain sight as the two principal protagonists: the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Others perform back stage, such as Pakistan, China, and the United States, and they are really very discreet about it. Only one group is generally forgotten. However, it promises to become a decisive element in the near future: the Muslim peoples of Central Asia.

To obtain a good understanding of the dimensions of the problem, it is necessary to observe that Afghanistan is only a geographic extension of Turkestan and to recall the historical, cultural, ethnic, and religious relationships which unite these two countries. The greatest rulers who reigned in Afghanistan--Mahmud of Ghazni, Emperor Babur, and Husein Bayqara of Herat--were originally from Central Asia. At all times in Afghan history Bukhara and Samarkand were real centers of civilization. With the exception of the indigenous Pashtuns, the people of Afghanistan are composed of the same Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen who live beyond their northern borders and speak the same languages. The Tajiks in particular, whose role in the resistance is growing day by day are divided between Soviet Central Asia (where there are 3 million of them) and Afghanistan (where there are 5 to 6 million). Furthermore, it should be recalled that in the 1920's more than 1 million Turkestanis, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs and Turkmen, fleeing the repression which followed the crushing of the Basmachis by the Soviet armies, found refuge in northern Afghanistan and that their descendants are still there. Thus, the events in Afghanistan could not fail to affect the Turkestanis closely. Let us imagine an act of genocide in Belgium or Switzerland. Could the French remain indifferent to it?

However, the Afghan war goes on endlessly, and the Soviet Army seems unable to obtain a decisive victory, either by force of arms or by diplomacy. The Soviet efforts in Afghanistan have met with unquestioned success in a single sector: propaganda. Since 1980 they have sought to push this war within the Muslim world into oblivion. In effect, with only rare exceptions, the Muslim

countries, with the Arab states in the lead, have not reacted to the Afghan genocide and do not seem to hold the Soviets responsible for the massacre of their fellow Muslims. Moscow's prestige has not been tarnished: the Soviet muftis, after a short pause in 1981 and 1982, have resumed their travels to the Middle East. They are received everywhere with the greatest honor, even in the most conservative states like Jordan or Saudi Arabia. Against all of the evidence and without anyone attempting to contradict them, they boast of the religious liberalism of Moscow and of the good fortune of Soviet Muslims. Their statements, including denunciations of the American and Israeli warmongers, are very well received. They recall tirelessly that the USSR, the best ally of the Muslim world, is also a great Islamic power, with about 50 million of the faithful within its borders.

The Islamic Policy of Moscow: Myths and Realities

By a strange paradox, made possible by the ignorance and the lack of initiative of the Western and of the Muslim world, the aggressively atheist Soviet Union is the only state to apply a true "Islamic policy," which systematically makes use of the religious hierarchy abroad to the maximum advantage of its imperial expansion. The almost total absence of reactions to the Afghan tragedy is one of the consequences of this state of affairs.

The objective of Soviet propaganda also consists of making the Muslim people of Central Asia forget the Afghan war as much as possible. This decision seems to have been made after March 1980, when the hesitant and certainly unexpected behavior of Muslim soldiers in the Soviet occupation army made their immediate recall essential. Since then the Soviet authorities have been particularly careful to isolate Soviet Muslims from the rest of the world, and especially from Afghanistan. To judge from the press and radio broadcasts coming from Central Asia, we may have the impression that everything is going well and that nothing disagreeable is happening South of the Amu Darya. At most they deplore annoying, but not very serious agitation on the part of a few groups of terrorists--in the pay of Chinese, American, and Pakistani imperialists--who vainly seek to hold back the advent of the socialist regime! At times--and particularly in 1984--these same bandits have tried to cross the border of the USSR. However, thanks "to the vigilance of our vaillant frontier guards," they were soon wiped out. If the Muslims of Central Asia were to be satisfied solely with official information reports, they would--of all Soviet citizens--be the poorest informed about what is happening at their very doorstep. However, the "agitprop" [propaganda agents], who are so efficient when foreign affairs are concerned, are unable to protect the territories inhabited by Soviet Muslims from foreign "contamination." In fact, since 1980 the iron curtain in this part of the country is only an illusion. The indigenous people can obtain specific and detailed information on foreign developments at the very moment when Marxism-Leninism, an old and ossified ideology, no longer seems able to satisfy either the intellectuals or the masses. Today such news reports, all of them potentially subversive, penetrate the USSR through various channels, some of which were created by the Soviets themselves.

The first such information network is that of the Soviet Muslims themselves, including in particular the Caucasians, Tajiks, and Tatars, who are still very numerous in Afghanistan. Several thousands of them probably hold subordinate positions, where they keep in contact with the Afghan people as chauffeurs, interpreters, and workers in labor battalions. Their sympathies are well known. For the most part, they feel solidarity with the Mujahidin. News reports also circulate among the Afghans who live in the USSR (nearly 25,000 in 1985). These people are students, members of the Soviet youth organization [Komsomol], and military officers spread out across the country. They are far from all being communists or admirers of the Russians. The third channel is provided by foreign Muslims--students, researchers, engineers or simple tourists, among whom the enthusiastic supporters of Soviet communism only constitute a minority. They are faced by a majority of Muslim believers who more or less support the cause of the Mujahidins.

Finally, published or spoken foreign propaganda broadcast by radio comes into the Soviet Union from all sides: from China (Radio Urumchi), Iran (Radio Gorgan and Radio Tabriz), and Europe (Radio Liberty, Deutschewelle, and the BBC), and from the Middle East (the radio services of the countries of the Persian Gulf). For a number of years, in addition to radio broadcasts, all of the republics of the Soviet Union, including those of the Caucasus and of Central Asia, have been invaded by recorded tape cassettes. These have either been imported clandestinely and soon copied by the dozens or hundreds or--and this is a new development--recorded in the USSR itself. Certainly, these cassettes have very diversified contents: pop music and pornographic songs of foreign inspiration. However, they also contain, in particular, if we are to believe Soviet reports, Muslim "clerical propaganda" and religious hymns and sermons. The newspaper TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA from Ashkhabad (Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic) recently revealed that "religious fanatics, obscurantists, and agents in the pay of foreigners" had succeeded in infiltrating themselves into the network of music recording studios of the local Ministry of Culture and there had produced hundreds of copies of cassettes of religious hymns, instead of "constructive" songs for the workers and the collectives, as provided for in the plan. An article published in the 14 October 1984 issue of this newspaper is headlined, "A Stinking Product." It shows a grossness of tone which recalls the worst days of the Stalin era and reveals the concern of the Soviet authorities over the increasingly numerous examples of religious revival. In the article Islam is compared, among other charming things, to "something rotten which is destined to be thrown onto the 'pomoiki' [rubbish] heap of history."

Thus, the cassettes which contributed so much to the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran are entering in force into the Muslim republics of the USSR, closely followed by video cassettes. It is too soon to hazard a guess as to the long term consequences of this new phenomenon in the cultural history of Soviet Islam. However, one thing is certain: the famous iron curtain, which was so effective only recently, has become a true "sieve." One of the consequences of this development is the new perception that Soviet

Muslims have of the unity of the Muslim world and the awareness of their cultural, ethnic, and spiritual affinity with their fellow Muslims beyond the frontiers (who amount to more than 800 million people, whereas their Russian "Big Brothers" only amount to 150 million people). This resumption of contact, after nearly a century of isolation, is a dramatic discovery: "In Afghanistan the Russians are killing our brothers by race and religion!"

The psychological consequences of the Afghan war have made themselves felt more or less everywhere in the Soviet Union, as the numerous "Samizdat" publications show. For example, we might mention issue number 7 of the new Ukrainian "Samizdat," "LA CHRONIQUE DE L'EGLISE CATHOLIQUE D'UKRAINE" [The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in the Ukraine, which was published in the summer of 1984, but which has only recently reached the West. This document mentions the 570 soldiers from the three districts of the Western Ukraine (Sub-Carpathian Russia) who were seriously wounded or killed in Afghanistan. In the same way the clandestine Lithuanian publication AUSHRA has regularly published reports on the growing number of young Balts killed in Afghanistan. The general message of these clandestine publications is clear and hardly varies at all: "The war carried on by the Russians in Afghanistan in fact makes use of Ukrainians and Balts, who serve as 'cannon fodder'!"

There is no doubt, and all of the evidence is in agreement on this point, that the Afghan war, far from strengthening the cohesion of the Soviet peoples, threatens to worsen already tense relations between the Russians and their "younger brothers" as it drags on.

The Muslim Republics of the USSR: Spiritual Renewal

The impact of the Afghan war and of the Iranian Islamic revolution on the Muslim republics is different, but potentially even more dangerous. It may be summarized as follows:

(1) The Russian "Big Brother" is not invincible. The Afghans and the Iranians are there to prove this every day. Resistance is therefore possible. For the Muslims of the USSR, heirs of a great culture and of a glorious history, conquered by the Russians hardly a century ago, the struggle of the Mujahidins is an example and a promise at the same time. While we keep the proportions in mind, we may say that their struggle could have a psychological effect comparable to that which the defeat of the Russian armies in Manchuria had in 1905 on the growth of the national movement of the Poles and the Finns.

(2) Islam, which Soviet agitprop personnel for the past 70 years have been at pains to depict as a decadent relic of a past gone by, destined to take its place on the famous "ash heap of history," has turned out to be popular--more dynamic and better able to mobilize the people than Marxism-Leninism in the Russian style.

In the Middle East fundamentalist Islam represents the revolutionary force, whereas communism belongs to the past and to a conservative outlook. Islam is demonstrating that it has a better system of organization, based on the discipline and the devotion of the faithful. In Afghanistan the two communist parties, the Babrak and the Karmal, would not survive for 24 hours after the departure of Soviet troops. In Iran the ayatollahs have succeeded without any difficulty in liquidating the Tudeh Party, the oldest communist party in the Muslim world.

Certainly, the events in Iran and Afghanistan, even when they are known to the Muslim peoples of the USSR, have not created a new situation either in Central Asia or in the Caucasus. However, they may serve as a catalyst. They are accelerating a development which had already begun 20 years ago, after the fall of Khrushchev. They are making this development more dramatic and more dangerous for the stability for the Soviet empire. In fact, these events have had a dual impact.

On the one hand, we note a new interest among the younger generation of Turkestani and Caucasian intellectuals in Islam considered as a coherent entity--religion, way of life, and culture. A foreign Muslim returning to Central Asia in December 1984, after an absence of 4 years, was struck to see among the young, indigenous people a real infatuation with Sufism and, more generally, with the most orthodox spiritual tradition of Islam. In fact, at the time of his previous visit, he had only observed among the young people of the same age a vague attraction for an abstract spirituality, a mixture of Buddhism and of yoga.

The spiritual renewal and the return to national sources of culture explain the paradoxical and violent anti-Islamic propaganda campaign unleashed in all of the Muslim republics of the USSR. Until 1980 the Muslim religion, by comparison with Christianity and Judaism, had enjoyed a relatively privileged status. Now, in that same year 24 publications (books and pamphlets) containing anti-Islamic propaganda were published in the USSR. This figure has continued to increase since then (37 publications in 1982 and 72 in 1983). The tone of this anti-religious literature has also changed. Today it is no longer a question of academic polemics but, more brutally, as during the anti-religious campaigns of the 1930's, of the total incompatibility between Marxism and Islam. Therefore, stress is placed on the need to see Islam disappear once and for all in all territories where "advanced Socialism" has triumphed.

On the other hand a passionate interest has appeared in the Islamic countries on the other side of the Soviet frontiers, among which the Mujahidins of Afghanistan and Turkey have a preferred place. As a corollary there is the almost official appearance of fundamentalist and pan-Islamic currents of opinion which are the expression of a form of solidarity with the external Muslim world. For thanks to abundant evidence we have proof that it is fundamentalist Islam--that of the Iranian ayatollahs, the Afghan Mujahidins, and the Arab Ikhwan al-Muslinin--which interests the younger generation of

Muslim intellectuals, and not the "Islamic Socialism" of Qadhafi or of the Syrian Ba'th (and still less the Marxism of Kabul or of South Yemen!).

The discovery of Islam beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union ("The Afghans, the Iranians, or the Turks are closer to us than the Russians.") explains, in part, the new campaign of linguistic and cultural Russification undertaken by the authorities in 1983. As was the case during the time of Stalin, this now involves making Russian the sole official language of the elite groups. Among the Muslim intellectuals this action has already aroused a nationalistic reaction aimed at protecting themselves from cultural assimilation. This is all the more so, since the Soviet authorities are also attempting--up to now without any great success--to mix the people through the transfer of Muslims to northern Russia and to Siberia.

What's to Be Done?

In the USSR the leaders, like Lenin during the revolution, should be asking themselves, "What's to Be Done?" (chto delat'?), in order to weaken the destructive effects of the Afghan war. In theory their field for maneuver is still large, and many solutions are open to them.

The simplest thing to do would consist in ending the Afghan war by an unquestioned and definitive victory. However, unless there is an unheard of escalation in its war effort, the Soviet Army appears farther than ever from this objective. A compromise implying an arrangement and, inevitably, concessions from the Soviet side is unthinkable, because it would be perceived by the Muslims of the USSR as the first defeat of the "Elder Brother." The political consequences of such an interpretation would be incalculable. A total or partial annexation of Afghanistan hardly seems possible, although the indigenous elites of Central Asia do not necessarily appear hostile to such a move. It is difficult for us to see how the Soviet leaders could agree to add to their 50 million, badly assimilated Muslims about 15 million turbulent and nationalist Afghans.

There still remains a political solution, of which a great deal has been made in the West, which would consist in "Sovietizing" the youth of Afghanistan by subjecting it to intensive indoctrination in the schools and the universities of the USSR. In this way the Soviets would bet on the future, hoping that time would be working for them. We are beginning to know this process well, thanks to the testimony of many young Afghans who have passed through the Soviet universities (testimony which has been faithfully and objectively reproduced in the bulletin of the Afghan Information Centre in Peshawar, published by Professor Sayd Majrooh). Certainly, it is too soon to draw any conclusions about this enormous effort (at least 25,000 Afghans are to be found at any given time in the Soviet Union). However, as of this point two remarks should be made.

First of all, ideological indoctrination is a part of the bureaucratic routine, in which the leaders themselves no longer believe. It carries within it the germs of its own ineffectiveness. An Afghan medical student at the University of Tashkent was heard to say: "They don't ask you to believe or not to believe in Marxism-Leninism. It is enough to listen to them."

Secondly, after 68 years of effort, the Soviets have not succeeded in creating a Muslim "Soviet Man" in Central Asia. Can they hope to succeed satisfactorily in doing this with individualistic Afghans, resistant by nature to any indoctrination, particularly if this is imposed by foreigners?

A second solution would consist of isolating Central Asia from the external Muslim world by lowering a new iron curtain. This is an operation which is not very likely to succeed because of its technical and political difficulties. It would be necessary to prohibit entry into Soviet territory by foreign Muslims, and not only Afghans. This is not impossible in theory, but it would be equivalent to going back 40 years, to the Stalin era. Since that time the audio and video cassettes have emerged. There are foreign radio broadcasts, fundamentalist tendencies are to be found almost everywhere in the Muslim world, the hostility of China which is also trying to use the Islamic card (but against the USSR, of course), and the Islamic revolution in Iran. How can you make an abstraction out of this?

A third and more radical solution would be to begin again and finally to succeed in the "Sovietization" of the Muslim peoples of the USSR, returning to the strategy which was followed by the first Muslim communists in the 1920's and which Stalin abandoned and condemned, beginning in 1928. Among other major changes, this would imply the establishment of a real status of equality between Russians and Muslims. It is not for us to discuss the prospects for such a move, but isn't it too late for that?

Whatever the case and supposing that the war in Afghanistan is not near its end, the Soviets are going to enter a period of growing difficulties in their relations with their Muslims. This does not necessarily signify that they will be more conciliatory toward the external world, as some people think a little too easily in the West.

FOOTNOTE

1. Published in Ukrainian in Rome, as a supplement to issue number 12 of VISTI Z RYMU, p 13.

5170
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AFGHANISTAN

SOVIETS REPORTEDLY SUFFER HEAVY LOSSES IN PANJSHIR

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 11 Jul 85 p 12

[Text] ISLAMABAD, Wed.--The communist army in Afghanistan appears to be suffering heavy losses from death, desertion and capture in a Mujahidin offensive in the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul, according to Western diplomats here.

Babruk Karmal's army, now at less than half its pre-war strength of 80,000, is reported to have lost one general and large numbers of soldiers to Mujahidin fire. Hundreds more have deserted or been captured since fighting began in early June, the diplomats said, quoting reports from Kabul.

Special Interior Ministry security troops and men who previously guarded foreign embassies in Kabul have been sent in to fill the ranks of the army, which lost one of its five main bases in the valley to the resistance on June 15, they added.

Coordinated

Reports from the Panjshir speak of about 300 communist soldiers killed since the Muslim fighters launched coordinated attacks on five large military posts set up after Soviet troops took half the valley in a large offensive in April 1984.

Soviet troops pulled out of the posts last September, leaving their Afghan defenders in an increasingly vulnerable position as mujahids under the celebrated Pansher commander Ahmad Shah Masood built up their weapons supplies and planned new attacks.

Reports say attacks on the posts and other installations have killed about 300 of Karmal's men, including Brigadier-General Ahmaduddin, who died when mujahids took over the isolated post at Puzhghur on June 15.

Masood's Jamiat-i-Islami party said it captured 460 soldiers and officers in Puzhghur.

The diplomats said mujahids were also said to have captured two other communist generals in late June at Dan-i-Darra, near the town of Rokha in the lower half of the valley.

Kabul sources also report that death and desertion have reduced the army's crack 444th Commando Brigade to 20 per cent of its normal fighting strength. Other reports said the army's 8th Division had lost more than 1,000 men the same way.

CSO: 4600/569

AFGHANISTAN

MUJAHIDIN SAID TO STEP UP PANJSHIR FIGHTING

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 17 Jul 85 p 15

[Text] ISLAMABAD, Tues.--Mujahidin attacks on communist military posts in the Panjshir Valley have developed into a major offensive inflicting heavy losses on Kabul's army, Western diplomats said today.

The Muslim fighters held off Soviet commandos trying to push them out of the Puzhghur military post which they captured last month and had forced communist troops further down the valley, the diplomats said.

Reports reaching Kabul said most of Kabul's 400 soldiers sent to retake the post were killed or had surrendered and several hundred reinforcements were killed, wounded or captured, they said.

The diplomats said they thought the Soviet Army, which took the valley floor in an all-out offensive in April 1984, would probably launch another assault to re-establish its slipping control over the main villages in the Panjshir.

"We doubt the generals of the Soviet 40th Army will be able to let the situation in Panjshir deteriorate much further without some response," one diplomat said.

The fighting, which Panjshir resistance commander Ahmad Shah Masood initiated in early June, concentrated on Puzhghur, the last of five army outposts set up by Soviet forces after their offensive.

By early July, the mujahids had held off Soviet commandos landing by helicopter on the mountaintops above Puzhghur and had pushed Soviet and Kabul regime forces several miles west to the next post at Bazarak.

A 400-man army column ordered by Kabul to retake Puzhghur collapsed from death and defections, the diplomats said, and many of the 1,000 troops sent in to reinforce them were either killed or captured in an ambush as they advanced.

The envoys said heavy helicopter bombing was hampering resistance movements during daytime but the fighters were still able to rocket fortify positions successfully at night.

Masood appears to have received fresh shipments of anti-tank rockets and a small number of anti-aircraft missiles despite intensified Soviet efforts to block supply routes from Pakistan, they said.

Panjshir mujahids have also resumed attacks on convoys on the Salang Highway, the main road between Kabul and the Soviet Union passing just west of the mouth of the valley.

CSO: 4600/568

AFGHANISTAN

GENERAL KILLED, 460 ARMY PERSONNEL REPORTEDLY TAKEN PRISONER

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 30 Jun 85 p 15

[Article by Tom Heneghan]

[Text] ISLAMABAD, Sun.--The killing of a key Afghan general and capture of a large military post in the Panjsher Valley north of Kabul resulted from a major resistance intelligence coup, according to Afghan exiles in Pakistan.

Resistance fighters killed Brig-Gen Ahmaduddin, Chief of Staff of the Afghan Army's First Corps in Kabul, on June 15 with a minimal loss of blood despite the fact the post he was inspecting had more than 450 men to defend it, the exiles said.

The resistance Jamiat-i-Islami Party, whose Panjsher commander Ahmad Shah Masood captured the post at Puzhgur, halfway up the valley, said 110 Afghan Army officers and 350 soldiers were taken prisoner after only one night of fighting.

"Masood didn't explain how he did it, but he must have infiltrated the post and persuaded enough officers not to fight when the attack came," said a Jamiat member based in Peshawar. "Probably only the general and a few loyal officers actually fought."

State-run Radio Kabul seemed to back up this interpretation when it announced the general's death on Friday night, saying Ahmaduddin "bravely fought up to the last moment of his life" but not mentioning any other Government casualties or acts of heroism.

Ahmaduddin was leading a high-level delegation to see if Puzhgur needed to be reinforced after nine smaller posts around it fell to the resistance.

This success for Masood's intelligence network came as a counterweight to the increasingly sophisticated use of informants and spies by Soviet and Afghan troops.

It also boosted the morale of the "mujahidin" (Islamic warriors), whom the Russians caught by surprise in late May during a large offensive in the Kunar Valley in eastern Afghanistan. Many resistance fighters were spending the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan in Pakistan.

The Puzhgur post, the last in a chain of five large bases set up by Soviet troops after they overran much of the Panjsher in April 1984, was a ripe target for resistance infiltration, the exiles said.

Soviet troops pulled out last September, leaving about 500 Afghan soldiers to man the valley's most exposed post which at times could only be resupplied by helicopter.

The unusually high ratio of officers to soldiers hints at morale problems among the troops, many of whom would have been young men pressed into service and liable to desert or defect to the resistance if left unguarded by more loyal officers, the exiles said.

The low number of reported deaths--Masood's letter spoke only of two while fragmentary Western diplomatic reports last week mentioned several killed--appeared to indicate most of the post's defenders did not fight.

Masood has long been known for his tight organization and information network that helped thwart three assassination plots against him prior to the Soviet offensive last year.

The Communists more vigorous intelligence efforts began to pay off last December when Zabihullah Khan, the Jamiat commander for the northern region around Mazar-i-Sharif, was killed by a land mine planted along one of his routes to his headquarters.

Heliborne commandos tracked down and killed several local resistance leaders in eastern Afghanistan last winter with a speed and precision only detailed intelligence of their movements could have allowed.

Maulvi Shafiullah, a well-known commander in the Koh-i-Safi area northeast of Kabul, was killed in a precision artillery attack on one of his hideouts in April.

CSO: 4600/570

IRAN

VELAYATI DISCUSSES INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TERRORISM, GULF WAR

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 20 Jul 85 pp 16, 14

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr 'Ali Akbar Velayati by ETTELA'AT; date and place not specified]

[Text] Political service. An interview with the reporter for the political service of ETTELA'AT, Dr 'Ali Akbar Velayati, the minister of foreign affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, explained the procedure for the implementation of the general principle of "neither East nor West" in the foreign policy of the country, the basis of the establishment of relations with various countries, the factors which prevent or expedite actions involving the policy of neither East nor West, the efforts of global oppression to isolate the Islamic Republic in the world, the situation with regard to the relations between Iran and Europe, the Eastern bloc and the Third World, Iran's relations with France and the Soviet Union, issues regarding international terrorism, and the Iran-Iraq war. The details of this interview follow.

ETTELA'AT: Mr Minister, the guiding principle for the Islamic Republic of Iran in foreign relations is the slogan of "neither East nor West." There are various interpretations in explaining the practical application of this slogan by the political circles and the officials of the foreign policies of the country.

Today, Islamic Iran is faced with two problems in regards to domestic issues and what is occurring in the world.

On the one hand, in the short term, many political, economic and social (domestic and foreign) issues have become an obstacle in the course of the imposition of this policy.

On the other hand, the constant conspiracies of global oppression, especially the United States, are evident against political and economic independence and, on the whole, the rule of neither East nor West over the foreign policy of the country.

To what extent have we achieved, in reality and in practice, this vital and pivotal slogan of the Islamic revolution?

Minister of Foreign Affairs: The most important gain of the Islamic revolution of Iran in the international arena is political independence and, as a result, the economic, cultural and other forms of independence which our nation will attain.

In our time, considering that dependence is in fact interpreted in terms of the Eastern or Western camps, in order to explain our independence seeking it is said that we follow the slogan of neither East nor West. Today, the two superpowers have divided the world between them. With this slogan, we want to say that we will not submit to this unjust division and we believe that the countries of the world, particularly the Third World and Islamic countries, must be truly independent. As long as countries are not independent in the true sense of the word, there is no possibility for change in our world. Hence, our people supported the slogan of neither East nor West even before the revolution. In fact, it was their essential demand. Before the victory of the Islamic revolution, the people determined the foreign policy direction of the country. They spoke in their slogans of wanting a system which is dependent on neither the East nor the West, but one which moves independently on the basis of Islam. But we must be careful that in interpreting this slogan we do not commit errors. Some individuals do commit errors. For example, when someone from the Islamic Republic--whether it is an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or another organization--makes a visit to another country or a delegation from one of the countries visits Iran, depending the camp to which the country which is visited or whose delegation visits Iran belongs, they criticize that, for instance, such an action is contrary to the slogan of neither East nor West. However, the true meaning of the slogan of neither East nor West is [that there should be] domination neither by the East nor the West. The slogan of neither East nor West does not mean that we will have relations with neither the West nor the East, nor with any of the countries that support the West. If we were to expand this meaning even to relations, in practice, we would reach a point of having relations with only three or four countries in the world.

This is not what our nation and those who wrote the Constitution meant. The person who has led the revolution to this point, that is, the imam, has also frequently said that we want to have relations with the rest of the world, making, of course, an exception in regards to a few countries.

Agreements Between the East and the West

Mr Velayati added: Certainly, following this path, that is, the path of independence from the great powers, is not an easy task and we will certainly face numerous problems, as has happened in practice thus far. It rarely happens in the world that the East and the West agree over a very sensitive issue. But you see that the East and the West have come to agreement on numerous occasions against us, a clear example of which is the issue of the imposed war of Iraq on Iran, in which the government of Iraq receives help from both the East and the West. This is not something that anyone denies. The Iraqi Air Force has airplanes made by both the Soviet Union and France. The minigroups who have been engaged in terrorist acts since the beginning of the revolution have been dependent either on the East or on the West, if not on both.

This shows that this policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is not accepted and is not satisfactory for either of the two superpowers. We have no choice but to stand on our own feet, be independent, continue the slogan of neither East nor West, and be steadfast in this slogan. This slogan and policy of ours will be the salvation of the Third World countries. In other words, if we are able to stand on our own feet, in fact, we would open a door to a free political atmosphere in the world for the Third World and allow the countries under domination to take a breath and provide hope for the nations in bondage. The day that we abandon the slogan of neither East nor West, in other words, set aside our demand for true independence in the world, would be the day of our downfall.

Of course, this is a difficult path. But, at the present, it is smoother than it was before the revolution. However, we admit that there is still a long road ahead of us.

Negation of Domination

ETTELA'AT: On what basis are our relations established with various countries of the world at the present time?

Dr Velayati: Another basis of our foreign policy is the negation of any sort of domination. We neither wish to dominate nor do we accept anyone's domination over our country. Therefore, it is the second basis of our foreign policy. Another basis is relations with countries based on mutual respect and equal rights. With whatever country we have relations, those relations must be based on equal rights, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. On the whole, we seek peaceful relations with all nonbelligerent governments and would like to have relations with almost all countries, with the

exception, of course, of specific countries such as Israel, South Africa and the United States.

The determining factors in our foreign policy, except for the countries that were mentioned, differ according to the kind of country [with which we are dealing] and what we have in common. If a country is Islamic (Islamic in the sense that the people of that country are Muslims), it is closer to us than a non-Islamic country. The Third World countries also are closer to us. If a country is our neighbor, all things being equal, we place more priority on relations with that country than with another country which is far away. If we look at the policies of the countries on the international scene, an independence-seeking policy in its true sense would bring the countries closer to us than to countries that have a revolutionary and unprogressive policy [as published].

Political and Economic Needs

ETTELA'AT: Do economic and political needs influence the creation of relations with various countries of the world?

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Certainly, economic, cultural and political needs are determining factors in our foreign relations. However, we will not abandon our principles for them. In other words, if our cultural, scientific and economic relations with a country would mean abandoning the principles of our foreign policy, we will give up such relations. But, they are influential factors which affect our foreign policy decisions.

Factors Impeding the Movement

ETTELA'AT: What are the impeding or expediting factors in the practice of the policy of "neither East nor West"?

Dr Velayati: The kind of political relations we have with other countries differs depending on whether or not such countries intend to create domination in our country. If we take the powerful countries of the world into consideration, the more the smaller countries are dependent on the powerful poles of the world and the further away they are considered to be from us. Therefore, we place vital importance on the principle of the independence of the countries, their being independent of the existing dependencies in the world. It needs no repeating that our close relations with other countries is based on what we have in common with them. The more these common ties, the closer our relations will be, and the fewer they are, the further we will be from them.

Conspiracy to Isolate Iran in the World

ETTELA'AT: With the victory of the Islamic revolution and the appearance of a new power in the world, global oppression, especially the United States, which had been harmed most of all, engaged in the policy of isolating the Islamic Republic in the region and the world, and from then on, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs put its diplomatic efforts into coming out of this isolation. Also, the economic needs and the special conditions in the country required us to eliminate these obstacles as rapidly as possible and engage in normalizing relations, establishing true relations with the world and neutralizing the propaganda of oppression, which are the main obstacles to normalizing relations. To what extent, at the present, has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs been successful in normalizing relations and at the same time preserving our principles?

Dr Velayati: This is quite correct. One of the conspiracies that our enemies on the world scene prepared after the Islamic revolution of Iran was to isolate us.

Fortunately, with the clear-sightedness and alertness of the government and the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran, these conspiracies have been neutralized. At the present time, we have more relations with the outside world (other countries), as a newly founded government, than do many regimes with a longer history in the world. You can see that constantly either Iranian delegations leave for other countries or Iran hosts high-ranking delegations from other countries of the world. The behavior of the authorities of other countries towards the officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran shows that Iran's diplomacy with other countries has been successful. The most important reason for the success of diplomacy is the very strong support of the people for this government. It has become clear to the world that the people of Iran are united in their support of the existing government and regime. Every once in a while an opportunity arises for the people to declare this support, the latest being the march on Qods day, which was very effective in global considerations. Some of the counterrevolutionaries who have sold out their homeland and fled abroad, taking refuge to foreigners, manage propaganda against us with the help of their masters, with numerous radio stations and newspapers at their disposal, publishing their news and misguiding public opinion in other countries. Our movement on the international scene can neutralize these conspiracies, and the movement of the people on various occasions in support of the regime will be very effective in rendering the propaganda of the enemies ineffective.

Therefore, as you pointed out, our enemies want to politically isolate the Islamic Republic of Iran. The regime of the Islamic Republic has tried through alertness, wisdom and perseverance to

have logical and sound relations with the world, and thus far our regime has been successful in this area. We have opened more than 20 new agencies in the world. In other words, there are many more Iranian diplomatic agencies around the world than there were during the previous regime. Also, our relations with about 45 countries have been promoted to the level of ambassador, and there is much more diplomatic traffic between the Islamic Republic and other countries than that of the previous regime.

The variety of countries that have relations with us and the change in the direction of our policy from leaning heavily towards the West (during the previous regime) to leaning towards the Third World is a good sign in achieving the foreign policy objectives after the Islamic revolution.

In any case, we will continue our efforts in this area. Thus far, with God's help, we have been successful in these efforts.

Relations with Europe, the Eastern Bloc and the Third World

ETTELA'AT: What is the situation with regard to relations between Iran and Europe, the Eastern bloc and the Third World at present?

Minister of Foreign Affairs: At the present time, we have good relations with some of the European countries. Our relations with some of them are normal and with some of them, not very pleasant. With the Eastern bloc, we have a relatively good situation. Diplomatic exchanges between ourselves and the Eastern bloc countries have increased compared to prior to the revolution, and our commercial exchanges have expanded as the result of the expansion of political relations.

Concerning the Third World, I must say that the level of our exchanges with the Third World was about 9 percent of our total exchanges. This level has now increased three times. Of the 20 new agencies which we have opened in various countries, 17 are in Third World countries.

France and Clear Policy

ETTELA'AT: At the time of the departure of the previous French attache from Tehran and his meeting with Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani, it was felt that relations between Iran and France would be normalized. The talk of the former French attaches and the reaction of the Iranian authorities to this event strengthened these feelings. However, thus far, the expansion of relations has not been carried out. What is the situation with regard to our relations with France at the present?

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and any other country are bilateral. If France is interested in expanding relations with Iran, we are also interested in good relations. We have also told this to the French. The reporter of LE MONDE came to Iran some time ago and interviewed me. In that interview, I explained the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning political relations between Iran and France in response to the LE MONDE reporter. Our views are clear. Also, Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani expressed similar views in his meeting with the former French attache.

Unfortunately, the government of France has been making one mistake in its evaluation of the Islamic revolution and the regime of the Islamic Republic, which it is still making on a smaller scale. They did not think that this regime would be so rooted and that it would have the deep and conscious support of the people. Hence, in our opinion, there was a great mistake in their calculations regarding relations with Iran. They thought that some of the counterrevolutionary elements who had escaped the wrath of the nation were capable of doing something; but, if they were able to do anything, they would not have fled the country. Unfortunately, the necessary awareness has not yet come to the officials and political authorities of France. In the talks that French officials have had with the officials of the Islamic Republic, they have continuously expressed their wish to improve relations and we have responded affirmatively. However, in action, they have not taken effective steps. It seems that perhaps those who have spoken about good relations with France have not been people of authority. Otherwise, our conditions are very logical and reasonable: repayment of our frozen loans and not helping the counterrevolutionaries--who do not create any problems for us, but this issue in itself does not show good intentions on the part of the French government in relations with us. The basis for good relations is good intentions and understanding. If they want good relations, they should eliminate the contrary signs from the political scene. The third instance concerns France's aid to Iraq. In the course of this war, France has provided significant help. What they did in the past, again, did not indicate good intentions towards the Islamic Republic. Stopping this aid can be another sign of their good intentions. Of course, it cannot be denied that they have taken positive, though limited, steps. But it seems that a specific faction making the decisions for France has no effective role. In any case, if there are problems in relations with France, they were started by France and their continuation is also the responsibility of France. As for us, we have not from the beginning had any desire for cloudy relations, and, as a regime made powerful by the support of the people, we respond to every negative action with a negative action and every positive step with a positive step.

The Soviet Union and Problems in Mutual Relations

ETTELA'AT: One of our important problems in foreign policy is the issue of relations with the Soviet Union.

The Soviets have occasionally offered a friendly hand, but in practice, we see that the actions of that country and their generous aid to our enemy and the regime that has imposed the war on us prove the contrary. At the present, how are the relations with the Soviet Union?

Dr Velayati: Both countries (Iran and the Soviet Union) are making efforts for good neighborly relations. Since the revolution, there have been comings and goings between the two countries and positive steps have been taken by both sides. However, there are some problems to which the Soviets must pay attention. These problems are mostly the negative factors in the course of good relations. One is the uncontrolled aid of the Soviet Union to the government of Iraq in the imposed war which, considering the dependency of the regime of Iraq on global oppression and the lack of a popular base for that government, poses the question for us: "Why has the Soviet Union helped and [why does it continue to] help Iraq?" Furthermore, after the imposed war, this aid is, in fact, considered in a sense a negative action towards us. Another point is the issue of Afghanistan. As a Muslim country and our neighbor, Afghanistan has been invaded by the Soviet Union and this invasion and violation of the territorial integrity of that Islamic country for us as the "Islamic Republic of Iran" cannot be justified. We have frequently said that the basis for solving the problem of Afghanistan is the departure of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Of course, this does not mean that the U.S. agents and the reactionaries should be able to take the place the departure of the Soviet forces. Rather, the government of Afghanistan must be an independent one based on the wishes of the Muslim people of Afghanistan.

Departure of Soviet Experts

Dr Velayati added: Another point that has occurred recently and certainly does not have a positive effect on the relations between the two countries is that the Soviet experts who were working on the projects in Iran have left Iran without any justifiable reason, both from the power plant project and the projects involving the steel mill. For whatever reason, they have left Iran. As far as our people are concerned, such an action is not considered to be friendly.

But on the whole, we intend to expand relations with the Soviet Union as one of our neighbors. This is similar to our decision with regard to our other neighbors, such as Turkey and other

countries on the southern coast of the Persian Gulf. We would like to have such relations with the Soviet Union as well.

This relationship is based on good neighborliness, the expansion of relations on the basis of good neighborliness, and the expansion of relations by preserving mutual respect and rights and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

These are among the principles that we have in mind in our foreign policy.

International Terrorism

ETTELA'AT: Occasionally, the issue of international terrorism becomes the main issue discussed by the propaganda organizations of global oppression and officials controlling it. Recently, Iran, Nicaragua, Libya, North Korea and Cuba have been named as the leaders of this movement. What is your opinion concerning the factors which help create such a viewpoint and the reasons for the perpetuation of such slogans? In other words, what factors make these countries the target of the enemies and inculcate these views in the minds of the people of the world?

Dr Velayati: Propaganda has been one of the weapons used by our enemies against us since the revolution. One of the points that they emphasize in propaganda as a negative factor is the false claim that Iran supports international terrorism.

The powerful in the world intend to continue their domination over the world. They have even established the political culture of the world and interpreted it in accordance with their own interests. Among them is the term terrorism. Terrorism means creating fear and terror, and you see that its leaders are those who seek domination in the world, in many instances even confessing to it. Even some of the U.S. media have revealed that the U.S. government is trying to make use of individuals to kill some revolutionary personalities in some of the countries or employ a number of functionaries in revolutionary countries to fight the legitimate governments of those countries, such as helping the counterrevolutionaries in Nicaragua or giving sanctuary to Iranian counterrevolutionaries.

But they have always used this issue as a weapon against the revolutionary countries and are still doing so. What is certain is that as the Islamic Republic, we must work to explain our views throughout the world and try to negate these accusations. But we must certainly know that considering that the mass media of the world are generally at the disposal of those who intend to expand their domination over the world, they will not make your voice heard, but they will broadcast the voice of your opponents throughout the world.

Therefore, we must always take a general principle into consideration, which is, we have to disregard the accusations of all persons such as the U.S. president, because if they realize that we are bothered by them, they will use them as a weapon against us. Of course, this does not mean that we should not act to enlighten world public opinion in explaining our own views. But certainly such accusations will never end. In other words, you try to neutralize one, and another is carried out against you; you try to neutralize the second, and then there is a third. Which is to say, this propaganda is unlimited and if we spend all of our efforts to neutralize such accusations, we will always have a reactionary position and they will have the initiative in action, whereas we must be present actively on the political and propaganda scene of the world, support our own correct policies, and propagate our just positions.

You see that Islam also greatly values propaganda. Propagation of good deeds, preventing people from doing evil and instructing them to do good are among the important precepts of Islam. Some even consider them more important than other precepts. The issue of propaganda in Islam plays a very valuable role, because, after all, human beings are influenced by propaganda. In short, what I am saying is this:

1. We must not place so much value on the accusations of the disinformation organizations which exist in the world under the name of global mass media to the extent that we are distracted from our main tasks.
2. As far as we can, we must work towards propagating the goals of the Islamic revolution in the world, in other words, engage in explaining and enlightening world public opinion concerning what we say.
3. We must try to take the initiative in affairs and not merely engage in reacting.

World Powers Coming to Their Senses

ETTELA'AT: In Iranian propaganda, it is occasionally said that some of the countries of the region and international agencies must come to their senses and stop supporting Saddam so that the present regime or Iraq is overthrown. What is meant by "coming to their senses" and what must be done?

Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Velayati: Our most important goal in raising this issue is to make the world see the true nature of Saddam's regime. We especially have the countries in the region in mind, so that they realize that this person who, as the leader of the Iraqi government, has invaded our country (Iran), violated international laws and destroyed the security and peace of the

people of the region is a person who cannot be reformed. And there is evidence from the time of the coup d'etat of the Ba'thists in Iraq which, along with his actions, proves this point. We want to show the world and the countries in the region that if this person gains power, he will create unrest in the region once again and create problems for his neighbors. If we want to deal with the war in a fundamental manner, we have no other choice but to uproot this main factor of unrest in the region. This is what we are pursuing politically in the region and on the international scene and we think that we have had positive gains in this area, to some extent.

ETTELA'AT: What are the practical signs of this "coming to their senses?"

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Political efforts, numerous travels to international assemblies and various countries of the region, and contacts with the officials of other countries play a major role in achieving this goal.

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IRAN

MONTAZERI REITERATES LAWFUL ENCOUNTER WITH ACCUSED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 21 Jul 85 p 2

[Text] Qom. Sa'd (Mojber), the director general of protocol of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, met and spoke with Ayatollah Montazeri. In this meeting, Sa'd Mujabbar expressed the greetings of the Muslim nation, Colonel Qadhafi, the leader of Libya, and the high-ranking officials of that country and offered a report on the friendly relations and common positions of the two revolutions of Iran and Libya against imperialism and also the growth of the Islamic movements in the countries under domination and the conspiracies of the United States against the Islamic revolution.

According to this report, Vahid-Dashjerdi, the director of the Red Crescent society of the Islamic Republic of Iran, also presented a report in this meeting concerning the delivery of food and medicine to the fainted Muslims of Africa. Then Ayatollah Montazeri praised the officials of the Red Crescent, prayed for those who have given aid, and said: It is appropriate, now that the Red Crescent has accepted this great service, to also provide assistance to the oppressed Muslims of the Sudan. Our nation will not hesitate to provide for the needs of the oppressed Muslim brothers and sisters anywhere they are.

Directives of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri in Meeting with the Deputy Speaker of the Majlis and Members of the Judicial Committee

According to a report by the CENTRAL NEWS UNIT, members of the judicial committee accompanied by Yazdi, deputy chairman of the judicial committee of the Majlis, also met with Grand Ayatollah Montazeri and discussed in detail the work and programs under study and to be ratified in this committee.

In this meeting, he praised their activities concerning the ratification of the legislative bills and stressed restrictions on the arrest of accused individuals and avoiding the unnecessary arrest of the relatives of an accused person as well as the legal

treatment of the accused by the interrogation and prosecutor general's officials and stressed that implementary and intelligence agents do not have the right to impose any kind of punishment without a court ruling.

Avoiding Excesses and Waste Among the Well-To-Do Strata and Some of the Organizations

Also, in the course of the past several days, the unity caravan of Esfahan, the officials of the war support headquarters of the trade and technical unions of Tehran automobile manufacturers, the officials of the central office for absorbing specialized forces of the central headquarters of the Guards Corps, and various strata of the people met with Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. In this meeting, he praised the self-sacrifice of our beloved people on the fronts and behind the fronts. Pointing out that such self-sacrifice and generosity of the people can only be rewarded by God Almighty, he said: With all this self-sacrifice and giving of extraordinary gifts by the people to the fronts, and despite the fact that a headquarters has been created to direct and coordinate the aid of the people, unfortunately, it is still heard that the people's aid is not distributed in a correct manner, and in many places on the fronts, there is no coordination. Since the headquarters has not been able to implement our goal in the best possible manner, the people with gifts go to the fronts in order to ensure that the gifts are not wasted--for example, in some places there is nothing while in other places resources are accumulated and our combatants are left without them.

He then emphasized: The caravans that go to the fronts to help the beloved combatants must not take ethnic origins and being from the same town, God forbid, into consideration. Rather they should find where the shortages are and send help there, regardless if they are from the same city or not. In conclusion, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri referred to the problem of excesses and waste among some of the well-to-do strata of the people and some of the organizations and said: Supposing that we were not engaged in the imposed war. Even then, such waste and excesses that exist in some places would not be religiously proper, let alone in our present situation, when we are at war. All the well-to-do and other strata of the people and all organizations must pay more attention to this point and steps must be taken not to waste God's gifts.

Meeting of Friday Imams of Several Cities with Grand Ayatollah Montazeri and the Gifts of the People to the Fronts

According to this report, during the past few days, the Friday imams of Zahedan, Tonokabon, and Firuzabad; the new Friday imam of Dorud; Hojjat ol-Eslam Sadri, the representative of the people

of Ilam in the Assembly of Experts; and Nadi, the representative of the people of Najafabad to the Majlis, met with him separately, in which meetings an amount of about 3 million rials in aid to the African famine victims and about 1,700,000 rials for the reconstruction of war-stricken regions, given by the people of Zahedan, and 200,000 rials and some gold and silver by the people of Iranshahr, with the cooperation of the Sunni clerics of that city, as well as 6 million rials from the self-sacrificing employees of Azmayesh factory of Marvdasht by the Islamic society of this factory were presented to Grand Ayatollah Montazeri as aid to the fronts of the imposed war by Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ebadi, the representative of the imam and Friday imam of Zahedan.

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IRAN

KHAMENE'I: ATTRACTING WORLD PUBLIC OPINION ESSENTIAL

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Jul 85 p 3

[Text] KEYHAN political service. The seminar of the ambassadors and attaches of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the American and European countries was opened yesterday with a speech by the president.

First, Dr Velayati, our minister of foreign affairs, in a brief speech, spoke on the goals of the seminar of the ambassadors and attaches of the Islamic Republic of Iran to European and American countries and expressed hope that in the future, we would have positive changes in the foreign relations of the country.

Thus the president spoke in these ceremonies about the future policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and said: Among the important issues that must be given attention is contact with world public opinion. In the beginning of his speech, the president referred to the experience that has been gained in the recent years in regards to foreign policy and which has strengthened the relations of the Islamic Republic of Iran with other countries of the world and called this experience one of the important gains of the revolution.

He added: With these experiences, we are more hopeful for the future of the foreign policy aspects of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The whole of the regime of the Islamic Republic will become familiar with your views, which are effective in shaping the political system of the country.

In a part of his speech in this meeting, the president spoke on certain points concerning the operation of the diplomatic agencies of the Islamic Republic of Iran abroad and said: Among the important points is that we have reached the conclusion from the political events in the world concerning us that our diplomacy has been successful, the mistakes we have made notwithstanding. Of course, these mistakes must not easily be forgotten. But on the whole, it seems that the diplomacy of our

country has been successful in the past four years. Prior to that, the diplomatic operations were essentially different from this period. Our situation is that we have made the world accept several things. Firstly, our slogan is just, and until our slogan is understood, we cannot expect support. Secondly, we have established useful relations in the world, without which we would be less effective. Thirdly, we have followed the policy of open diplomacy, which is one of our other successes. Before it, our agencies were not desirable ones. Among the other successful accomplishments is the maturity and competency of the diplomatic cadres, which has been gained as a result of experience and work. Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i added: In this seminar, all the participating representatives must certainly have something to say and a plan to offer. In the past few years, our successful foreign policy has resulted in the stabilization of the regime of the Islamic Republic in the view of the governments and world policies, despite the activities of the opponents and minigroups. This regime, blessed by the blood of the martyrs, the struggle of the combatants and your work, has gained world recognition. Then, concerning the foreign policy perspective of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the president said: The next step in this area and the future success in whatever form this regime is managed must be thoroughly studied and discussed. The continuation of the work of the past must be based on new goals. This study is the work of a group. Today, we do not merely think about Iran being in a good situation. We have a goal on a world level, and since we are trying to eliminate poverty and oppression, and since we oppose suppression and the changes in the nature of the world movements, we have global aims. We cannot impose these goals alone; we need help. Concerning the necessity for membership in world assemblies, he said: Today, the non-aligned movement has lost its vitality. But the presence of this movement in the world is also an opportunity and its existence is at least effective in raising the issues of the Third World in the meetings of this movement. In the second phase of its foreign policy, the Islamic Republic of Iran should seek new friends and allies. For instance, in the Indian Ocean, we must find countries that have common interests with ours and make an alliance with them. In the area, in terms of resistance against the illegitimate domination of the United States anywhere in the world, we can find friends and allies. We have continental allies in the region with whom we have a relatively common culture and goals. We must try to look for groups. By preserving the values of the Islamic Republic, we must seek new relations and allies for our country. Our purpose in having relations with other countries is not domination, but achieving common goals.

In another part of his speech, concerning attracting public opinion, the president said: Attracting public opinion in the world is an important issue in our foreign policy. As time goes

on, we become more aware of the issue of public opinion. The awareness of our ideas on the part of the people of the world will enable us to move better on the right path. And what is meant by public opinion refers to opinions other than those of the government leaders of the world. On the level of decision making, an article or an issue can be effective in the minds of the officials. We must plan for public opinion.

In conclusion, he said: Another task in the new phase is becoming actively involved in visits and revisits. Such contacts can improve the political and economic situation.

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IRAN

EMIGRE PAPER ATTACKS CLERICS FOR CONTINUATION OF WAR

Paris QIYAM-E IRAN in Persian No 117, 21 Jun 85 pp 1, 3

[Paris QIYAM-E IRAN, biweekly in Persian, publisher Mehra' in]

[Text] While the Iranian nation is spending black days and white nights and is seeing with its own eyes the destruction of everything, the bawling of the ruling clerics is salt on the wounds of the nation.

In the weekly show called Friday prayer, the president and the speaker of the Majlis appear in turn in a reinforced concrete room in the shelter of hundreds of bodyguards and shout that "we will soon put Iraqi soil in a feedbag and level Baghdad to the ground and smack Saddam's ears."

This comes at a time when Iran's people have spent another night in terror.

This comes at a time when the daily and nightly bombings have ruined another section of homes and cities and have seated other families at the funerals of their loved ones.

This comes at a time when the people have headed off to the mountains and deserts and the heavily populated cities of Iran have become cities of Phantoms.

This at a time when the ordinary flow of life in all the cities has been disrupted and ongoing work has been halted. This at a time when due to the disruption of industry and commerce, Iran is quickly moving towards chaos, famine and a thousand other misfortunes.

This at a time when Iranians are becoming aware that the idiotic policies of the clerics' regime have weakened not only the economic and industrial foundation, but the military foundation of the country so that today we are unable to defend our own airspace and tomorrow our land borders will probably be vulnerable in the same fashion.

A wise human does every job for a purpose and if he feels that he is heading in a direction that is distancing himself from his goal he of necessity changes his path. A government which possesses a minimum of awareness, at peace and war, in any case pursues a goal. But the crazies who have lorded over Iran

for 6 years have no definite program and goal in peace or war. In peacetime when everything was prepared so that they could present the nation with tranquility and prosperity, they prepared for war, and in war neither limit nor border nor principle nor law nor benefit or harm do they recognize. As they themselves have said repeatedly, they are not even pursuing victory, but are continuing the war for the sake of the war itself.

When a club falls into the hands of a madman, he does nothing but this. He clubs anyone he meets on his way without discriminating whether he is friend or foe. He shatters everything that he comes upon with the blows of his club, whether it is some antique or an empty bottle. This insanity comes to a halt when they grab the madman and take the club from his hand and chain his hands and feet.

A little while before the brainless leaders of the Islamic republic shouted and threatened whenever they fell into difficulties that they would close the Strait of Hormuz and set the Persian Gulf on fire.

They repeated the threat so often that the United States, on the excuse of protecting the vital interests of the western world and preserving the region's security, stationed its warships in the Persian Gulf, and now even the flight of ducks in the Persian Gulf is under U.S. control.

Now, in fresh difficulty, the clerics are shouting that we will level Baghdad to the ground. The result of this insane bawling is that Iraq's air attacks are directed against Iran's cities because each person gives himself the right to repulse a threat with any device at his disposal.

In reality, the clerical regime has for several uninterrupted months placed Iran in a grave situation from the international standpoint with its obstructionism against various efforts to end the war.

The international figures and delegations which from the beginning of 1982 up to the present have mediated to end the Iran-Iraq war have tried in various languages to make the leaders of the Islamic republic understand several points:

First of all, until the war is stopped no international authority can issue a judgment identifying the aggressor and setting the level of damages.

Secondly, for various reasons neither of the sides in the Iran-Iraq war will achieve military victory.

Thirdly, the continuation of the war will have no benefit except the dissolution of the economic and military force of the two combatants to the benefit of the weapons merchants and the purchasers of cheap oil.

Fourthly, the Iraqi regime will not fall as a result of the war's continuation, and the foundation of an Islamic republic puppet government in Iraq is nothing but an impossible dream.

Mediators have told the leaders of the Islamic republic that if they do not understand these several points, there is no way to break the impasse of the war and achieve a reasonable solution. However, Mr Khomeyni and his aides once again put the cart before the horse and repeat their idiotic conditions.

In the problem of the war the Islamic republic uses the same logic and method of which terrorist operations rely, meaning that they threaten and ask for extortion money. It is obvious that the world, which a half-century before submitted to the extortionist policy of Hitler and saw the result of that, today will not give in to the extortion of Khomeyni, and as a result it is Iran and the Iranian nation which must pay the penalty of this fatuous policy.

Apart from Libya, which is afflicted on its own part with a lunatic the like of Khomeyni, and Syria, which profits from the agitation in the markets to its own ends, today all the world's countries have reached one common conclusion concerning the Iran-Iraq war, and that is that until mad Khomeyni is reined in, the war will not end.

Unfortunately, Khomeyni, like Hitler, has hidden himself in a refuge that is protected by a complete army of mercenaries, and in order to restrain him apparently there is no way other than to bring down the roof and pillars upon him. But this bloodthirsty old man is determined to deliver what remains of the Iranian nation over to death before he goes to hell's infernos, and to completely destroy what remains of Iran.

Those persons who support Khomeyni's insane policy or have a role in the implementation of it are in every sense of the word war criminals, and if they stay alive they will perforce pay the penalty of their and their boss's sins.

For months the Iran-Iraqi war has continued solely to assuage the bloodthirst of the charlatan clerics. Today Iran's people, unitedly, old and young, rich and poor, privileged and un-privileged, or to quote Khomeyni, from dwellers in palaces to dwellers in hovels, have clearly realized that in a war which profits them not at all, they are paying the penalty of the clerical regime's insanity.

The recent wide-spread demonstration against the war is the result of the people's common consciousness of this reality. The demonstration truly terrified the ruling clerics, and to compensate for its effects, they put on the stage after lengthy preparations a "counter-demonstration" show, Jerusalem day: a group of the regime's mercenaries and a group of indigent people, whose throats are under the Komitehs' knife because the Komitehs provide their food rations, were once again dragged into the streets and persuaded to again put on the trite play of "War, war till victory." They took care of the shortage of customers with inherent impudence, and the propaganda trumpeted the news of a demonstration of "several million" of the always-on-the-scene people.

However, other than the sick minds of the cleric Khameneh'i and the cleric Rafsanjani, what weak mind could hear the shout of 'long live hunger' from the throat of the hungry, and the bellow of 'praise sickness' from the mind of a sick man and believe it?

The mullahs' regime with this staging not only failed to fool anyone but supplied to the world a new document of its weakness against the will of the Iranian nation.

The Iranian Nation is at war and is seeking victory. But which war? Which victory?

We know and the clerics themselves know well that today this war and this victory is against the ruling regime until victory.

9597
CSO: 4640/629

IRAN

FOUR MORE KURDISH REBEL LEADERS KILLED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 10 Jul 85 p 2

[Text]

ORUMIYEH, West Azarbaijan Prov., July 9 (IRNA) — Four more leaders of counterrevolutionary Kurds have been killed and several of them have surrendered to government forces over the past several days. This was announced Tuesday by the Hamze Seyyed ul Shohada Headquarters in northwest Iran.

The announcement said that in the continuation of the Ansarullah operations in the mountainous regions of Kurdestan Province, in addition to the killing of one Aliyar, head of the military branch of the outlawed Kurdestan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), which had been reported earlier, four other top leaders of the KDPI and Komeleh group were also killed. The four were listed as:

1 — Kak Abra, also known as Abubakr Saqqez who was in charge of protecting the KDP chief Qassemlou.

2--Mirza Abdullah Mirgholam, deputy to Hiz Mohseni of the KDPI.

3--Abdul Karim Husseini, son of Sheikh Jalal Husseini also known as Baba Sheikh in charge of the military branch of the Khabat group which not long ago separated itself from the KDPI, and

4 — Hashem Bisaran, head of the Showan group of Komeleh.

The announcement added that Abdullah Sureh of the KDPI and Arsalan Ilkhanzadeh of the Komeleh politbureau, along with a number of their followers, gave themselves up to the units belonging to the headquarters expressing their regret for their past mistakes. They are now fighting the rebels alongside the government forces.

CSO: 4600/567

IRAN

BIMONTHLY RELEASE OF IRAQI POWS CONTINUES

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 16 Jul 85 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN, July 15
(IRNA) — Three of the 55 disabled Iraqi PoWs released unilaterally by the Islamic Republic of Iran Monday asked Iranian authorities for political asylum minutes before their scheduled departure from Tehran.

The other 52 PoWs were delivered Monday morning to Turkey's Red Crescent Society for transfer to Iraq.

Every two months a number of Iraqi PoWs will be released unilaterally by the Islamic Republic of Iran, an official of the commission in charge of the Iraqi PoWs' camps told IRNA Monday, adding that the decision had been taken by the commission.

The official said that Iran's humanitarian action in releasing the Iraqi PoWs unilaterally will be carried out through Turkey's Red Crescent Society.

The official said that Iranian authorities, in studies connected to dis-

abled Iraqi PoWs have understood that some of them had had some heart problems or suffered from other diseases before they were forced to come to the war fronts.

The despatching of these groups to the battle fronts where they were taken captive by Iranian combatants, was due to Iraq's shortage of manpower, the official said, adding the Iranian authorities will urge international organizations to put pressure on Saddam to cease his inhumane actions.

The commission official said that this time all repatriated Iraqi PoWs' names have been made public by the Islamic Republic in order to prevent the Iraqi regime, unlike the previous times, from hiding them from their families.

The newly repatriated PoWs expressed their appreciation and thanks for Iran's hospitality and reiterated that during their stay in Iran, their treatment was excellent.

IRAN

MAJLIS APPROVES PENALTIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED BORDER-CROSSING

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Jul 85 p 2

[Excerpts] Another law, read in session two, is a bill to punish those crossing the country's borders without authorization, amend some articles in the Passport, Immigration, and Alien Entry and Residence Law, which was presented and discussed.

Isma'il Shushtari, representing the Judicial Affairs Commission, commented on this bill. He said: This bill, which was referred to this commission for consideration in the second session, was discussed, studied, and approved on 24 and 31 Ordibehesht 1364 [14 and 21 May 1985] in the presence of the Minister of Justice and representatives of the Ministry of the Interior and the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

Item One of the bill was then read and presented. Since there were no proposals, it was put to a vote and approved.

The Bill to Punish those Crossing the Country's Borders without Authorization and Amend some Articles in the Passport, Immigration, and Alien Entry and Residence Law.

Article 1 — Whoever brings another person across the border without authorization or makes provisions for or facilitates the unauthorized crossing of others is in violation of the law and will receive one of the following punishments:

A — If the act of the one giving crossing harms security, if it does not constitute war against God or corruption on the earth, he shall be sentenced to two to ten years in prison.

B — If the person to whom crossing is given is forbidden to leave or enter the country or a smuggler the perpetrator will be sentenced to two to eight years in prison and fined 2,500,000 to 10,000,000 rials.

J — If the person to whom crossing is given is given a sentence or convicted of a crime within the jurisdiction of the First Criminal Court, the perpetrator will be sentenced to two to four years imprisonment.

D — If the person to whom crossing is given is a minor the perpetrator will be sentenced to three to five years imprisonment.

If the perpetrator's act is not mentioned above, the perpetrator will be sentenced to one to three years imprisonment.

Note One – If the one giving crossing is an employee of the government or an affiliated institution and misuses his position in the commission of this act, in addition to the above penalties he will be permanently barred from government service.

Note Two – In addition to the penalties provided, all funds obtained through the act will be dealt with in accordance with Paragraph One Article Five in the Islamic Punishments Law and the Law for Implementation of Article 49 of the Constitution enacted by the Majlis.

Item Two was then presented and the Commission on Councils and Domestic Affairs proposed amendments with regard to allowing entry to unauthorized vehicles and the penalties for doing so.

Musavi Tabrizi and Kamel Kheir-Khah spoke as opponent and advocate of the amendment.

The commission's representative spoke in opposition to the amendment and gave explanations. The Councils Commission amendment was then put to a vote and rejected.

Items Two to Eight of this bill were then presented, voted on separately, and enacted.

Item Two – The law intensifying penalties for those allowing unauthorized persons to cross the borders enacted in 1344 [21 Mar 1965 – 20 March 1966] and its subsequent amendments and laws conflicting with the items and notes above are void.

Item Three – Item 34 of the Passport Law enacted in Esfand of 1351 [20 Mar – 20 Feb 1973] is amended as follows:

Item 34 – Any Iranian who leaves the country without a passport or documents with the authority of a passport will be sentenced to one to two years imprisonment or fined 100,000 to 500,000 rials.

Item Four – Article 35 of the Passport Law enacted in 1351 [21 March 1972 – 20 March 1973] is amended as follows:

Item 35 – Any Iranian who enters or leaves the country at unauthorized points will be imprisoned for two months to a year or fined 100,000 to 500,000 rials.

Item Five – The following phrases are appended to the Passport Law as Article 35 Addendum and Note.

Article 35 Addendum – Any Iranian who leaves the country without a passport or documents with the authority of a passport through an unauthorized border and is apprehended during crossing will be sentenced to one month to a year's imprisonment or fined 50,000 to 300,000 rials. If the perpetrator has a passport or documents with the authority of a passport, he will be sentenced to one to six month's imprisonment or fined 50,000 to 200,000 rials.

Note – Those who deliberately cross the border without authorization following sheep or livestock will be sentenced to the above penalties, and the owner of the sheep or livestock on whose instructions or knowledge the crossing was made will be prohibited from residence along the border for five years.

Item Six – Item 15 of the law pertaining to alien entry and residence in Iran enacted in Ordibehesht 1310 [21 April – 21 May 1931] and its subsequent amendments are amended as follows:

Item 15 – The following persons will be sent to corrections prison for one to three years or fined 500,000 to three million rials, unless their crime is covered by laws with stricter penalties:

- 1 – Whoever forges a passport or residency or entry permit, or knowingly uses such forged documents, or obtains such forged papers for another.
- 2 – Whoever deliberately lies under oath to authorized officials to procure identification or a residency or entry permit, makes untruthful statements, withholds information pertinent to his nationality, or knowingly uses a passport, residency permit, entry permit, or identification papers obtained through these means.
- 3 – Whoever deliberately crosses the Iranian border without the necessary documents and authorization, as well as anyone who enters through unauthorized routes or borders.
- 4 – Whoever uses documents or papers belonging to someone else to establish his nationality or identity, and whoever uses his own or someone else's documents, papers, or identification to establish the nationality or identity of a foreigner.
- 5 – Whoever hides to avoid carrying out an expulsion order issued against him, or who enters Iran without authorization after being expelled.
- 6 – Whoever participates or aides in the perpetration of any of the acts listed above.
- 7 – Whoever commits one of the acts mentioned in items one, two, and four of this item outside the country in order to obtain rights available due to this law or one of the guidelines pertaining to it will be prosecuted and punished on his return if he has not been given final sentencing and punishment outside Iran.

Note Three – The initiation of any of the crimes mentioned in this item will be regarded as commission.

Item Seven – Foreigners who enter Iran with their sheep or livestock, in addition to having their livestock confiscated by the Iranian government, will be imprisoned for five months to a year or fined 30,000 to 80,000 rials, and if there is a treaty between the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the neighbor government, they will be treated in accordance with the treaty.

At 2:10 p.m. the public session of the Majlis adjourned for a recess.

9310
CSO: 4640/669

IRAN

STUDENTS NOT OBSERVING ISLAMIC GUIDELINES TO BE EXPelled

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Jul 85 p 2

[Text] Tonokabon—KEYHAN Correspondent—Beginning with the coming academic year, students who do not observe Islamic guidelines and criteria and who come to the schools with inappropriate clothing, and pictures, posters, books, and publications violating religious law will be warned and given guidance the first time, and commitments will be obtained from their parents. In the event of repetition, they will be expelled and deprived of further study.

This was announced by Seyyed Kazem Akrami, Minister of Education, prior to the sermons at the Tonokabon Friday prayer.

He discussed the importance of education and training from the point of view of Islam and the pure Imams. In another part of his talk, he discussed the responsibility of parents with regard to the education and training of their children. He said: Education and training is the adoption of ethics and proper behavior, good manners, and guiding children to the most important responsibilities of their parents. He also discussed changes in the educational system. He said: We must realize that one of the important pillars of changing the educational system is changing the way people view the outcome of their children and their attitude towards their stature, training, and political, social, and religious leanings. It is necessary to note that our main difficulty with education and training, next to the problem of the educational environment and the shortage of schools, is this very lack of attention by parents to the future of their children. In another part of his talk, he said: A new set of guidelines has recently been issued, according to which beginning with the coming academic year students who come to school without observing Islamic guidelines and criteria, doing such things as wearing inappropriate clothing, carrying pictures, posters, books, and publications in violation of Islamic law, as well as behaving and acting in ways not suitable for the Islamic republic, will be warned and given guidance the first time, and commitments will be obtained from their parents. Afterwards, in the event of non-compliance an order will be issued expelling them and depriving them of further studies.

9310
CSO: 4640/669

IRAN

EYEWITNESS COMMENTS ON COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC STATUS

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 28 Jun 85 pp 2, 7

[Text]

For foreigners, doing business in Iran has been a major headache in recent years. However, Iran realizes that business means cash and that is one commodity which is in very short supply. Hence, the country is making efforts to facilitate business dealings - even though goods and services are being bartered for anything from oil to pistachio nuts. One businessman who has just returned from Iran spoke to **MEMO**. His comments:

• Like most developing countries, Iran badly needs goods and services from the industrialized West; but, like most developing countries, it is also short of hard currency.

"The country's problems have made foreign businessmen very cautious about restoring business links and these problems can be summarized as follows:

- 1) The bloody and expensive war with Iraq, which has been going on now for almost five years and which has deprived the country of many of its financial resources;
- 2) The oil glut that has seriously affected oil producers over the past two years has had an enormous impact on both Iran and Iraq. The numerous air attacks on each other's installations have reduced the flow of oil for much of the time. This and the generally soft oil market have combined to reduce Iranian oil production from a record six million b/d during the Shah's time to less than one million b/d at present. The country's foreign earnings have dropped very substantially.
- 3) The Islamic Revolution has wiped out much of the economic infrastructure which existed before. This has meant the destruction of a body of professional managers, planners and bankers who, until the fall of the Shah, had contributed to the steady growth and stability of the country;

4) The uncertain future has left the country without any real sense of direction, and it is generally accepted in Iran that when Ayatollah Khomeini dies there will be bloody street fighting as various factions try to seize power.

"In fact, just over a month ago, several thousand dissidents were on the streets of Tehran demonstrating against the regime. Inevitably, fighting erupted between these demonstrators and members of Hezbollah (Party of God), which is controlled by the revolutionary committees — semi-autonomous local bodies of extremists. The government has consistently failed to exercise any control over these revolutionary committees and the longer that control is lacking, the greater the possibility of "open public warfare" between their supporters and the generally more moderate public-at-large. The revolutionary committees have even directly criticised the government for being lax in implementing Islamic principles.

"Amid all this, Western businessmen are nevertheless once again beginning to flood into the country to try to do business there. The main reason for this is that businessmen, who until now have followed a policy of "wait and see", accept that if they are to do any business they will have to do it within the present social structures and limitations. Those who did business before the Islamic revolution are trying to adapt to the new realities and they are learning all the new hotel and street names.

"The first thing the foreign businessman faces on arrival is a currency declaration form — and, subsequently, a black market boom which did not exist before. Officially, one US dollar equals 95 rials. On the black market, however, one dollar would fetch 600 rials. This means that a hotel room costs either \$55 or less than \$10 (on the black market) per day — depending on which way you look at it.

"Another of the new realities in Iran is that the revolution has put an end to the use of credit cards, which means that businessmen travelling to the country will be in serious trouble if they do not carry enough hard cash.

"Before concluding any deal, business people have to register details of their companies with the Procurement and Distribution Centre (PDC), which is controlled by the revolutionary elements. A price list must also be handed over to the Centre showing discounts granted on those prices..

"Local agents are banned and foreign companies must deal directly with both the public and private sectors. However, if a company wishes to appoint an agent this should be done very discreetly and certainly it should never be disclosed. Thus, a gentleman's agreement must govern such a deal.

"Even if PDC permission to sell in Iran is granted and a buyer is found, there are still problems to overcome. First, obtaining an import licence, and second, opening a letter of credit — both of which may take anything from six months to one year. And by that time the prices of the goods in question will probably have risen.

"As the hard-cash crisis mounts in Iran, consumer and durable goods are becoming scarce. At Mehrabad Airport, one can see Iranians arriving back home laden with all sorts of things, including electrical appliances.

"To solve this cash problem, the government has had to resort to bartering and a businessman should not be surprised if oil or pistachio nuts are offered as means of payment. In fact, many international companies are accepting this, and some have even established special divisions to handle payment for goods and services in oil — the only "currency" Iran can readily lay its hands on.

"To sum up: a businessman visiting Iran today must expect the unexpected. Flying an Iran Air jumbo jet, one can expect to find a mosque on the upper level. While waiting one's turn to be seen by an Iranian official, one can expect to see a European businesswoman wearing the chador. And during any meeting, one can expect to be suddenly interrupted by the noise of loudspeakers broadcasting the mou'azzen chanting 'Allahu akbar.....' and, there and then, the meeting will stop because, simply, it is the midday prayer.

"Nevertheless, business people are beginning to accept that the new Iran is not going away, not for the time being anyway, and they are adapting accordingly — even if they are being paid pistachio nuts. How the business situation in Iran will now develop is anyone's guess; but the Iranians are beginning to accept one clear new reality: business means cash. It also means more relations with the outside world. *

CSO: 4600/571

IRAN

ENERGY MINISTER VISITS IRRIGATION INSTALLATION SITES

Tehran BURS in Persian 2 Jul 85 p 2

[Text] Mr Ghafuri-Fard, Minister of Power, went to Khuzestan to inspect the Khuzestan Water and Power Organization's installations, and discussed the Gatvand irrigation project and the great Kazerun emergency canal for agriculture and industry, which is being built by workers of the Khuzestan area water and power district, as well as 500 profit-sharing units which have been built for the homes of war-stricken people of this province by the Khuzestan Water and Power Organization in Shushtar. During this inspection, attended by the acting director of the Khuzestan Water and Power Organization and several local officials, several war-stricken people told the Minister of Power about their problems, and Mr Ghafuri-Fard gave orders to the appropriate officials in order to solve these problems.

This report states that the Minister of Power, continuing his inspection, also visited the Dez Dam, and gave the necessary guidance during a meeting of the Khuzestan Water and Power Organization in Shushtar.

According to this report, the Minister of Power also visited the Martyr 'Abbas-Pur Dam, the Masjed-e Soleyman irrigation project, the Karun Four Dam area, and this dam's research office. It is noted that the Karun Four Dam is an electrical power-producing dam. At its base the Martyr 'Abbas-Pur Dam will be built, and the relevant studies are now underway.

9310
CSO: 4640/664

IRAN

OFFICE OF SOCIAL SERVICES ANNOUNCES PROJECTS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 17 Jul 85 p 3

[Text] Dr Abu al-Fazl Gharazi, acting director of the Office of Social Services, gave a press conference in which he answered questions from correspondents on new health care and treatment facilities in the Office of Social Services in several of the country's cities and the redrafting of the social security law.

To begin, he said: This year construction will begin on 19 health care and treatment centers and ten hospitals in the cities of Behshahr, Hamadan, Khorramabad, Tabriz, Alborz industrial village, Arak, Zarrinshahr, Saveh industrial village, the labor section of Esfahan, Urmia, Zanjan, Tehran, and Shahr-e Kord.

He also discussed the drafting of the social security law, which is now being studied in the Council of Ministers. He said: This law was compiled in 170 three- to four-hour sessions, and efforts were made, using 30 years of experience of experts in this field, to observe justice for laborers and managers. Gharazi added: In this study, thought was given to arranging insurance for unemployment, and for rural, professional, and self-employed workers. A separate bill was written for workers such as taxi drivers and physicians. In this draft, it is expected that the social security organization, as the insurer, in cooperation with the Ministry of Health, will supervise the treatment of insured individuals. He called on representatives of the Majlis to consider the independence of the Social Security Organization in enacting this law, and to require this organization to use its capital solely for the welfare of insured individuals.

He added: At the present time this organization spends 600 million tomans monthly on pensioners and 450 million tomans for treatment. It is anticipated that by the year 1370 [21 March 1991 – 20 March 1992], this organization's income will surpass its costs. The organization's experts are now trying to implement programs for putting capital to work, and to strengthen the organization's financial foundation by participating in economic activities.

He added: For example the Social Security Organization has purchased two thousand residential units from the newly-constructed 'Omran industrial village in Tehran (Ekbatan Village), and is making them available to successful applicants on 15-year payment schedules.

Mohammad Baqer-Razavi a public relations and guidance official in the Social Security Organization, also discussed voluntary insurance. He said: If a worker is fired on the orders of a manager, since the manager will pay nothing after his removal for his insurance, the fired worker may report to the branch office of the Social Security Office, where his is listed, and request

voluntary insurance with the payment of the full premium. He said: The advantage of voluntary insurance is that the worker has not severed his connection with the Social Security Organization, and until he finds work again he will be included with those who are employed.

He also discussed the failure on the part of some of the Social Security Organization's contract physicians to honor insurance policies. He said: Since the new insurance treatment plan has just begun to be implemented, many vague points have arisen for a number of physicians. These will be cleared up soon with explanations and guidelines from the organization, and contract physicians will work strictly according to the guidelines.

He added: In the event of direct non-acceptance of insurance policies by physicians, treatment clinics, and all the organization's contract health care and treatment centers, the Ministry of Health will be responsible for investigating such violations.

9310
CSO: 4640/670

IRAN

POSTAL CHIEF DETAILS NEW PROJECTS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Jul 85 p 2

[Text] Seyyed Mostafa Seyyed-Hashemi, Tehran Province Postal Director, gave an exclusive interview to KEYHAN in which he discussed the results of his trip to Japan and South Korea. He answered questions from KEYHAN's correspondent concerning this organization's new plans, mailing money, implementation of the plan to issue motorcycles to mail carriers, and the establishment of post offices at organizations and ministries with large volumes of mail.

He began by discussing the results of his trip to Japan and South Korea. He said: This trip, which was made for the purpose of examining postal services in Japan and South Korea, had fruitful results. During this trip, in evaluating the manner of providing postal services in these two countries, we became aware of the quality of postal service in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In South Korea, despite the fact that its area is 17 times less than that of Iran and it has very good overland transport routes, we saw that some of their letters take 72 hours to reach their destinations, but in Iran, despite the destruction we inherited from the former regime and that we are in a war, in Tehran and 24 other provinces they take 48 to 60 hours. He added: These two countries have a very active system for mailing money, and we hope that extensive measures will be taken in Iran by those responsible in this area to establish, with the completion of planning, of a system for mailing money.

Seyyed Hashemi added: This trip lasted 16 days. We visited postal centers and various communications factories (cable manufacturers, etc.), exchanged views with postal officials in these two countries, and achieved fruitful results. We hope that these relations will become stronger in the future. Concerning the matter of concluding a treaty between the two countries, Seyyed Hashemi said: This trip was purely for the sake of inspection and benefitting from the experiences of these two countries, and no treaty of any kind was signed.

With regard to the system for mailing money, he said: By the end of the current year [20 March 1986] an experimental implementation of the system for mailing money, especially in some of the war areas, will have begun, and, if successful, will be expanded to the rest of the country. Seyyed Hashemi said: In this connection, the Tehran Province postal system can take useful steps to cooperate and create a system for mailing money in the Province of Tehran.

He said: Currency, if insured, has recently begun to be accepted by the three stations at the airport, the train station, and the terminal. If a traveler leaving the country wishes to send the currency he has with him to Tehran or another city, up to 1,000 rials of his currency will be accepted at government exchange rates, if insured, and sent to its destination. He said: We have

no restrictions on the mailing of publications. Of course we provide special envelopes at reasonable prices at central post offices. The use of these envelopes provides a suitable wrapper for publications to protect them from damage.

Concerning this center's future projects, Seyyed Hashemi said: In a new project, all mail between various organizations, institutions, and ministries may soon be deposited in a drop box at the nearest postal area to each organization for delivery by the Tehran Province Post Office.

He said: On the basis of this plan, all letters between institutions, their affiliated organizations, and other companies and ministries will be delivered to their destinations by eight a.m. the next day if deposited by one or two o'clock in the organization's designated drop box. The Director of the Tehran Province Post Office said: A list of addresses and postmasters for 2,000 organizations, companies, and ministries has already been compiled, and in accordance with guidelines to be sent to these 2,000 addresses by the Tehran Post Office, all of these organizations will be informed of the manner of implementation of this plan.

He also said: The Tehran Post Office will have the capability of providing very fast and high-quality postal services. It is better if all institutions, companies, and ministries make use of government postal services instead of those of the competition. If they have problems, the problems will be solved if they contact Public Relations in the Tehran Province Post Office.

He said: On the basis of the new project, special post offices are planned for installation at ministries, companies, and institutions with a high volume of mail. These post offices will provide postal services both to those institutions and the people in that area.

He also said: In the area of establishing a system for mailing money, at the present time we will insure and deliver a maximum of 1,000 tomans. If the amount of money is larger than this, it must be sent in several insured parcels.

He said: All Tehran postal districts except districts 13 and 15, which are part of the main office and which accept consignments weighing a maximum of 30 kilograms, accept consignments weighing a maximum of 20 kilograms.

He discussed the extensive activity between the Tehran Postal Express and the 24 other provinces in the country. He said:

The collection and delivery of express mail is done by special carriers and officials. With their extensive and rapid activity, these people have won the confidence of the people. The income, volume, and quantity of express mail has thus increased more than before, and the quantity of these mailings increases every day. In Tehran province an average of 200,000 letters are delivered daily, including regular and registered mail, and this is in addition to express mail.

Seyyed Hashemi discussed the manner in which motorcycles are to be issued to letter carriers. He said: Under this plan, whose implementation began the first of the month of Tir in the current year [22 June 1985], all motorcycles will become the property of the carrier after a period of time.

He said: Of course the length of the period of time will depend on the type and model of motor. For example, for a propane motor in the city the period is two years; for an 80 to 100 cc chain-driven motor in the city it is three years, or 2.5 years on the outskirts of the city, or two years in a village. For a 125 cc motor in Tehran the period is four years, 3.5 years on the outskirts of the city, or three years in a village.

Continuing his remarks, the Director of the Tehran Post Office said: The implementation of this plan will cause the brother letter carriers to take a greater interest in maintenance and care of their motors, in view of the fact that that they will own them in the future. The organization will pay a monthly sum for maintenance and repair.

In conclusion, he asked for cooperation from the people in protecting letter carrier motorcycles. He asked those in multiple-story private companies, organizations, institutions, and housing structures where the letter carrier must climb to a building's upper floors to deliver letters, leaving his motorcycle at the front door, to install mail boxes in front of the building, thereby preventing wasted time and possible damage to his motorcycle for the letter carrier. He called upon the people to cooperate with the post office by writing addresses carefully on standard envelopes for sale at post offices, not to put valuable or smuggled items in letters, and to use suitable containers for their consignments, because faster postal service can be achieved simply by careful writing of addresses.

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CSO: 4640/670

IRAN

ONE FIFTH OF COUNTRY'S TIRE NEEDS PRODUCED DOMESTICALLY

Tehran BURS in Persian 27 Jun 85 p 8

[Text] With an annual production of 15,000 tons of various kinds of tires and tubes, the Iran Tire Company produces almost 19 percent of all the country's needs.

The acting director of the Iran Tire Factory gave a press conference. He said: After the triumph of the Islamic revolution, this factory's output, which was being managed by foreigners, temporarily stopped. After purchasing 25 percent of the shares of foreigners, Iran Tire Factory began producing tires for passenger cars, agricultural machinery, and road construction. He added: Despite the fact that much of the factory's equipment is old and dilapidated, through the efforts of this factory's toiling laborers and experts, we have been able to raise the production ceiling to 15 thousand tons per year, and we have decided to maintain this level of production.

The acting director of this factory added: In addition to procuring the needs of the government and the military, the Iran Tire Company distributes and sells its products throughout the country with the help of its 355 representatives.

He discussed the quality of this factory's products in comparison with comparable foreign products. He said:

This factory's products are competitive with comparable foreign products, and are generally satisfactory to consumers. In some cases, with new ingredients created in this factory's laboratories, the Iran Tire Company's products are better than their foreign counterparts. He added: At the present time this factory meets almost 19 percent of the country's needs, and with the new plans that have been implemented, there is a possibility of increasing this percentage in the future. He said: By importing machinery needed by the factory and with the help of domestic experts, parts of the factory will be rebuilt and expanded, which, according to plan, will raise the factory's nominal capacity to 23 thousand tons per year.

He discussed the factory's needs for raw materials before and after the Islamic revolution. He said: Previously, 95 percent of the factory's raw materials were imported, but after the triumph of the revolution, through certain measures to replace raw materials, we have been able to decrease this figure 25 percent.

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END